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This thesis attempts to analyze the American Thesis, also the American Creed or the 
American Ideology (the terms as used by Anatol Lieven in America Right or Wrong: An 
Anatomy of American Nationalism) as the United States` national identity. In interaction with 
a set of national myths, the American Thesis constitutes the narrative of US America`s 
identity, the nation`s ‘common sense’ and morality. The thesis begins with the definition of 
the phenomenon of the nation as a political and cultural community, then proceeds to discuss 
the specific contexts from which the narrative image of the US nation emerged. Next, the 
thesis studies the American Creed as the cultural instrument of fostering social cohesion and 
assimilating uncanonical dissent. Finally, the myths of US nationalism are analyzed in the 
context of their narrative structure and affective dynamics which account for the ontological 
and emotive power of the American Thesis.  




Diplomová práce se zaměřuje na analýzu tzv. Americké teze, také Americké krédo nebo 
Americká ideologie (termín, který používá Anatol Lieven v America Right or Wrong: An 
Anatomy of American Nationalism) jako národní identity Spojených států. V interakci se 
souborem národních mýtů Americká Teze představuje příběh (narativ) o americké identitě, 
vyjadřuje ‘zdravý rozum’ a morálku národa. Práce začíná definicí fenoménu národa jako 
politického a kulturního společenství, poté pokračuje diskusí o konkrétních kontextech, z 
kterých vzešel narativní obraz amerického národa. Dále práce analyzuje Americké krédo jako 
kulturní nástroj podpory sociální soudržnosti a asimilace nekanonického nesouhlasu. Nakonec 
diplomová práce probírá mýty amerického nacionalismu v souvislosti s jejich narativní 
strukturou a afektivní dynamikou, které tvoří ontologickou a emotivní sílu Americké teze. 
Klíčová slova: Spojené státy americké, Americký nacionalismus, mýtus, Americké Krédo, 
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… there is no way to give us an understanding of any society […] except through the stock of 
stories which constitute its initial dramatic resources. 
- Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue 
America […] is a place, […] where fact and fiction, myth and reality dance a curious gavotte. 
It is a society born out of its own imaginings. 
 - Christopher Bigsby, “Introduction: What, then, is the American?” 
This thesis attempts to discuss the discursive construction of US America`s national identity. 
Drawing on the works by Liah Greenfeld, Richard Hughes, Anatol Lieven, and Pierre 
Bourdieu, I argue that the American Thesis (or the American Creed / the American Ideology) 
represents the United States` national identity, the nation`s ‘common sense’ and morality (‘the 
good’) which bind US America ideologically, managing dissent and thereby fostering social 
cohesion (pro-social behavior) and commitment to the nation state among the American 
people.  
To support my argument, I will, following the argument by Benedict Anderson, approach the 
US nation as ‘a political imagined community.’ Following the understanding of the nation as 
a community of individuals, I will therefore stress the primacy of the analysis of the human 
factor in the construction of social reality. This will allow me to define the nation as foremost 
a mental construct (indeed, Anderson`s ‘imagined community’). In my understanding, nations 
are imagined for identifiable political reasons and in specific ‘styles’ / manners of imagining. 
Therefore, I will study the nation as foremost a political and cultural community.  
Drawing on John Breuilly`s conception of nationalism as ‘a form of politics’ as well as the 
definition of nationalism as the discourse of the elites, I will thus study the political dimension 
of nation-building from the perspective of the centrality of the issue of power and the active 
existence of power groups in possession of capital (economic, political, symbolic, etc.) which 
these groups seek to preserve and augment (to support this argument, I will address the 
analysis of the colonial elites in North America by Howard Zinn).  
Following Liah Greenfeld`s conception of human society as essentially symbolic and 
meaning-oriented, I will proceed to discuss the cultural dimension of the phenomenon of the 
nation. I will therefore argue that a specific image of social reality is sustained by subjective, 
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meaning-creating symbolic means of culture and materialized / objectivized into empirical 
reality from the minds of the participants in a social order. Adopting Pierre Bourdieu`s notion 
of habitus, I will argue that culture is constitutive of mind, and that, to discuss such social 
phenomena as the nation, it is important that we not only identify the relevant actors in 
possession of power in whose interests the adoption of national identity is attempted, but also 
study the meaningful orientations of these actors, that is, the concepts and ideas that constitute 
their worldview and define their motivations (that ideological repertoire which the actors 
perceive as commonsensical and morally right to profess).  
This understanding of the nation as a political and cultural community corresponds to 
Greenfeld`s division of the process of nation-building into its two most fundamental phases – 
the structural and cultural phase. It is within this framework that I will attempt to study the 
specific contexts from which the US nation emerged. The structural constraints of US 
America`s national beginnings were expressed by the structural (and thus status) 
inconsistencies between the traditional image of social order and the new social reality of the 
day (the Revolutionary moment in the former American colonies). This inconsistency, which 
was structurally manifested as ‘anomie,’ caused an identity crisis in the elite groups and was 
potentially disruptive of the status-quo of power relations which was previously guaranteed 
by the traditional organization of social reality as well as by the traditional identity within this 
status-quo configuration of power. This provided an incentive for the elite groups to unite the 
former colonists into one nation and thus ensure the preservation and augmentation of the 
various sorts of social capital. A national identity was thus in demand.  
The cultural constraints of the emergence of the US nation were manifested in the fact that 
future Americans were already in possession of national identity which was the English 
national identity with its peculiar complex of ideas and values, most fundamental of which 
was the ideal of individual sovereignty / liberty (the equality of rational human beings; the 
individual`s right to exercise power over their lives, be their own master).  As I will argue, 
English nationalism constituted the habitus (the common sense and the ‘good’) of future 
Americans, and, when the colonists perceived that England departed from these canonical 
values and ideals, they declared independence. The peculiar rhetoric, which allowed the 
architects to articulate and legitimize their dissent, became the first expression of the nascent 
nation`s identity.  
Drawing on Anatol Lieven`s terminology, I therefore argue that the US nation`s identity as a 
set of ideas and a symbolic construct is represented by the American Thesis (the American 
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Creed or the American Ideology) which postulates faith in civic liberty, individualism (the 
acknowledgment of the autonomy of the individual conscience), as well as in cultural and 
political egalitarianism. Following Lieven`s line of argument, I will thus demonstrate how the 
American Thesis as US America`s national identity not only articulates, rationalizes and 
legitimizes the discursive construction of the US nation, but also binds the United States` 
national community in a powerful ideological consensus, assimilating various kinds of dissent 
and holding the patchwork of the US nation together.  
Finally, drawing on the analysis by Richard Hughes, I will study the American Creed in the 
context of its interaction with the most fundamental myths of US nationalism / culture which, 
in my argument, account for the astonishing power of the Thesis to manage departures from 
the canonical image of social reality and provide the Creed with its ontological status that it 
has in the minds of most Americans. I will argue that it is the specific narrative organization 
of such mythic constructions that makes the myths of US national culture so believable, 
enduring, and organic to the US American national mind. Following Hughes`s discussion of 
US mythology, I will thus attempt to demonstrate how the narratives of chosenness, 
naturalness (self-evidence) and messianism/millennialism in an intricate interaction with the 
principles of the Thesis create the narrative of the US national identity, simultaneously 













2. The Definition of the Nation 
 
Nations provoke fantasy.  
- Lauren Berlant, The Anatomy of National Fantasy 
According to Berlant, there is a complex interaction of forces that make up a nation. Nations 
link the private and personal to the collective and political in a nexus of meanings and 
explanations, producing the phenomenon of national consciousness. In my understanding, the 
study of the nation in ‘dry’ scientific terms does not provide one with the full picture of the 
phenomenon and does not explicate its force. The nation is not merely about the historical 
process, not merely about structures; nations are in many respects about narratives, images, 
and rituals; they are emotions and feelings, identifications and renunciations, and therefore, as 
Berlant puts it, a “field of force.”1  
The nation is thus in a lot of respects about people, for it is the human being and the human 
mind that ultimately fantasize a nation.  Adopting a constructivist perspective, I argue that 
social reality does not exist independent of human consciousness. Therefore, while studying 
communities and social phenomena such as the nation, I believe it is important to take 
account of foremost the human factor. As Liah Greenfeld writes in her Nationalism: Five 
Roads to Modernity, it is the human factor (the human agency) that constitutes the nucleus of 
social action, combining in itself both culture (idealism) and structure (social structuralism).2 
As Greenfeld notes, “[b]oth ideas and social structures are only operationalized in men.”3 It is 
the individual who first imagines and ultimately objectivizes both culture and structure in 
various transactions with other participants in a social order.4 Greenfeld notes that in case a 
particular image of social order “loses its grip on the minds of a sufficient majority, or of a 
minority with sufficient power to impose it on others, it cannot be sustained and is [thus] 
bound to vanish from the outside world as well.”5  As this citation demonstrates, social reality 
is materialized / objectivized into the lived reality through the agency of human actors, for, as 
Greenfeld asserts, quoting Durkheim, “men […] ‘are the only active elements of society.’”6 
 
1 Lauren Berlant, The Anatomy of National Fantasy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991) 57.  
2 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 1993) 
19-20.  
3 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 19. 
4 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 18. 
5 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 18.  
6 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 19. 
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This approach to the phenomenon of the nation somewhat allows us to reformulate Berlant`s 
remark that ‘nations provoke fantasy’ into a more probing question: Can the nation itself be 
one such fantasy? The thesis therefore invites the reader to attempt to answer this question by 
approaching the nation as foremost a mental construct and social reality as the product of 
human consciousness and its activities. Jerome Bruner, one of the fathers of the cognitive 
revolution in psychology, suggests that we view social reality from the standpoint of the 
philosophy of social constructivism, as he notes: “contrary to common sense there is no 
unique ‘real world’ that preexists and is independent of human mental activity and human 
symbolic language; that what we call the world is a product of some mind whose symbolic 
procedures construct the world.”7 ‘Reality’ is thus “what one stipulates (rather than finds),”8 
and “what we take as the world is itself no more nor less than a stipulation couched in a 
symbol system.”9 The world perceived as given is therefore the product of human thought, 
human imaginings. Reality is not given, but the result of world making. There is no aboriginal 
reality, while to believe otherwise, as Bruner believes, is to fall prey to naïve realism.10 Since 
there is no ‘aboriginal reality,’ what makes ‘reality’ along with its ‘ultimate truths’ and 
‘falsities’ (‘common sense’) is the meanings and imaginings of social actors.  
The work of Benedict Anderson has been among the most influential contributions to the 
consolidation of the constructivist approach in the study of nations. Anderson approaches the 
nation as, indeed, a mental construct, or, as he defines it, ‘an imagined community.’ An 
imagined community, as Anderson argues, is basically any community that functions beyond 
‘face-to-face’ interaction among its members.11 The nation as a community of individuals 
falls under this category as well, and is therefore also imagined. This is not to say that the 
nation necessarily implies something existing only in one`s imagination (not real), rather that 
“the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, 
meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion.”12  The existence of nations is thus due to the act of imagining communion.13 At 
the same time, all nations are imagined as limited (“even the largest of them […] has finite, if 
elastic, boundaries, beyond which lie other nations”), sovereign, and as a community 
 
7 Jerome Bruner, Actual Minds, Possible Worlds (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London: Harvard University Press, 
1986) 95.  
8 Bruner, Actual Minds, 104.  
9 Bruner, Actual Minds, 105.  
10 Bruner, Actual Minds, 65.   
11 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London, 
New York: Vergo, 2006) 6. 
12 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
13 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.  
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(“regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is 
always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship”14). 
In her study of nationalism, Greenfeld similarly draws the reader`s attention to the amount of 
imagination involved in constructing a nation,  as she writes: “[t]he only foundation of 
nationalism as such, the only condition, that is, without which no nationalism is possible, is an 
idea.”15 Nationalism is thus “a style of thought.”16 The particular image of a national 
community “exists as much in the minds of people as in the outside world:”17 social actors 
objectivize this image from their minds into the lived reality in various interactions with one 
another as well as with social institutions which, themselves shaped by the image, as if testify 
to the ‘reality’ of it.18 As Pierre Bourdieu believes, “an exploration of objective structures is at 
one and the same time an exploration of the cognitive structures that agents bring to bear in 
their practical knowledge of the social worlds thus structured.”19 Following the above 
argumentation, I therefore argue that the nation is a mental construct in the sense of its being 
an imagined community as well as in the sense that social reality itself and the knowledge of 
it are somewhat the products of the human mind and human agency.  
To return to Anderson`s understanding of the nation, the scholar, exploring the boundaries of 
imagined communities, argues that such communities are “to be distinguished, not by their 
falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined.”20 I understand this ‘style of 
imagining’ not least in the sense that any national community seems to be sustained by the 
symbolic means of a respective culture which tends to display a liking for some versions of 
that particular community and not for others. Anderson at the same time describes the nation 
as a “political community,”21 and thus adds further dimension to the present discussion of the 
nation: the political dimension which I understand as foremost the dimension of power. 
Therefore, the nation is as imagined as it is related to the field of politics and power, which 
allows me to identify two most important aspects to the phenomenon of the nation: the nation 
as a political and cultural community. This understanding is further supported by Greenfeld`s 
analysis of the process of nation building in which she distinguishes two fundamental phases 
 
14 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 7.  
15 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 3.  
16 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 4.  
17 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 18.  
18 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 18.  
19 Pierre Bourdieu, The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, trans. Lauretta C. Clough 
(Cambridge, Oxford: Polity Press, 1996) 1.  
20 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6. 
21 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 6.  
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in the formation of nationalisms: structural and cultural, “each defined by the factor dominant 
in it.”22 These two phases therefore determine the very nature of the phenomenon.  
 
2.1 The Nation as a Political Community 
 
Such scholars of nationalism as, for example, John Breuilly, approach the phenomenon of the 
nation as foremost “a form of politics.”23  Nationalism, in Breuilly`s understanding, is about 
“seeking or exercising state power and justifying such action with nationalist arguments.”24 
Nationalism is thus related to the issue of power (to the pursuit of power by certain social 
groups), and most importantly to the power to control the state. The key point here that marks 
the difference between a nation and a people is the presence of a political and intellectual 
elite, having the resources and motivated to control and channel the political activism of the 
masses for its own purposes (to gain control of the state) and for the security of its interests. 
Therefore, I might conclude that the issue of power is thus closely related to the discussion of 
elite groups.  
As Greenfeld notes, “nationalism was a potent force already before it became a mass 
phenomenon, simply because it motivated the elites who held the reins of power and 
controlled collective resources.”25 Therefore, I argue that, in the political process, the elites 
play a leading role. In my assessment, the elite is a power group that ensures the very 
existence of a political regime: “persons who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or 
otherwise pivotal organizations and movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly 
and substantially.”26 It is a group that operates in the “field of power” that Bourdieu also calls 
“the field of the dominant class.”27 Although refusing to regard nationalism as exclusively the 
politics of the elites, Breuilly nonetheless agrees that the elites are essential as actors in the 
construction of national identities as well as in organizing and spearheading national revolts.28 
Therefore, in my understanding, the elites set the rules of ‘the national game,’ and, in many 
ways, they do so in accordance with their own particular motivations. The elite groups would 
 
22 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 16.  
23 John Breuilly, Nationalism and the State (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993) 1. 
24 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2.  
25 Greenfeld, 23. 
26 John Higley, Elite Theory in Political Sociology (Montreal: IPSA International Conference, 2008) 3. 
27 Pierre Bourdieu, Habitus and Field: General Sociology, Volume 2, edition est. Patrick Champagne, Julien 
Duval, Franck Poupeau and Marie-Christine Riviere, trans. Peter Collier (Cambridge, Medford: Polity Press, 
2020) 293. 
28 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 2. 
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logically be the principal beneficiaries in case the nationalist project proves successful. How 
so? 
What makes the elites a powerful group is their possession of a particular resource, or, in 
Bourdieu`s terminology, capital: economic, political, and not least cultural or symbolic.29 
Capital, in fact, becomes “a central stake in the struggle for the monopoly on dominant 
positions.”30 This is however not about “the mere possession” of certain capital per se, but 
“the possession of a capital conferring power over capital, meaning over the very structure of 
a field, and therefore, among other fields, over profit rates, and by extension, over all ordinary 
holders of capital.”31 The elite is thus “the dominant class [that] comprises all agents that in 
effect hold the positions of power over capital, meaning over the very functioning of”32 the 
field of power. This understating of the elites` motivations makes me conclude that this class 
must be the most conservative segment of society. Its conservatism resides in the fact that 
these groups seek to extend the status quo of power relations (“to secure power over the 
different powers”33), for it is the existing regime that makes them the upper class of a given 
society. It follows, then, that the elite groups are most interested in the maintenance and the 
continuous reproduction of those social, political, economic, and power relations in which 
they prosper, unless the existing regime puts these relations at risk of disruption. In this case, 
the elite seeks “to transform these [existing] power relations.”34 This paradoxically creates the 
situation when this most conservative segment ends up in the vanguard of social change. 
Following Howard Zinn`s understanding of the American Revolution as in many respects a 
conflict between the elites,35 I therefore dare argue that the Revolutionary moment in the 
British colonies in North America was in fact due to a schism among the power groups 
(between the colonial elites in America and the established elites in the British metropole).  
As I will further argue, the existence of the nation is premised on the idea of a national 
people`s sovereignty, most importantly political sovereignty. In my understanding, by its 
‘illegal’ actions (“a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the 
establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these [sovereign] States”36), the British metropole 
 
29 Bourdieu, The State Nobility, 5. 
30 Bourdieu, The State Nobility, 5.  
31 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Field of Power and the Division of the Labour of Domination,” in Researching Elites 
and Power, ed. Francois Denord, Mikael Palme, Bertrand Reau (Paris: Springer, 2020) 34. 
32 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Field of Power and the Division of the Labour of Domination,” 34. 
33 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Field of Power and the Division of the Labour of Domination,” 34. 
34 Pierre Bourdieu, “The Field of Power and the Division of the Labour of Domination,” 34. 
35 Howard Zinn, A People`s History of the United States (London and New York: Longman, 1980) 83. 




abridged the sovereignty of its people in North America. The colonial elites at the same time 
understood very well that the non-recognition of a people`s sovereignty was synonymous with 
the danger of the revision of all statuses, rights, and relations within the American colonies. 
While change is logically a space of uncertainty, the preservation of the existing regime in 
this case created a depressing certainty, that is, the loss of sovereignty, which was, again, 
synonymous with the loss of power over the very field of power, of the various kinds of 
capital. This, as I see it, was the very reason why the colonial elites in America decided to 
create a nation and part ways with the imperial center; indeed, why they entered the struggle 
to “establish in whose name it is legitimate to dominate.”37 I will attempt to prove this point 
below in the discussion of the historical contexts from which the US American nation 
emerged.  
At this point, I would like to address Greenfeld`s analysis of the structural phase (involving a 
structural change in a social reality) in the formation of nations, for it adds an interesting 
dimension to the discussion. The colonies` declaration of independence, although protecting 
the elites` interests from the English center, changed the social reality (its very structure) in 
yesterday`s British possessions in North America. According to Greenfeld, the transformation 
of social reality into a nationalistic one could not have occurred, had influential actors not 
been “willing, or forced to undergo it.”38  This transformation however created a 
“fundamental inconsistency:” the elites` former identities (provided by the old organization of 
the social structure) were no longer commensurate with the new social reality of the day; and 
this accounted for the crisis of identity of these groups. The elites simply lost their status, 
guaranteed by the colonies` membership in the English nation: there were no longer any 
structures which would legitimize the status-quo power relations. The elites suffered “the 
identity crisis” which was structurally manifested as “anomie” and “took the form of status-
inconsistency.”39 This “inadequacy of the traditional definition, or identity, of the involved 
group” served as “an incentive to search for and, given the availability, adopt a new 
identity.”40 It follows, then, that, to preserve status and power by first mobilizing the masses 
against the oppressive forces and later by nationalizing the former, the elite groups had to 
secure an ideological consensus among the former colonists. The elites sought the masses` 
cooperation, but lacked any easily available knowledge of how to accomplish it, which 
 
37 Bourdieu, Habitus and Field, 293. 
38 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 14. 
39 Grenfeld, Nationalism, 15. 
40 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 16. 
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resulted “in the need for models and blueprints, for an image of order.”41 They therefore 
needed to devise a nation, and thus fill an identity void. As Greenfeld puts it, “[t]he adoption 
of national identity must have been, in one way or another, in the interest of the groups which 
imported it; [s]pecifically, it must have been preceded by the dissatisfaction of these groups 
with the identity they had previously.”42 Rather restrained in viewing nationalism as 
exclusively the politics of the elites, Breuilly nonetheless contends that the loss of expected 
positions suffered by the members of the political and intellectual elites may contribute to 
their liking for nationalist ideology as an ideology able to supply a new identity carrying 
“images of an ideal state and an ideal society”43 in which they will maintain their positions of 
dominance. The fact that the new identity was national indicates the existence of the national 
idea in the architects` minds as well as the acknowledgment of national identity`s “ability to 
solve the crisis.”44 The adoption of one common national identity thus became the most 
optimal solution to the crisis in that particular historical moment. In that context, the creation 
of a nation out of a relatively atomized mob of individuals was the best possible resolution to 
the structural crisis, that is, it could effectively protect the status and particular interests of the 
elite and secure the elite`s power over the state. This, in my opinion, links the issue of identity 
brought up by Greenfeld to the issue of power studied by Breuilly and Bourdieu. The desired 
organization of power relations is ensured by a particular structure of social reality (social 
order) which in turn provides the interested actors with a stable identity. Should a structural 
change occur, there would no longer be any structure to support the validity of the actors` 
identity and their claims to power and status.  
The schism was thereby creating a new social reality which was to be truly national.  As 
Bourdieu notes, “when the dominant class changes, the principle of its domination […] its 
legitimating discourse changes”45 as well. However, what kind of a nation was it to be? In the 
first years of its existence, the US American nation was not a given: it was poorly defined and 
comprised a motely mob of individuals with just as motely sets of conflicting/dissenting 
interests and loyalties. As Greenfel notes, “what was born was not the infant American nation, 
but the embryo.”46 With the English out of the way, the imperial center no longer threatened 
the elites` exercise of power. What now threatened the elites` interests was the lack of unity in 
the nascent American nation. Given my understanding of the elites as the most conservative 
 
41 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 18. 
42 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 14. 
43 Breuilly, Nationalism and the State, 329. 
44 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 14. 
45 Bourdieu, Habitus and Field, 299. 
46 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 422.  
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segment of society, I dare logically conclude that the elites thus fear any kind of turbulence, 
anything that can compromise their power and status. However, I also believe that such social 
turbulence is practically a constant in the social reality of US America, for its very identity is 
built on the idea of individual sovereignty (which I discuss below) which is positively 
reinforced by the cultural ideal of secession. The example of the US nation-building project 
demonstrates that, for the architects of the US American nation, perhaps the greatest obstacle 
to the securement of their interests was the lack of all kinds of unity in the former colonies 
(for example, the existence of multiple ‘local’ identities that of ‘a New Englander,’ or ‘a 
Virginian,’ but not necessarily American47). In “Federalist 10,” James Madison recognizes the 
danger that factionalism – a “common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights 
of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community”48 – pose. He 
also believes, however, that factions (the inequality of people in ‘possessions, opinions, and 
passions’) are ‘endemic’ and inevitable. Therefore, he stresses the importance to control this 
factionalism. In her analysis, Greenfeld supports this argument by writing about “the 
persistent threat of secession” to “the development of national unity.”49 As Greenfeld 
remarks, “[t]he separatist impulse was inherent in the very conception of the Union,”50 and is 
indeed built into the fabric of US American national consciousness.  This cultural ideal, or 
even the organizing principle, produced much of the ‘entropic’ force that was constantly 
endangering the desired ‘unity in diversity.’  
My argument is that, if at first an ideological consensus was needed to convince the masses of 
the necessity to overthrow the unjust British rule, after the independence had been won, an 
ideological consensus in the form of one common national identity was necessary to create a 
stable social space (social reality) in which the elites could exercise their power, augment 
capital, and thus remain in control over ‘the field of power.’ The US American nation had to 
be imagined in such a way as to make it the central object of a collectively binding allegiance. 
According to Wodak, et al., national identity as a discourse is foremost the discourse of the 
elites.51 Discursive acts and practices are “socially constitutive”52 (the issue of power inheres 
in this constitutiveness), for they create particular social conditions, construct, legitimize, and 
 
47 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 409. 
48 James Madison, “The Federalist Number X,” The Federalist, ed. John C. Hamilton (Pheladelphia: J.B. 
Lippincott & Co., 1864) 105.  
49 Greeneld, Nationalism, 431. 
50 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 431. 
51 Ruth Wodak, Rudolf de Cillia, Martin Reisigl and Karin Liebhart, The Discursive Construction of National 
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then maintain and reproduce a particular status quo, or even destroy a status quo as in the 
revolutionary moment in the American colonies.53 Discursive acts and practices “influence 
the formation of groups and serve to establish or conceal relations of power and dominance 
between interactants.”54 The models of identity are thus articulated by the elites and acquired 
by national interactants in various dialogic contexts.  
According to Greenfeld, “[t]he particular image of social order,” which “forms the 
constitutive element of any given society,” is “provided by a culture.”55 This argument places 
“an emphasis on the cultural, subjective, meaning- and model-creating symbolic elements in 
social reality” and invites to take account of “the concepts and ideas in the minds of people,” 
both the active national actors and ordinary national members, which are “necessary for the 
interpretation of any social phenomenon” such as, in this case, the nation. Indeed, the elite 
groups may be motivated by specific situational constraints to shape, organize, and lead 
nationalist revolts and construct nation identities, yet the question remains: what kind of 
reasoning may guide their actions? Therefore, Greenfeld deems it important to take into 
consideration the interested actors` reasoning (their ideas, volitions, motivations), and how 
such “principles of vision”56 make it possible for these actors to manage their specific 
situational constraints.57 This brings us to the discussion of the second aspect of the 
phenomenon of the nation, that is, the conception of the national community as (at its core) a 
cultural community.  
 
2.2 The Nation as a Cultural Community 
 
As Greenfeld remarks, “[s]ocial reality is intrinsically cultural” and “necessarily a symbolic 
reality, created by the subjective meanings and perceptions of social actors.”58 Any given 
social order represents an objectivization of its image from the minds of those who participate 
in this order.59 This specific image of social reality is provided by a community`s respective 
culture. Culture thus provides “models and blueprints”60 of social order which structure social 
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reality and allow an effective cooperation among a community`s members The national 
community is therefore an ‘intrinsically cultural’ community.  
In her research, Greenfeld, in fact, identifies a cultural phase as one of the fundamental phases 
in the formation of nationalisms, as it follows the structural phase in which a structural change 
in a social reality occurs.61 The dominant principle operant in the cultural phase is the 
conceptualization of the national idea in accordance with the relevant actors` particular 
“indigenous traditions”62 of thought and belief. If the structural phase generates specific 
situational constraints, the cultural phase creates its own cultural constraints. As Greenfeld 
notes, “[c]ultural and structural constraints always interact,”63 while this interaction wields 
considerable influence on the interested agents, producing specific states of minds in these 
individuals in power.64 These states of mind undergo rationalization (conceptualization) by 
the actors and, “if rationalized creatively, may result in new interpretations of reality, [and 
thus] affect structural conditions.”65  As Greenfeld remarks, “[s]ocial action is determined 
chiefly by the motivations of the relevant actors,” while these very motivations are in turn 
shaped by the actors` “beliefs and values” as well as by the structural constraints which the 
actors find themselves in. Given the interaction between the structural and cultural 
constraints, structural constraints thus also “affect the [actors`] beliefs and values.”66 Social 
action is therefore determined by motivations and in turn creates structures.67 The 
conceptualization of the national idea in the context of specific structural and cultural 
constraints thus creates specific / unique national identities. Following Greenfeld`s argument, 
“any identity is a set of ideas, a symbolic construct,”68 and I dare argue that it is even more so 
in the case of the US American national identity, for “[t]he American case illustrates the 
essential independence of nationality from geo-political and ethnic factors and underscores its 
conceptual, or ideological, nature.”69 
Before proceeding further, I believe that the conception of the nation as a cultural community 
requires a working definition of what culture truly is.  I therefore suggest that culture be 
viewed “as a system of rules and principles for ‘proper’ behaviour, analogous to the grammar 
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of a language, which sets the standards for ‘proper’ speaking.”70 As Pierre Bourdieu, French 
sociologist and anthropologist, puts it: “there is always a correspondence between the 
objective structures within which any given social individual lives and the mental structures 
that they draw on to conceptualise the social world.”71 Culture is thus what guides thought 
and behavior not only in the sense of its establishing patterns of these thought and behavior, 
but also in the sense of its setting a complex “of control mechanisms – plans, recipes, rules, 
instructions (what computer engineers call ‘programs’) for [their] governing.”72 I thus argue 
that the study of culture, of “the cultural, subjective, meaning- and model-creating symbolic 
elements in social reality,”73 is necessary in the analysis of communities, including the 
national community. A national culture therefore might be described as representing a 
particular discourse: it constructs “meanings which influence […] and organize […] both our 
actions and our conception of ourselves […]; [n]ational cultures construct identities by 
producing meanings about ‘the nation’ with which we can identify; these are contained in the 
stories which are told about it, memories which connect its present with its past, and imagines 
which are constructed of it.”74 A national identity created in/by culture is “a discursive 
sketch:” that is, it does not pretend to the hegemonic uniformity over the national subject and 
allows factionalism or differences in various sorts of background (class, ethnic, sex, etc.). 
However, national unity is achieved “by the exertion of cultural power” in the “offering both 
membership of the political nation-state and identification with the national culture.”75 It is 
worth noting, however, that such national unity “exists only as a discursive construct.”76  “In 
the modern world,” as Hall states, the national culture into which one is born “is one of the 
principal sources of cultural identity.”77  
In this section, I will attempt to demonstrate how a national community does not exist 
independent of culture, how it is itself a product of culture and history (structural and cultural 
constraints). Culture presents a particular image of shared reality: it determines the common 
sense (the canonical) of a given national community. Culture is created and transmitted 
in/through the word in various transactions (interactions) among the members of a national 
community.  The unique character of a nation (its identity, its ‘color’) is determined by its 
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culture, “the predominant narratives, inscribed goals and moralities intrinsic to that culture.”78     
To become a national member is to learn the word and how it should be used, that is, to learn 
the culture and the proper expression of one`s intentions in a culturally appropriate manner.79 
Language and the canons of its use are the necessary cultural instruments that allow one to 
operate/participate in cultural transactions (in a culture). Language thus not only “implies a 
view […] about [one`s] symbolic environment,” but also prescribes “how one is presumed to 
operate within it.”80 Following Bruner`s argument, I argue that the world as one knows it (and 
one`s national community as part of this world) does not arise from direct experience of it 
(even those undergo ‘interpretation’ through conceptual filters – ideas, attitudes, cognitions, 
perceptions, etc.).81 The ‘known’ (national) reality is therefore conceptual. The ‘realities’ of 
the social world arise in linguistic use (given the constructiveness of language) in 
interpersonal negotiations of meaning. Bruner suggests to view culture as a forum (highlights 
the forum aspect of culture) for such (re-)negotiation.82 Each culture is in possession of its 
own means for negotiating meaning. Meaning is consensus: “meaning and reality are created 
and not discovered.”83 Any national community seems to be sustained by the symbolic means 
of a respective culture which tends to display a liking for some versions of that particular 
community and not for others: “’reality’ is what one stipulates (rather than finds)”84 and 
“what we take as the world is itself no more nor less than a stipulation couched in a symbol 
system.”85 
National Identity as Habitus 
As I have already mentioned, following Greenfeld`s argument, the ‘birth’ of nations is due to 
the interaction of specific structural and cultural constraints which define the unique character 
of specific nationalisms and national identities. To illustrate the role of cultural constraints in 
the formation of nations a bit more, I would like to adopt the concept of habitus from the 
social philosophy of Pierre Bourdieu. In my opinion, the concept of habitus aptly 
demonstrates how culture shapes social reality, how it is indeed about cultural constraints 
rather than active volition on the part of the actors in their conceptualization of the nation.  
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Habitus (from French, habitude: ‘habit’) in Bourdieu`s understanding can be roughly 
described as a regular (as in ‘a recurring pattern’) social behavior; “customs [and] 
costumes,”86 so to say. The social agents “are inscribed inside the social world; they inhabit 
the social world,”87 while this world is “a place of acts of knowledge.” A social subject is 
“oriented by meanings”88 of the social world; they must know it in order to be able to 
participate in it. In this regard, habitus represents some kind of “practical knowledge and 
mastery of the patterns of the social world.”89 Therefore, the category of habitus is a system of 
norms which is formative and constitutive of an individual`s behavior and their 
interactions/transactions in a social space; it is a set of “dispositions that are permanent life 
styles resulting from learning, training and incorporation.” Habitus represents “the rules that 
govern the working of a social space, the rules of the game.”90 Given that “the social exists 
both in things and in bodies,”91 habitus as “the incorporated social”92 similarly exists in the 
body of a community as well as in the bodies of its individual members. Habitus, according to 
Bourdieu, “turns […] social things […] into living realities.”93  
“The notion of the habitus,” according to Bourdieu, “defines a principle that generates 
thoughts, perceptions, actions and words.”94 Three levels of habitus can thus be distinguished: 
the mental level of ideas (cognition); the level of “emotions and attitudes” in which certain 
emotions come to be associated with certain ideas (affectivity); and the level of “behavioural 
dispositions,”95 the willingness to direct one`s behavior in accordance with the ideas and 
emotions/attitudes associated with them (actionality). Jerome Bruner, for his part, refers to it 
as “schematizing” (Bourdieu also uses the term “schemas”96): schematizing in the realm of 
the social is “a persistent framework of institutions and customs which acts as a schematic 
basis for constructive memory.”97 These schemata make the ‘skeleton’ of one`s experience. 
Bruner attributes ‘schematizing’ to the economy of mental processes (perception, attention, 
extraction of knowledge, etc.). Interactions (and the products of them) are therefore 
habitualized into ‘formats’/’models,’ which allows the interacting partners to “predict each 
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other, attribute intentions, and in general assign interpretations to each other`s acts and 
utterances.”98 This is most evident in children`s behavior: when the habits of interaction are 
violated, they react with surprise.99 With age and experience, these self-made ‘models’ evolve 
(“specialize and generalize”100), and so do the theories about the world and others, about 
human condition, which inhere in these models. In fact, these models are rarely ‘self-made.’ 
These models are something we appropriate/internalize from what constitutes the 
commonsense knowledge within our cultural community: “experience on and memory of the 
social world are powerfully structured […] by deeply internalized and narrativized 
conceptions”101 provided by habitus.   
The entrance into a habitus takes place in the process of one`s becoming a social agent; as one 
“enters into the relationship with the social.”102 The incorporation into the social allows the 
agent to develop the ‘automatisms’ of orientation in a social space and the ‘automatisms’ of 
adequate reaction to events and situational contexts.103 This leads one to make sense of and 
adequately react to social reality, to communicate one`s thoughts and even feel in a particular 
way.104 Through the internalization of habitus, one is predisposed to see and act in a specific 
manner; the agent feels this mode of perception and the style of action as organic to himself 
or herself.105  Specific perceptions and assessments of social reality result from economic, but, 
more importantly, social and axiological relations: they establish structures and social 
practices which guide the agent`s actionality in a social space. As Bourdieu puts it, “social 
subjects are modified by social and economic conditions” and “constantly transformed by 
experience - this is what the habitus is.”106 Habitus is thus a product of history, a set of 
schemata of perception, thought, and action, which adjudicates on the normality / canonicality 
(perhaps, even naturalness) of social practices. The acquisition of a habitus is thus “a process 
whereby the biological individual […] enters into a relationship with the social world, of 
which he is always partly a product.”107 
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The internalization of habitus through social learning is the “kind of education without agents 
consciously teaching or taught;”108 it is “sense without consciousness.”109 Social agents “do 
not have a perspectival view of the world or see it as representation; they engage with reality 
and act and operate within it with no deliberate object of consciousness or reflection.”110 
Bourdieu`s central idea here, by his own admission, is that “there may be knowledge and 
meaning without consciousness.”111 Social agents are therefore not so much social subjects or 
actors, for they are not fully in control of social meanings nor are they consciously playing a 
certain role. According to Bourdieu, the term ‘habitus’ denotes that social agents “are a locus 
of intentions of meaning, of meaningful intentions of which they are not strictly speaking the 
subjects.”112   
I believe it would not be a mistake to argue that habitus represents some kind of common 
sense (both as ‘good sense’ and ‘folk wisdom’) for those who were raised in a particular 
habitus. This argument might be supported by the seeming sense of naturalness of habitus 
(given the above description of how one enters into a habitus) which makes it virtually 
immune to reformation: any information is selectively filtered through the commonsense 
knowledge of reality (habitus), the information which appears contrary to this knowledge is 
effectively dismissed as ‘nonsense.’ In this sense, habitus is close to Barthesian understanding 
of myth, for it, too, seems to “transform […] history into nature,”113 providing ‘self-evident 
truths.’ Indeed, any given habitus is “a product of history;”114 a community`s “incorporated 
history.”115 According to Bourdieu, there are “two states of history: history in its objectified 
state, as accumulated in instruments, documents, rites, theories, customs, traditions, styles of 
language and clothing, and history in its incorporated state.”116 In habitus, “social patterns 
become natural.”117 As Bourdieu understands it,  the “process of naturalisation is 
accomplished in a particularly successful manner when it is exerted through agencies whose 
action has the superficial appearance of Nature and therefore seems almost natural.”118  
Habitus, indeed, appears quite natural, as it does not seem to inhibit thought: one can freely 
produce thoughts, but these thoughts and conclusions will hardly transcend the semantic 
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circumference delineated by habitus (or, to be more precise, by the historical or social context 
of its origin).119 Any such ‘dissent’ would be interpreted as nonsense (or, indeed, foolishness 
or even the symptom of an addled mind). According to Bruner, any (utopian, reformist, or 
revolutionary) change initiated by a social agent must at least minimally conform to this 
implicit consensual code.120 Any effort to initiate action in a particular group is doomed to 
failure, unless it appeals (again, at least minimally) to the habitus of the group (which, again, 
is formative of the group`s motivations, aspirations, intentionality). As Bourdieu writes, 
“[t]hese social laws cannot be transgressed, they can only be transformed, and at the cost of 
much hard work.”121 Any qualitative change must thus be formulated in the language of the 
canonical, must appeal to the ordinary. As the following discussion will illustrate, to enlist the 
support of the masses in colonial America to overthrow the British rule and establish a 
national polity, the activating elites had to articulate their intentions in compliance with the 
patterns of thought that the colonists regarded as common sense, for “the essence of a 
[social/national] game is to produce the kind of habitus that does not call the game into 
question,”122 that is, to ensure everyone`s “investment in the [national] game.”123 
Habituses are formed in long-term practice, and, as I argue, once the US national identity had 
been successfully consolidated, it itself became one such habitus for the future generations of 
Americans. “A generative spontaneity, which asserts itself in an improvised confrontation 
with ever renewed situations, [habitus] obeys a practical logic,”124 which makes habitus ‘a 
(situational) necessity made a virtue125 and nature.  The rhetoric of the Declaration 
(particularly, the phrase ‘when in the course of human events, it becomes necessary’) 
demonstrates how “social necessity takes on the guise of natural necessity and exerts its 
influence through certain mechanisms.”126 “Without necessarily being the product either of a 
conscious strategy or of a mechanical determination,”127 habitus nonetheless answers to the 
situation by producing strategies which become objectively adjusted to that particular 
situation. The US American national identity was once such a situation-specific answer to the 
necessity (a situational constraint) to rid itself of British dominion: as Howard Zinn argues, 
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there was “no conscious forethought strategy by the colonial elite, but a growing awareness as 
events developed.”128 Today, it might be argued, the principles and ideals of this identity are 
indeed held as virtue (once a product of necessity, it has become US America`s habitus, its 
‘common sense’ and morality).  
In my understanding, through habitus, culture is able to convey a certain commonsense 
knowledge about one`s social (national) reality. The individual self as a national (and cultural) 
member can be described as a “saturated self.”129 The (national) self is always content-full: it 
is saturated with the content of images, information, discourses, indeed, a certain kind of 
cultural knowledge, or culture-specific “systems of meaning.”130 One`s modes of perception 
of the self and the world are thus determined culturally. Culture is built into political and 
institutional structures (which it legitimizes and maintains), and is thereby linked to the 
exercise of power over individuals (the political control of one`s behavior and orientations, 
the maintenance of the status quo of power relations, etc.). In light of the following 
discussion, the national community and its members therefore do not seem to exist as 
‘content-less,’ they are always saturated; or ‘scripted.’ As has been argued, this cultural 
knowledge represents a national community`s ‘common sense,’ that is, ‘a commonsense 
knowledge of social reality,’ which is produced, determined and used by a culture as its 
instrument. It is therefore a normative ‘blueprint’ of the transactions/interactions within a 
community: the ‘role’ prescriptions, which the social agent learns as he/she enters into the 
drama through the acquisition of the language. Commonsense knowledge thus comes about in 
interaction, and becomes what Bruner calls a community`s “the ordinary,”131 or the canonical, 
indeed a ‘list of self-evident truths’ against which reality is judged. As Bourdieu notes, “the 
activities of our practical sense are part of the ordinary order of our ordinary existence.”132 
Habitus in this regard represents ‘the habitual’ and is thus “a sort of principle of constancy, of 
self­coherence or […] consistency.”133 According to the sociologist, habitus can be treated as 
“a mode of knowledge as long as we realise that we need to understand this knowledge as 
obeying a different kind of logic.”134 This logic seems to be the habituality of habitus: “the 
sense of something ‘acquired through experience’, by confrontation with the patterns of the 
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social world” and  “the experience that enables us to get by in life, to be experienced, which 
gives us […] ‘assurance in decision and action in the situations of life.’”135 
In my assessment, what a national community knows about itself is predominantly 
“enculturated knowledge:”136 much to one`s surprise, one might discover that such 
‘commonsense’ knowledge makes no sense at all to someone who comes from a different 
cultural environment; or appears as outright comic, which appears to one as some kind of 
blasphemy. Here, habitus as ‘passion’ does not describe “an emotional state but the logic of 
fetishism - that is, a belief that seems illusory to anyone outside the game, but one that is well 
founded […] if we see it from the viewpoint of someone who knows the conditions of 
production of the game and the players.”137 Not only does culture formulate ‘the canonical,’ 
but also sets the standards of what is considered moral. It thus determines “the good”138 and, 
indeed, defines ‘virtue’ (as has been noted, habitus itself is a necessity made virtue). The 
knowledge of what constitutes ‘the good’ is also part of a community`s commonsense; ‘the 
ordinary/canonical’ thus might be said to be necessarily ‘the good.’ Crossley traces a basic 
link between an individual`s moral orientation and their identity (for example, as a member of 
a national community): as she notes, “we have a sense of who we are through a sense of 
where we stand in relation to ‘the good.’”139 The human desire to belong within a group 
drives one to self-identify with what a reference community recognizes as ‘the good.’  
“Values inhere in commitment to the ‘ways of life,’”140 while one`s commitment to a 
particular set of values “locate[s] one in a culture,” which enables an individual to effectively 
participate in their respective culture. ‘The good’ is articulated through/in language and 
symbolic systems (custom, ritual) as the tools of culture: ‘the good’ as a moral source is 
brought within the reach by language, by stories/narratives/metaphors, which confer meaning 
and substance on a community`s life. These stories secure people`s commitment to and 
orientation towards ‘the national good,’ and channel their behavior towards this ‘good.’141 
Each community will have its own repertoire of narratives which describe what ‘the good’/the 
moral is:  as Bruner puts it, “[o]ur sense of the normative is nourished in narrative.”142   
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I therefore might conclude that culture determines a community`s ‘common sense,’ becomes 
its map of reality: it organizes a national community`s experience, infuses this experience 
with substance and meaning, as well as ensures pro-sociality (that is, the abidance by the 
excepted norms of conduct) of a social actor. Culture and cultural means thus might be 
described as among “the most powerful forms of social stability,”143 and by that of a more 
efficient political control. According to Bruner, cultural interpretation (explication through 
cultural means) sets in / is triggered in moments when there is a disruption of ‘the ordinary’ 
(of common-sense, of how things should be) by ‘the exceptional.’ Culture-specific 
explications are thus employed to patch the breaches in commonsense meanings, to return 
‘the exceptional’ to the norm, that is, to the ordinary.144 As Bourdieu remarks, “social 
conventions assert their existence when we want to transgress them.”145 Explication through 
cultural means, as Bruner states, contains that which is divergent in a way which promotes 
“[(re-)]negotiation [of meanings] and [allows to] avoid confrontational dispute and strife.”146 
This point will move center stage in the following discussion of the ability of the American 
Thesis as US America`s national identity to contain dissent.  
To sum up this part of the chapter, it becomes clear that social reality is imagined and 
organized in accordance with what is believed to be ‘the canonical’ and by definition ‘the 
good.’ This ‘common sense’ is materialized / objectivized in the lived reality (for example, in 
institutions). Such an objectivization sustains the perception of a particular version of reality 
(certain cultural meanings) as, in fact, the Reality. In interaction with others (as within a 
national community), an individual member grows ‘saturated’ with the knowledge of their 
national reality. In my understanding, the acquisition of cultural knowledge would not be 
possible, were it not mediated by language. Language is the principal instrument of cultural 
learning.  
 
Language as an Instrument of Cultural Learning 
A national community (as any other community of individuals) is dependent on language and 
linguistic practices that people use in everyday interaction to makes sense of itself.147 In my 
assessment, the nation`s knowledge of itself is arrived at not through logical or rational 
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thinking, but through linguistic structures and socio-historical narratives. The fundament of 
meaning, from which one comes to reflect on one`s self and experience is determined by 
language (signs, images, and power which inhere in them). As Bruner notes, culture supplies 
ideas, concepts, theories (in other words, some cultural knowledge) through the acquisition of 
which one is able to become embedded into a culture, to be a full-fledged participant in social 
action.148 This learning process is of deeply social nature: it occurs in one`s interaction with 
others, and takes the appearance of an individual`s adaptation to their environment. This 
process of socialization is thus “the phenomenon of the adaptation [to] expectation.”149 As 
Bourdieu notes, “[t]he habitus is the kind of feel for the social world and experience that 
enables people to adapt objectively, without calculating, at least within certain limits.”150 
Social ‘survival’ in this cultural environment “is secured through the learning mechanisms by 
which humans acquire those habits or dispositions of adaptive value.”151 One therefore 
acquires a “feel for the game.”152 Such learning is mediated by language and the products of 
it. Language is thus history,153 for “the feel for the game is acquired in playing, which makes 
it a product of history.”154 Therefore, language is a cultural phenomenon: it represents the 
world in a particular way, depending on how the sign-referent relationships are mediated by a 
particular culture.  The world of cultural meaning is entered via the acquisition of language, 
its system of signs and the world representations they refer to.  
Another point to consider in relation to language as an instrument of culture is its 
constitutiveness. Language not only facilitates the acquisition of meaning, but also carries 
meaning in itself. As Bruner notes, language does not seem to conform so easily “to the 
requirements of plain reference or of verifiable predication.”155 Therefore, language contains 
‘particular maps of reality’/some ‘pre-structure,’ for any instance of language use (even if it is 
a factual statement) implies a particular perspective/stance (consider the implicatures, 
presupposition triggering, etc.). An utterance is thus a certain perspective or stance imposed 
upon the world by means of selection, focusing, nuances of meaning, context, discursive 
context of the speaker/hearer, etc. Language is thus never neutral. As Bakhtin puts it, 
“[l]anguage is not a neutral medium that passes freely and easily into the private property of 
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the speaker’s intentions; it is populated – overpopulated with the intentions of others.”156 
According to Bruner, language is not neutral and can never be so, for language itself as well 
as an act of its use impose “a point of view not only about the world to which it refers but 
toward the use of mind in respect of this world.” The scholar thus believes that “[l]anguage 
necessarily imposes a perspective in which things are viewed and a stance toward what we 
view.”157 Moreover, the above-mentioned constitutive capacity of language makes it possible 
for a message to create reality of its own. Bourdieu calls it “the ontological power of 
language:” “you can say everything with language’; everything can be said; you can even 
speak of things that don’t exist.”158  Language is capable of creating meaning on its own 
independently of the factual reality, because meaning arises not from the relationship between 
‘sign’ and ‘referent’ (signs in this sense are meaning-less, meaning-empty), but between the 
relationships/play between signs themselves.159 The receiver of the message is thus 
predisposed to understand/interpret it in the canons of the reality created. Language not only 
allows for communication (or transmission of some knowledge about the world), but also 
represents the world (the subject of this communication) in a particular manner: transmission 
is thus complemented by the creation of knowledge/reality. It therefore creates “the kind of 
mongrel reality composed of [phenomena] that can exist because all things can be said, and, 
since all things can be said, all things can be thought and imagined.”160 As I have argued in 
relation to Anderson`s conception of the nation, the very word ‘nation’ as if grants existence 
to this phenomenon, even though it is but a mere mental construct – “[t]hat it has meaning 
does not mean that it refers to something that exists”161 or “that something that exists is [not 
necessarily] something physical, tangible and locatable.”162  
The constitutiveness of language, as has been demonstrated, contributes to the creation of one 
common reality by creating the illusion of the factual existence (indeed, reality) of certain 
cultural meanings. All of this is due to “the capacity of language to create and stipulate 
realities of its own,” to give “an externality and an apparent ontological status to the concepts 
words embody,”163 even if these concepts are beyond the experienced reality (the concepts of 
the law, nation, deity, etc.). As Bourdieu remarks, “granting language an ontological status 
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and power implies letting language play an eminently political role.”164 This again brings the 
two conceptions of the nation as a cultural and political community closer together.  To 
paraphrase Ludwig Wittgenstein`s remark that “[t]he limits of my language mean the limits of 
my world,”165 we can say that the limits of my culture in a lot of crucial respects mean the 
limits of my world, since I tend to see this world via the lens of my native culture.  
*** 
To sum up, in this chapter, I have attempted to provide a working definition of the nation. 
Following the research by such scholars as Greenfeld, Anderson, Breuilly, and Bourdieu, I 
argue that the nation is a mental construct, that is, ‘an imagined political community’ whose 
imagining is conditioned by specific situational and cultural constraints influencing the elite 
groups in whose interests the adoption of nation identity is undertaken. As can be observed 
especially in US nationalism, “even the political interpretation of a nation is not completely 
immune to operating with […] cultural symbols.”166  
As Bruner notes, culture is “constitutive of mind.”167 The minds of the architects of specific 
nationalisms whose motivations initiated nationalist revolts and the construction of national 
identities were similarly conditioned by the cultural environment (habitus) in which these 
minds were nurtured. It is therefore important to study both the structural and cultural 
contexts which shaped the motivations of the relevant actors who were powerful enough to 
determine social action which was in turn creating structures. In my assessment, the American 
Revolution and the birth of the US American nation illustrate the interplay of the political and 
cultural quite well: the US example demonstrates how “the identity narrative channels 
political emotions so that they can fuel efforts to modify a balance of power. […] The identity 
narrative brings forth a new interpretation of the world in order to modify it.”168 The specific 
situational and cultural contexts, from which the US nation with its peculiar identity emerged, 
will therefore be the main focus of the analysis in the following chapter which studies the 
situational constraints that the American Revolution created for the future US Americans and 
how this crisis was managed by appealing to the fundamental principles of English 
nationalism as the colonies` habitus (cultural constraints).  
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3. The Contexts of the American Creed/Thesis as US America`s National 
Identity 
 
Following the above understanding of the nation as ‘an imagined political community,’ we 
might ask further questions: How was US America`s national identity constructed (indeed, 
imagined) via cultural means? And how did this construction (this imagining) allow to 
achieve specific political goals? In light of the conception of the nation as a political as well 
as a cultural/symbolic community (and both at the same time), and a mental construct at that, 
it would be interesting to first analyze the contexts from which the US national identity 
emerged and in which it is firmly embedded; that is, to undertake some kind of ‘the 
archeology of knowledge;’ to answer the question: How did US America come to know 
itself? 
As Breuilly argues, nationalism as ‘a form of politics’ becomes meaningful only when placed 
in the specific context of its origin (along with the identification of the aims which a specific 
nationalism allowed to pursue).169 Therefore, the starting point for the discussion of the US 
national identity should be the context from which the US American nation emerged. The 
word ‘context’ here is rather an umbrella term which stands for the various contexts of US 
America`s national beginnings. In establishing the historical background of the US national 
identity, it is thus important to study the specific situational context (situational constraints) as 
well as the cultural context (cultural constraints) of the utterance about the US identity as a 
nation (or Pierre Bourdieu`s concept of habitus). In this way, I will attempt to demonstrate 
how these two contexts shape the national discourse which, as has been previously argued, 
comes to shape the social reality and its institutions. As Greenfeld notes, to study a social 
phenomenon with its specific “structural factors,” we must concentrate on the analysis of the 
relevant actors as “the creators and carriers of ideas” who are ‘caught up’ in particular 
“situational constraints which have a bearing on their interests and motivations.”170 Here, the 
issue of power (the political aspect of nationalism) is closely connected to the analysis of 
culture / cultural discourse (the cultural aspect of nationalism) which in turn cannot be 
considered separately from the discussion of power relations which inhere in it. The nation is, 
after all, a state discourse of the elites.171 The analysis of the contexts therefore “allow[s] us to 
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identify the agents, or actual participants, in this transformation”172 and thereby those specific 
situational constraints in which these agents found themselves, as well as the repertoire of 
ideas which determined the agents` worldview (their ‘map of social reality’), all of which 
contributed to the peculiar character of the US American national identity.  
 
3.1 The Extralinguistic Structural Context of US America`s National Beginnings 
 
I would like to begin the analysis of the US national origins by discussing the extralinguistic / 
situational context in which the US national identity is embedded.  In this sub-chapter, I thus 
attempt to answer the following question: What were the situational constraints of the US 
nation`s ‘birth’? To answer this question, I would like to turn to the research by American 
historian and political scientist Howard Zinn whose A People`s History of the United States 
provides an ample historical evidence to the existence of the interested actors (the elites) 
instrumental in the creation of the sovereign US nation. The historical context of US 
America`s national beginnings, as Zinn recreates them, thus confirms the fact of the active 
existence of un upper class (an elite) in colonial America around the time of the birth of the 
nation as well as in the early national period. As Zinn demonstrates, the elites were guided by 
the objective to exercise political control over the colonial population before the Revolution 
as well as over the nascent US American nation in the post-Revolutionary period. Moreover, 
as will be further argued, the means by which the elite groups sought to exercise political 
control were primarily discursive (cultural).   
 
The Colonial Period 
In his research on the American people`s experience of history in US America, Zinn draws 
the reader`s attention to the fact that the colonial society in North America was stratified 
along the class lines as well as to the fact that there was an upper class of the colonial elite in 
Britain`s American colonies in whose hands the wealth and power were increasingly 
concentrated.173 The monopolization of power by these status groups was constantly met with 
resistance and protest. One of the most notorious rebellions was the revolt of Virginian 
settlers under the leadership of Nathaniel Bacon, hence Bacon`s Rebellion, which “became a 
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symbol of mass resentment against the [colonial] establishment.”174 Those who joined Bacon 
in protest were “part of a large underclass of miserably poor whites”175 whose condition was 
truly slave-like and who came to America guided by the ‘hopes of levelling,’ that is, the hopes 
to ‘equalize the wealth.’176 According to Zinn, “[l]evelling was to be behind countless actions 
of poor whites against the rich in all the English colonies, in the century and a half before the 
Revolution.”177 The reality they faced upon stepping on the American shores was different, 
though. What in fact made the reality of colonial America was, as Zinn believes, “a complex 
chain of oppression:”178 high taxes, rents, control of profit, unemployment, poverty, etc. The 
colonists were oppressed by the colonial elites who were in turn under the pressure of the 
imperial center.179  Indeed, in crucial respects, resentment to the rich elites was conditioned 
by the new-comers` “hopes of levelling,”180 which, as I argue, were stoked by the widespread 
idea that no one had the right to compromise another person`s individual sovereignty (human 
dignity). This feeling of resentment is in many respects due to the fact that people, coming to 
the colonies from England, came bearing the national identity of their home country181 (this 
point will be elaborated upon in the next section, discussing the habitus of US America`s 
national origins). As Zinn notes, “[m]ore than half the colonists who came to the North 
American shores in the colonial period […] were mostly English in the seventeenth 
century.”182 The specific character of this national identity was determined by a set of core 
ideas, ‘self-evident truths,’ which were central to the nationalism of England. As will be 
further argued, the equality of individual sovereigns, their ‘equal station’ vis-à-vis one 
another, was an idea of great power that has occupied the US American mind since the 
colonial beginnings.  However, in Britain`s American colonies, there was no actual equality: 
what made the lived reality was an abyss between the ideal and the real. Quoting Abbot 
Smith, Zinn remarks that the colonial society “was not democratic and certainly not 
equalitarian,”183 dominated by an upper class who exploited people as means to their personal 
ends. Therefore, at this point it is possible to conclude that there was indeed an upper class of 
the powerful few in the North American colonies who exercised “political domination” and 
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were “in control of trade and commerce.”184 The reality of colonial America thus reflected “a 
clear-cut class system.”185 As Zinn contends, “class lines [were only] harden[ing] through the 
colonial period; the distinction between rich and poor [were becoming even] sharper,”186 “the 
upper class was getting most of the benefits and monopolized political power.”187 
According to Zinn, traditional histories tend to emphasize the ‘extraordinary’ unity of the 
colonies in their revolutionary rage against England.188 The historical fact seems to be, 
though, that there was hardly any genuine unity among the colonists; what was indeed present 
was the rage that had been towering within the colonies – an internal class conflict. The 
colonies were “societies of contending classes.”189 As Zinn discovers, the political authorities 
were therefore constantly opposed in a variety of protests, riots, pamphlets,190 to the degree 
that “the problem of [effective] control”191 moved towards the top of the elites` agenda. The 
threat of class violence was ever-present.  
As Zinn writes, “[b]y the years of the Revolutionary crisis, the 1760s, the wealthy elite [had] 
controlled the British colonies on the American mainland”192 for one hundred and fifty years. 
In the process, the elites acquired their own fears.193 The greatest of those fears was the fear of 
the oppressed groups (“the Indians, the slaves, [and] the poor whites”194) uniting against the 
ruling few. It was therefore important to prevent such coalitions. Apart from the learned fears, 
the elites “had developed tactics to deal with what they feared.”195 One such tactic was to 
create unity (on the elites` terms) in one segment of the colonial population, while fostering 
disunity and discord in other segments.  Thereby, they sought ways to antagonize the white 
under class against the black slaves and the Indians, thus creating some sort of a ‘buffer’ that 
protected the elites.196 This tactic, for example, generated much animosity between the Native 
Americans and the white frontiersmen who were becoming more dependent on the 
government for protection against ‘Indian savagery.’ The possible alliance of the poor white 
and the enslaved black population, the precedent of which had already taken place in the form 
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of Bacon`s Rebellion, “caused the most fear among the wealthy white planter”197 who 
therefore made a few tiniest concessions to the poor whites and cultivated in every possible 
way the racial hatred against the black slaves. As Zinn notes, “[r]acism was becoming more 
and more practical.”198 
Another major development of the time, according to Zinn, was that “[a]long with the very 
rich and the very poor, there developed a white middle class of small planters, independent 
farmers, city artisans.”199 The loyalty of this middle ‘layer’ of the class hierarchy became 
another lever of control in the elites` hands. This segment of the colonial population was to 
become “a solid buffer [class] against black slaves, frontier Indians, and very poor whites.”200 
Understandably, the representatives of the colonial white ‘middle’ class were placated in 
every possible way: they were, for example, protected from the competition from black 
craftsmen/traders; and granted limited participation in local politics.201 In my understanding, 
for this group (the white middle class), as for basically anyone in the colonies, similarly vital 
were the sense of their status, individual sovereignty (which had been systematically violated 
by the British authorities) as well as the desire to preserve and augment property. As will be 
shown, their interests were thus informed by the ideological heritage and rhetoric of English 
nationalism which became the rhetorical instrument of the American colonial elites` influence 
on this class or, in Zinn`s words, “a critically important rhetorical device for the rule of the 
few, who would speak to the many of ‘our’ liberty, ‘our’ property, ‘our’ country.”202 As Zinn 
notes, “[t]hose upper classes, to rule, needed to make concessions to the middle class, without 
damage to their own wealth or power […] [t]his bought loyalty.”203 The main tool for the 
control of the white middle class`s loyalties was therefore a specific language, invented, as 
Zinn believes, by the elites (as will be demonstrated, it is fairer to say that the language was in 
a lot of respects more inherited than invented). It was, according to Zinn, “the language of 
liberty and equality.”204 I dare argue that this language was in fact the American colonies` 
mother tongue which they learned from their ‘parent,’ the English nation.  This language was 
therefore the rhetorical device which justified the rule of the few and bound people`s loyalties 
“with something more powerful than material advantage.”205 First, it was used to “unite just 
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enough whites to fight a Revolution against England, without ending either slavery or 
inequality.”206 Later, the language was adopted to unite the ‘newly born’ Americans into one 
nation under one leadership (the elites).  
 
The Revolutionary Moment 
According to Zinn, the American Revolution was in many respects an upper-class conflict 
between the new elites and the established/old elites.207 In my understanding, the British elites 
increasingly neglected the sovereignty of the American colonies which, as the colonists 
believed, they had by the right of their national allegiance to the British Crown, to the English 
nation. As Bourdieu puts it, “there has to be heresy for the orthodox discourse to 
intervene.”208 Heresy in this case was ‘a history of repeated injuries and usurpations’ by the 
British king, while the orthodox discourse was the discourse of ‘unalienable Rights,’ such as 
life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, or, in other words, the ideal of individual 
sovereignty. In Greenfeld`s words, it was unclear what angered Americans more – the fact 
that the taxes imposed by the center were hard on their wallets, or that they were not granted 
representation in the Parliament: as she puts it, “taxation without representation was an insult 
to their pride, more than an injury to their economic interests.”209 Nonetheless, the latter, in 
my opinion, can also be viewed as an act of the infringement of individual sovereignty. In any 
case, the sense of individual liberty and the personal interests of the elites were equally hurt. 
This was the moment when, according to Zinn, the elites realized “that by creating a nation, a 
symbol, a legal unity called the United States, they could take over land, profits, and political 
power from favorites of the British Empire.”210 This decision was, of course, not planned, but 
contingent, more like an opportunity than a strategic move: “not a conscious conspiracy, but 
an accumulation of tactical responses.”211 The main task before the power groups was to 
“create a consensus of popular support for the rule of a new, privileged leadership,” and by 
doing so to “hold back a number of potential rebellions.”212 The elites needed “to find 
language inspiring to all classes.”213 The new leadership had to mobilize/persuade the mob to 
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rise against the English.214 They therefore sought to win their allegiance. This task was 
certainly not an easy one, for the loyalty to England was quite strong among yesterday`s 
British subjects.215 According to Zinn, the elites wanted to use mob energy (the accumulated 
class hatred) against the British authorities and, amusingly enough, against the very idea of 
wealth (the disproportionate distribution of it), making the Revolution seem like a battle of 
the poor against the (British) rich (never against the rich group of the nationalist elites).216 
This strategy somewhat became a tradition: as Zinn states, this was “a forecast of the long 
history of American politics, the mobilization of lower-class energy by upper-class 
politicians, for their own purposes.”217 
After the independence had been won, the American leaders however realized that they 
desperately needed to devise strategies to contain the combustible imagination of the 
‘democracy-drunk’ mob. The elite attempted to build some kind of a rhetorical bridge 
between themselves and the masses, the bridge of the all-inspiring language of natural rights 
and democratic rule which seemingly recognized the ‘sanctity’ of individual sovereignty. This 
was “the language of popular control” that was “well suited to unite large numbers of 
colonists”218 into “a secure consensus.”219  As I argue, although this language was effectively 
used against England, in its origin, it was English: the US American speech consisted of the 
ideas, images, and metaphors that the English once made use of to rebel against their 
tyrannical monarchs.  
The existence of the political and economic elite in colonial America might further be 
supported by the analysis of the controversial issue of legitimacy as regards the signing of the 
Declaration of Independence. Jacques Derrida, for example, in his essay “Declaration of 
Independence” re-assesses the much-mythologized act of the signature and deliberates on the 
issues of legitimacy and representation. As he remarks, the ‘signers’ of the Declaration 
claimed authority to draft and ratify the document on behalf of the people, but there was no 
‘people’ before the signing. “The signature invents the signer,” the Declaration thus invents 
the people that “do not exist as an entity, the entity does not exist before this declaration, not 
as such; [i]f it gives birth to itself, as free and independent subject, as possible signer, this can 
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hold only in the act of the signature.”220 The above observation only further demonstrates the 
degree of the elites` involvement in the construction of nations. In my understanding, the 
Founding Fathers (well aware of the legal ambiguity of their act) therefore created ‘presence’ 
in the place of ‘absence.’ The elites thus sought “symbolic legitimization.”221 According to 
Bourdieu, “[w]hat will always save the men who hold this position [of power] is […] 
legitimation.”222 Bourdieu notes, adopting Max Weber`s terminology, that “the dominant 
require an ideology to provide a ‘theodicy of their own privileges.’"223 “To establish in whose 
name it is legitimate to dominate,” the elites, expecting “to be justified in existing in the way 
that they exist - that is, as dominant,”224 engaged in ‘symbolic struggle’ “to establish the 
dominant principle of domination, which is not identified as such, but is recognised and 
therefore legitimate.”225 The legitimation of the elite groups` status and thus power required 
an ideological consensus, the very idea of which presupposed the consent of the governed, for 
“in good symbolic logic, where legitimacy is concerned, a man’s best servant is other 
people.”226 As Bourdieu remarks, ““the essence of a game is to produce the kind of habitus 
that does not call the game into question,”227 and a “game only functions in so far as it 
manages to convince all the players that it is worth taking the trouble to play it.”228 The 
national game thus implies “the desire to play” and the desire to do it with passion. Bourdieu 
uses the word ‘passion,’ for “it is something suffered because we cannot do anything but 
suffer this interest;”229 and it seems like the colonists did suffer at the hands of the British 
Crown, their desire for individual sovereignty became their passion. It is this ‘logic of 
fetishism’ behind this suffered passion that makes one “realise that it is impossible to do 
without it and that nothing is more necessary than this illusion.”230 
As Greenfeld notes, the ideas of English nationalism thus occupied the minds of the American 
elite and the colonial masses: it was simply the way they were used to seeing the world, their 
‘common sense’ vision of reality.231 As Bourdieu remarks, “someone who has the appropriate 
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habitus cannot help playing.”232 The elites therefore understood (or more like intuitively 
‘felt’) that any explanation of the necessity to declare independence from Britain and to create 
a new legal entity/polity (the US American nation) had to be articulated along these rhetorical 
lines. It was because only this rhetoric could stir public affect; only this language 
corresponded to the ‘rules of the game,’ since “[w]hen you have a feel for the game, you don’t 
enquire into the existence or the raison d’etre of the game; you want to play.”233 The 
architects thus appealed to the central idea of English nationalism – the inviolability of a 
people`s sovereignty (as will be demonstrated, it was but a logical extension to the idea of the 
essential sovereignty of a man endowed with reason). Behind this barnstorming rhetoric was 
the elites` intention to keep the existing (status-quo) relations of power and wealth intact: “in 
serving [people,] they served themselves.”234  
The Early National Period 
The War of Independence resulted in the economic and status dislocation for some groups and 
the growth of the economic opportunities for others.235 The victory in the War of 
Independence opened up new opportunities for the rich American elite to become even richer. 
As Zinn notes, “this became characteristic of the new nation: finding itself possessed of 
enormous wealth, it could create the richest ruling class in history, and still have enough for 
the middle classes to act as a buffer between the rich and the dispossessed.”236 However, was 
there truly a US American nation in the period following the Revolution? After the 
Revolution, it became clear how pressing the issue of the establishment of a binding national 
identity was. As has been demonstrated, around the Revolutionary event, a blurry image of 
America`s national identity was used to serve the momentary interests of the day; after the 
victory had been secured, this image needed to be further elaborated on and transformed into 
a socially binding large-scale identity of the new nation, the United States of America.  Why 
was this task so urgent?  
As Karl Deutsch defines it, “nationality is a people pressing to acquire a measure of effective 
control over the behavior of its members. It is a people striving to equip itself with power, 
with some machinery of compulsion strong enough to make the enforcement of its commands 
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sufficiently probable to aid in the spread of habits of voluntary compliance with them.”237 At 
this point, I can conclude that the supremacy of the elite was the fact of the social reality in 
the pre-Revolutionary colonies. Therefore, the Revolution was the elite`s personal revolution 
fought in their interests. With the English elites out of the way, the American upper class 
could finally begin their project of nation building. In my understating, to survive in the new 
social reality, the elites had to unite the atomized groups of former colonists into one nation, 
to create a powerful/binding national consensus in the form of a coherent national identity and 
to make this identity stable, thus ensuring the stability of the existing power relations and the 
distribution of wealth. As Zinn believes, the elites in North America sought to unite “the 
thirteen states into one great market for commerce”238 as well as to preserve and augment 
other kinds of capital (political, cultural, symbolic, etc.) A common national identity was 
needed to beat the local loyalties and affiliations, to beat “treasonable or seditious 
discourses”239 (hence, the Sedition Act, probably the first test of the freedom of expression in 
US America) in order to create one nationalist discourse shared by all. A national identity 
was therefore to foster unity in an ideological consensus which would have “all the moral and 
emotional appeal of a religious symbol.”240 Even the word ‘United’ in the name of the new 
nation spoke of this desire. As Lieven notes, “a society as diverse and as bitterly divided 
culturally as America, with its diversity continually increased both by immigration and by the 
creative and destructive surges of capitalist change, cannot in fact live without strong 
common myths and the strong civic nationalism which depends on them.”241 Greenfeld`s line 
of argument supports this point, as she argues that the development of the national idea in US 
America had been distinguished foremost by its symbolic nature:  “[i]t has been the fate of the 
American nation, it is said, ‘not to have ideologies but to be one.”242 At first, this system 
rested on a shaky ground, for the unity in ideological consensus had for long been a project in 
the making. As Greenfeld describes it, the United States of America was indeed “a union 
begun by necessity.”243 Necessity is certainly not a pleasant feeling, and one surely attempts 
to overcome this subjective sense of burden. Therefore, the fear of popular unrest and possible 
disintegration cast a blight on the bittersweet aftertaste of winning independence. The nation 
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was born, but, as Greenfeld has it, “what was born was not the infant American nation, but the 
embryo; or rather, the nation was born so premature that for the next ninety years it existed 
only as a potentiality.”244 As will further be discussed in greater detail, the newborn 
Americans were already in possession of national identity, and theirs was an English one. “A 
drive for secession,” as Greenfeld remarks, “was inherent in the nature of the English 
nationalism which, furthermore, rendered it legitimate.”245 “The separatist impulse was 
[therefore] inherent in the very conception of the Union”246 as the heir to the ideals of English 
nationalism. The nascent American nation was “a union begun by necessity,”247 and “the 
threat of secession”248 was a tangible obstacle to the development of national unity: “[t]he 
Union was in perpetual peril of dissolving.”249  
The influence of particularism in US America (“a hundred sects and factions,”250 as 
Bercovitch puts it) had always been significant. Like Bercovitch, Greenfeld draws attention to 
the fact that the colonists and early Americans were a diverse mob of people, all in possession 
of different, sometimes conflicting, local identities: “[t]their local pride as New Englanders, 
Pennsylvanians, or Virginians was fierce and their sentiments toward the other colonies only 
on rare occasions resembled brotherly love.”251 In my understanding, the picture of the social 
reality in the early national period is thus one of considerable atomization, reinforced by the 
ideal of individual sovereignty (the right to secession). To unite these sovereigns under one 
common (political and cultural) power / authority seemed like a losing battle.  As has been 
noted, there was an actual threat of factionalism: such documents as, for example, “Federalist 
10” acknowledged the danger and somewhat inescapability of factions/factional strife in US 
America. Even to this day, as Robert Ferguson notes, “the possibility of collapse through 
internal dissension continues to haunt both political considerations and the literary 
imagination for generations.”252 Even within the elites, there was not much cohesion due to 
the differences in specific aspirations, background, political affiliations, career, etc.253 One 
thing that the elites had in common was the desire to protect their interests and preserve their 
status in the new social reality. A plausible/coherent discourse of national identity was thus in 
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demand. So was, according to Zinn, invented “the most effective system of national control 
[…] in modern times.”254 
 
The Road to Unity in Common Identity: The Civil War 
The union of the states had been repeatedly contested: as Greenfeld notes, “Americans held 
some things to be self-evident, but the Union was not among them;”255 “the forces that could 
(and eventually did) bring the United States to the brink of disintegration were at least as 
strong as those which fostered unity.”256 The creation of an authentic union was complicated 
by the differences in the visions of the US American nation (one of such ‘debates,’ of which 
Greenfeld speaks, is the difference in views between Federalists and Jeffersonians257).  As 
Greenfeld contends, “the possibility of secession as a response to dissatisfaction with the 
nation was always present.”258 The nation-scale conflict known as the American Civil War, it 
might be said, revealed the reality of the lack of genuine unity within the national fabric of the 
young US nation, and was perhaps the greatest historical example of an attempted secession 
legitimized in the language of one`s entitlement to the rights of individual sovereignty and 
self-government, the bedrock principles of US American nationalism.  
In my assessment, in a number of key respects, the Civil War, just like the War for 
Independence, was a conflict of regional elites which was this time played out within the US 
nation. The ‘stumbling block,’ though, was the same internalized ideal of sovereignty, 
inherited from the ideological repertoire of English nationalism and legitimized by the 
South`s membership in the US nation: as Greenfeld remarks, “the Southern states felt 
increasingly deprived of influence,”259 and, by seceding from the Union, they were exercising 
“their sacred right of self-government.”260 By its secession, the South was putting US 
America`s national identity in jeopardy.  
It seems that even the abolition of slavery was not an end in itself, given Lincoln`s overall 
indecision and the passage of the Fugitive Slave act by the federal government.261 As 
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Greenfeld notes, “most Northerners did not regard slavery in the South as problematic.”262 
Abolitionism was therefore in many respects a way / pretext to maintain the Union, since it 
quite well exposed the contradiction built into the Southern claims to individual liberty. 
Human bondage was seen as an affront to human dignity, and, by that, to the national ethos 
which avowed to protect this dignity. The affront was therefore to the nation`s foundational 
axiology, the affront was to the Nation (its identity). The South`s separatist sentiment and its 
unwillingness to abolish the slavery system were interpreted as an attack on the sovereignty of 
the Union and the values of the US nation. The ideals (the local identity) of the South were no 
longer seen as American.263 It might be somewhat an exaggeration, but the South was in a 
sense on its way to becoming a nation on its own. However, the South was defeated, and the 
common national identity, as Greenfeld puts it, “finally achieved a geo-political 
embodiment.”264 The geopolitical object of national loyalty had thus been established in its 
entirety.  
I argue that the triumph of the Union (of one nation) was the triumph of a single/common 
social reality. As Greenfeld notes, “the Civil War marked the line between the dream of 
nationality and its realization.”265 The victory affirmed the united nation and its national 
discourse, having practically completed the nation-building project (if it can ever be 
completed in the US). The Reconstruction that followed created the context in which “the 
unitary American nation became a primary focus of ideology and power.”266 US America`s 
national identity, once a “principle of symbolic legitimation,” became “the dominant or sole 
principle”267 of American nationhood. “A nation of self-made men,” US America itself 
became “a self-made nation.”268 
*** 
Such was the extralinguistic structural context in which, as I argue, the US national identity 
was born. However, why did the architects of the US American nation conceive of its identity 
the way they did – in that specific language (in ‘the language of liberty and equality,’ in 
Zinn`s words)? As has already been mentioned, the colonial elites and most of the colonial 
population were the bearers of the English national identity. English nationalism was 
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therefore the habitus in which those individuals were nurtured. It was the semantic 
environment which shaped their thought and belief. As this thesis argues, the founders could 
imagine the new nation only in the way which they considered ‘commonsense.’ At the same 
time, to enlist the support of the colonial masses, most of whom were, as it seems, raised in 
the same habitus, the elites had no choice (and they knew no other choice) but to describe the 
new nation in the terms of English nationalism. The principles of the English national identity 
were indeed the common sense which gave form to the colonists` thought and to which they 
appealed to justify the colonies` secession from Britain. English nationalism was therefore the 
cultural environment of the utterance about what the new nation was or was to be.   
 
3.2 The Cultural Context of US America`s National Identity 
 
Having briefly outlined the situational context of US America`s national beginnings, I would 
like to pay closer attention to the cultural context in which the future US nation was 
conceived.  As Bourdieu argues, “agents construct social realities and enter into struggles […] 
aimed at imposing their vision,” and they do so “with points of view, interests, and principles 
of vision determined by the position in the very world they intend to transform or 
preserve.”269 In the sociologist`s understanding, the ‘field of power,’ that is, the field of the 
dominant class in the social space of class relations (‘the social field’), is necessarily “the 
field of struggle for power between holders of the capital that creates opportunities in [this 
very] struggle.”270 According to Bourdieu, the ‘field of cultural production’ (intellectual, 
philosophical, artistic, literary) exists as a basic element of this struggle for power.271  Seen 
from this perspective, the dominant class`s ‘will to power’ might thus be understood as a 
struggle to establish “the dominant principle of domination, which is not identified as such, 
but is recognised and therefore legitimate.”272 The power groups thus “fight to establish in 
whose name it is legitimate to dominate,”273 and this struggle is of deeply symbolic nature. 
Greenfeld voices a similar conviction that social action is determined by the particular 
motivations of the relevant actors; these motivations however are shaped by the actors` 
specific beliefs and value orientations.274 Therefore, as Greenfeld contends, social reality is 
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“essentially symbolic” and “intrinsically cultural,” while social action is “meaningfully 
oriented action.”275 “[T]he study of meaningful orientations”276 and subjective meanings of 
social actors is thus integral to the study of the nation as a social phenomenon.  As has already 
been argued, a specific image of social order is objectivized / materialized into the actual 
reality from the minds of those who participate in this order.277 The image is thus very much 
determined by the content of these individual minds: ideas, values, orientations, etc. The 
specificity of such content is what accounts for the fact that “social orders are widely 
variable.”278  
To study the US nation, in Greenfeld`s opinion, is to study “the cultural, subjective, meaning- 
and model-creating symbolic elements in [its] social reality.”279 In the case of US America, it 
is perhaps even more important to do so, for the US nation “illustrates the essential 
independence of nationality from geo-political and ethnic factors and underscores its 
conceptual, or ideological, nature.”280 As Greenfeld notes, it was “the fate of the American 
nation […] ‘not to have ideologies but to be one.’”281 The US American case is indeed quite 
unique in this regard, for the symbolic / cultural constraints predated the situational 
constraints that arose in the Revolutionary moment.282 Future Americans brought their own 
social reality (the image of it in their minds) to North America: the colonists were already in 
possession of national identity long before the particular configuration of situational 
constraints around the Revolutionary moment made it possible for them to form a unique 
American identity.283   
Therefore, since, as has been argued, there is no ‘aboriginal reality,’ what makes ‘reality’ 
along with its ‘ultimate truths’ and ‘falsities’ (‘common sense’) is the meanings and 
imaginings which result from “the prolonged and intricate processes of construction and 
negotiation deeply embedded in the culture.”284 To outline the cultural context that 
conditioned the peculiar imagining of the US nation, I would like to address the work by Liah 
Greenfeld for its compelling treatment of the subject matter. Given that culture is 
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“constitutive of mind,”285 the question I attempt to answer here is ‘What cultural context was 
constitutive of the US American national ‘mind’?’ 
 
The English Idea of the Nation 
According to Greenfeld, the first and the only nation for almost two hundred years was the 
sixteenth-century English nation with its specific national identity.286 As Greenfeld further 
notes, given the dominance of England in the international arena, “the impact of the 
transformation that occurred in sixteenth-century England on [world`s major nationalisms] is 
beyond question.”287 The birth of the English nation was thus the birth of nationalism as the 
phenomenon that would define the world of modernity.288 Therefore, as Greenfeld contends, 
the analysis of English nationalism with its specific set of ideas and ideals “is essential for the 
understanding of the nature of the original idea of the nation, the conditions for its 
development, and its social uses.”289 I argue here that the analysis of English nationalism is 
especially relevant to the discussion of the US American national identity, for, as will be 
demonstrated, it was the English national identity that the United States as a nation was to 
inherit. The influence of English nationalism on US America was thus direct and most 
formative. It is perhaps the irony of history that England, which was to battle its colonial 
possessions in North America, in fact, created its own ‘monster’ long before the 
Revolutionary moment: the world’s first nation actively fostered the idea and ideal of 
individual sovereignty and raised its offspring in this ‘climate of opinion.’ England trained US 
America to conceive of its independence in the terms which would convincingly justify such 
an act; it provided the necessary ideological repertoire for the formulation of US America`s 
peculiar national character and national identity.  
 
A series of historical events contributed to the establishment of the nation as the central 
principle of social organization.  According to Greenfeld, the first and most formative event, 
which set off the chain of structural transformations in the social reality of England, was “the 
War of the Roses and the accession of the Tudor dynasty to the English throne.”290 The 
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structural consequences of this historical event generated a void in the upper classes of the 
English feudal hierarchy which were to be filled by the Tudors` “new aristocracy from the 
common people,”291 thereby creating a precedent of social mobility (“the reorganization of the 
social pyramid along different lines”292) in the formerly strictly stratified society. This 
simultaneously created a situation of “status-inconsistency.”293 The newborn elite was in need 
of a new image of social reality and a new identity which would sustain this particular image. 
The new aristocracy found itself in the state of some sort of cognitive dissonance which was 
expressed in the incompatibility between the existing idea that status was unalienable from 
linage and their specific situational context (new social circumstances) in which the 
individuals of relatively humble origin now constituted the society`s elite.294  In order to 
legitimize the newly acquired status, the demand was therefore to explain / rationalize this 
contradiction first to themselves and then to the people.295 As Greenfeld argues, the idea of 
the nation was to become such an explanation / rationalization.  
A number of further events contributed to the consolidation of the national idea in the minds 
of the English masses. One of the critical historical moments was the extinguishment of the 
power of Rome over the internal affairs of England and the establishment of the Anglican 
Church (this occurred in the historical context of the Protestant Reformation).296 Protestantism 
stimulated literacy, which only facilitated the distribution of the national idea that was in turn 
increasingly formulated in the language of Protestantism.297 In the years of Mary I`s anti-
Protestant policy, Protestantism itself came to be associated with the national struggle (the 
struggle for nationhood).298 Another important contribution was made by the English 
monarchs who were somewhat bound (by the ideological climate of the day) to participate in 
the nationalist discourse and who conceived of their country as foremost a ‘commonwealth’ 
of individuals.299 The English people`s loyalty to the Crown was nationalist at that, while the 
Crown did not reign over individual sovereigns, but, as a symbol of the English people`s 
uniqueness and sovereignty, served the nation.300 Under the Protectorate of Oliver Cromwell, 
the concept of the ‘commonwealth’ had taken on a new meaning of republicanism/republican 
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rule, further endowing the English folk with political power and authority.301 All these events 
were moving England in the direction of becoming a true nation. Although the Restoration 
witnessed a return to the old rhetoric, it nonetheless did not imply a “return to the pre-
nationalist conception of polity.”302 Therefore, the word ‘nation’ became synonymous with 
the people of England: the new lexis in Parliamentary acts began to reflect the new reality in 
which the society had already been living for some time. The reality was that “by 1600, the 
existence in England of a national consciousness and identity, and as a result, of a new geo-
political entity, a nation, was a fact.”303 ‘A nation’ came to be collectively understood as a 
community of individuals of ‘separate and equal station,’ that is, of the bearers of individual 
sovereignty.  
In light of the above discussion, it would be useful to remember Anthony Smith`s ethno-
symbolic approach to the nation. Central to his approach is the concept of “a dominant 
ethnie,”304 around which modern nations are constructed: dominant ‘ethnies’ not only create 
nations, but also “group together certain populations in terms of shared cultural 
characteristics”305 that define this nation. Ethnies are therefore “named units of population 
with common ancestry myths and historical memories, elements of shared culture, some link 
with a historic territory and some measure of solidarity, at least among their elites.”306 Ethnies 
might be distinguished by repertoires of myths, symbols, values, which are passed on from 
generation to generation across the whole of the territory and the population (horizontally and 
vertically). Ethnicity had never been the central state-/nation-building element in the history 
of the US nation. US America is by no means a mono-ethnic nation, but the national 
symbolism (indeed, the habitus) in which all members are united have specific ethnic roots 
(belong to certain ethnies): the English national identity seems to be the formative ethnie in 
this regard. However, as Greenfeld notes, the ideas at the core of English nationalism were “in 
no way peculiarly English,” but it was in England that they came to be internalized into an 
entire people`s identity. The ideological heritage of ancient Rome and Greece as well as the 
culture of the ancient Jewish people (most importantly, the Bible) contributed to the formation 
of nationalism as a phenomenon of modernity and, by that, defined this modernity.  As Smith 
himself notes: “though most latter-day nations are, in fact, polyethnic, […] many have been 
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formed in the first place around a dominant ethnie […]. In other words nations always require 
‘ethnic elements.’ These may, of course, be reworked; they often are.”307 At this point, I 
would like to linger a bit more over what constituted the central principles at the foundation of 
English nationalism which was to become the ideological basis of US America`s national 
ethos, indeed, its very identity.  
As Greenfeld remarks, the concept of the nation was at its core humanistic: its most 
fundamental element was the recognition of the essential rationality of man which entitled 
him to the freedom of thought and decision, to be the owner of his self, the supreme authority 
in his life.308 It was therefore the sacred right to individual sovereignty which defined the 
nature of English nationalism. One had thus been granted the greatest possible degree of 
liberty to carry out actions and make decisions dictated by his mind. The choice of pronouns 
is important here, for ‘reason’ was the attribute of a (white) man, his privilege. The right to 
reason was distributed unevenly309 and was, indeed, a privilege: some members of society 
were considered reasonable by the right of their nature (for example, white men of a specific 
religious persuasion), and it was to them that the logic of the national idea appealed. Others 
(women, the representatives of other races and nationalities) were considered as inherently 
lacking in reason. The possession of the faculty of reason nonetheless became “the basis for 
the recognition of the autonomy of the individual conscience and the principle of civic 
liberty.”310 The equality in reason qualified individuals to “participate in collective 
decisions”311 (especially those related to the field of the political). A community of reasonable 
sovereigns, the nation was becoming a common cause, indeed, a ‘res publica.’  
As Greenfeld believes, the sanctity of individual sovereignty, legitimized by one`s possession 
of reason, was further valorized by scientific discourse, for science came to embody this 
humanistic, rationalistic and empirical worldview.312 Science heralded the primacy of nature 
and natural laws. Science was in many respects articulating the character of the English 
national identity: it changed the worldview of the popular consciousness, thereby fostering a 
favorable ‘climate of opinion’ for the development of the nation. Nationalism in turn provided 
science with the necessary prestige, strengthening its status in society. As has already been 
noted, these ideas were not exclusively English. However, it was in England that they were 
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integrated into the very identity of a people with such success that these principles and ideals 
became a kind of ‘common sense,’ a commonsensical knowledge of social reality, 
transforming this reality forever.313  
To provide a historical example of the centrality of the ideal of individual sovereignty to the 
national consciousness of seventeenth-century England, “[i]t was this inability to be English 
in England,”314 according to Greenfeld, that motivated thousands of religious Englishmen to 
depart for the North-American shores. These future Americans were the Puritans, bearers of 
the English national identity. In Greenfeld`s assessment, the Puritans were ‘hard-core’ 
nationalists, for “[t]he Puritan state of mind […] was but a logical development of the national 
consciousness.”315 It was through the efforts of this religious sect that the 
democratic/republican stimulus within the idea of the nation was introduced into the social 
structure of England in the first place. On American soil, the Puritans were among those who 
were creating the image of social order in the new territory (Greenfeld points out “New 
England`s lead in the interpretation”316 of the US identity). On the surface, the Puritans 
demanded only spiritual reform, but many in England understood that Puritanism carried a 
powerful reformatory potential for the society as a whole: “Puritanism opened wide the gates 
for the reform of society in general, and implied nothing less than the destruction of the 
established order.”317 The religiosity of Puritanism aided in the promotion of the movement, 
in its self-representation and the formulation of its ideology: appeals to religion most 
convincingly justified the unprecedented reformist claims of the Puritans, claims that logically 
followed from the very definition of England as a nation.318 Social change was demanded in 
the idiom of God`s will and England`s position as a God-chosen nation. It was “through the 
Puritan mediation,” as Greenfeld believes, “that love of liberty became the distinguishing 
characteristic of America.”319 
As follows from the above discussion, nationalism (national sentiment) postulated “a 
principled individualism, a commitment to one`s own and other people`s human rights”320 and 
thereby launched a series of fundamental changes in the structure of the social reality and the 
rhetoric of the political culture. As Greenfeld argues, since its inception, the nation was 
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developing as democracy; this association survived in nations where the necessary social 
conditions for democratic development existed.321 In the case of democratic nationalisms 
(unlike collectivistic-authoritarian nationalisms), a new structural reality predated the 
emergence of a nation:322 a people already conceived of themselves as a political elite and had 
been exercising their political power for some time, that is, “sovereignty of the people was the 
implication of the actual sovereignty of individuals”323 (in practice, however, it was done only 
by a small number of individuals who as if represented ‘the people’). Therefore, where the 
structural transformations of society elevated common folk to the level of an elite (endowed 
them with ‘individual sovereignty’), democracy was possible. Greenfeld refers to this national 
principle as ‘individualistic or individualistic-libertarian.’324 This principle recognized in a 
synecdochic manner the political authority of each individual and, by extension, the authority 
of the collectivity that these individuals comprised, that is, a national people`s sovereignty.  
The notions of a national people`s sovereignty and its member`s individual sovereignty were 
indeed the semantic nucleus of the English national idea. Individualistic nationalisms (among 
which is US American nationalism) are at the same time distinguished by libertarian 
undertones: they acknowledge the freedom of an individual`s will within a nation – s/he is a 
sovereign, a source of power in him/herself, in his/her own right. English nationalism was 
indeed a unique and truly humanistic phenomenon in that it exalted the national subject as a 
person of reason and liberty, recognized their dignity and value as foremost an individual. 
Following Greenfeld`s analysis, I therefore argue that the idea of individual sovereignty, “the 
absolute sovereignty, self-government, or independence of every individual,”325 was central 
and defining not only with regard to English nationalism, but also to its ‘offspring,’ the US 
American nation.  
 
The National Idea in US America 
As Zinn notes, quoting Carl Bridenbaugh, the leaders of colonial America “eagerly sought to 
preserve in America the social arrangements of the Mother Country.”326 I might add that the 
elites sought to preserve not only ‘the social arrangements’ as regards the issue of power, but 
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also the ideological/cultural arraignments of the parent country which effectively legitimized 
the status-quo power relations. It seems to be especially true in the context of structural 
anomie that the secession from Britain was about to create, for when “a way of construing the 
world goes out of control,”327 one naturally seeks to keep “a state of knowledge from being 
upset.”328 As has been argued, it was the preoccupation with power relations (sustained by 
status) that was among the leading motivations behind the construction of the united 
American nation. I argued that the elites` decision to overthrow the British rule was their 
interpretation of the imperial center`s actions as the abridgment of the colonies` sovereignty. 
The elites` sovereignty (status) was guaranteed by their being the subjects of the British 
Crown. The affront to sovereignty was understood as taking the form of the encroachment on 
economic liberty and the liberty to exercise political power/authority, the sacred right of the 
British people, as the colonial elites and colonial population thought of themselves. As 
Greenfeld contends, the colonists, including “[t]he soon-to-be architects of independence,” 
thought of themselves as “true English”329 and even “better English than the English,”330 
while “[t]he formation of the sense of American uniqueness in no manner interfered with the 
loyalty of Americans to the English nation and their English national identity.”331 Americans 
pursued an even purer “realization of an English ideal”332 at the time when Britain itself, 
“tired of the revolutionary striving to attain the ideal,”333 was no longer able to realize it. It 
was “this sense of exemplary devotion to and implementation of English values”334 and 
inability to be ‘English’ within the British empire, that is, to exercise individual sovereignty 
and be the masters over “their destinies (and purses),”335 that got the elites thinking for the 
first time about the possibility of existence without the British hegemony; in a social reality in 
which their sovereignty and status would longer come under attack.  
By its nature, English nationalism was “potentially self-destructive:” “[a] drive for secession 
was inherent in [it and], furthermore, rendered it legitimate.”336 The idealistic devotion to the 
ideal of individual sovereignty was similarly “by its very nature a stimulus for disaffection 
and revolt, for the more intense the commitment to the ideals, the more sensitive, the more 
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intolerant, one became to the imperfections in their realization.”337 The principle value of 
English nationalism “made the separation conceivable, possible, and legitimate.”338 The 
colonies` particular grievances were therefore articulated in the only language that could 
justify the secession and make it legitimate. As Bruner remarks, “[g]etting what you want 
very often means getting the right story;” and for the elites, ‘to get the story right,’ it was 
necessary to appeal to “what constitute[ed] the canonically acceptable version.”339 The elites 
had to make their actions “seem an extension of the canonical, transformed by mitigating 
circumstances”340 in order to ensure consensus. “Any program of desire and action”341 thus 
must be carried out in accordance with the world picture / the map of reality which is believed 
by most to be the Reality. As Bruner puts it, “the value commitments of [a community`s] 
members provide either the basis for the satisfactory conduct of a way of life or, at least, a 
basis for negotiation.”342 In the aftermath of the War of Independence, the elites were ‘torn’ 
apart by the pressing question: “What was to be the nation of the Americans?”343 The 
powerful few thus further needed to create a certain narrative / discourse of national identity 
in the culturally legitimate language which would serve as such a “basis for the satisfactory 
conduct of a way of life or, at least, a basis for negotiation.”344 Given the colonists` “devotion 
to the English ideals,” the US American nation was to turn these ideals into reality. “Liberty 
and equality” thus “became self-evident”345 for Americans.  
After the Revolution, the greatest problem was that while, “[a]s Englishmen, the colonists all 
belonged to one nation, as Americans, they inhabited different provinces:” beyond their 
idealistic devotion to the English national identity “Americans of different colonies shared 
little, and the differences of locale, climate, and economic and social arrangements other than 
the basic equality of conditions among the white men led to the differentiation of the unique 
American identity into different local identities of specific colonies.”346 The articulation and 
adoption of one common national identity binding enough to beat all the local ‘prides’ and 
affiliations was necessary to secure a common ideological/cultural space, thereby minimizing 
the occurrence of popular unrest and the dissolution of the Union. The discursive construction 
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of a new identity nonetheless could hardly have taken any other form than the one which was 
native to the Americans. I argue that the English national identity with its fundamental 
principles and ideals was the habitus (or cultural environment) which nurtured the thought of 
the future Americans and constituted their ‘common sense.’ The principles of English 
nationalism thus constituted the ordinary / the canonical version of reality (‘common sense’ 
or, more precisely, ‘good sense’ and ‘folk wisdom’), and by that it constituted ‘the good’ (the 
moral). Indeed, the very rationale for the secession from England was formulated in the 
language of the principles of English nationalism. The founders had to appeal to the idea of 
individual sovereignty, to the language of predestination and natural rights, etc., but, as I dare 
argue, they themselves did not ‘speak’ any other language, for it was this habitus that formed 
them. This somewhat denies the elite (the political actors) an absolute freedom of thought and 
action. As Bourdieu notes, “the notion of habitus allows us to avoid two illusions: the illusion 
of an individual teleology - the subjective illusion […] - and the illusion of a collective 
teleology.”347 The elite`s strategies were therefore, on the one hand, a response to the 
situational context (structural constraints) in which they found themselves, while, on the other 
hand, the architects were ‘trapped’ in a different kind of context, the inner context of their 
specific habitus which conditioned their thoughts, motivations and actions. This, of course, 
does involve a degree of mediation by an individual, for, as has been noted, habitus does not 
inhibit ‘independent’ thought, only delineates its ‘semantic circumference,’ so to say. A 
strategy, as Bourdieu remarks, “is not cynical calculation, the conscious pursuit of maximum 
specific profit, but an unconscious relationship between a habitus and a field.”348 To quote 
Zinn one more time, there was, indeed, “no conscious forethought strategy by the colonial 
elite, but a growing awareness as events developed.”349 The situation was thus one of “supply 
creating demand.”350 The architects needed to makes sense of the exceptional, and such 
storied explications, as Bruner observes, will inevitably include an appeal to “some canonical 
element in the culture.”351 A cultural community`s ‘common sense’ creates a context in which 
the subject exists, and which in turn modifies the articulation and expression of the subject`s 
desires and beliefs. As I understand it, ‘supply,’ the ideal of individual sovereignty, thus 
created ‘demand’ for such sovereignty when the colonists felt like their ‘birthright’ was 
violated. To act against or to fail to acknowledge what is believed to be common sense would 
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make one appear “insane,”352 indeed, lacking in good reason. Britain`s actions were 
interpreted as just that, a series of ‘repeated injuries’ to the sense of individual sovereignty of 
its faithful American subjects. The ideals of a national member`s and a national people`s 
sovereignty were the ‘common sense’ and ‘the good,’ while the metropole`s measures were 
seen as violating this sovereignty, as, in the words of the Declaration, ‘an absolute Tyranny 
over these States,’ and thus as (by definition) morally corrupt. 
This argument, of course, might be debated, but there is a degree of reasonableness to this 
understanding of the motivations behind the elite`s strategies in light of the US American 
nation building. What the American nation as a cultural community needed most to cohere 
was “the existence of interpretive procedures for adjudicating the different construals of 
reality that are inevitable in any diverse society.”353 The diverse society of US America thus 
had to be “bound in a set of connecting stories, connecting even though the stories may not 
represent a consensus.”354 The American Thesis (the Creed) became one such ‘interpretive 
procedure.’ As I will attempt to demonstrate in the following chapter, by its nature, the 
American Thesis not only represents a powerful narrative of the US national identity, but also 
manages to bind / unite the diverse society of US America in one image of social reality 
(indeed, in one common ideological consensus) and downplay the effects of ideological 
dissent, thereby creating internal coherence and solidarity, ensuring the constant practice of 
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4. The American Creed/Thesis as US America`s National Identity 
 
From my perspective as a student of US national culture, US American nationalism is an 
intricate complex of different, sometimes conflicting and competing, components.  It seems to 
be about ardent faith in progress and change, and at the same time about a similarly semi-
religious allegiance to US America`s socio-political institutions. It is belief in an individual`s 
right to secession and self-expression, while at the same time some kind of reluctance (and 
even the undesirability of any attempts) to transform the established order. It is belief in the 
exceptionality of US America`s ways of socio-historical development, which at times gives 
rise to extreme forms of nationalism. It is the conviction that US America`s unique model of 
development can be easily applied to the rest of the world, and, moreover, that it is US 
America`s providential mission to do so. It is about strong adherence to the ideals of equality, 
while at the same time about the cultural inclination towards hero-making and deification of 
the rich. It is commitment to the ideals of individual sovereignty and liberty, while at the same 
time to the virtue of community, which makes the US nation quite conformist, leading to the 
occasional abridgment of individual rights. Finally, it is about intellectualism and modernity 
and at the same time anti-intellectualist and anti-modern sentiments in their crudest forms.  
I therefore conclude that US nationalism is distinguished by a considerable degree of duality, 
some sort of the Jekyll and Hyde syndrome, if I can make such an analogy.  Quite a few 
thinkers (listed below) have commented on US American nationalism`s paradoxical 
combination of the modern and pre-/anti-modern, the progressive and reactionary, the new 
and antediluvian/radically conservative. Engels, for example, spoke of “a truly American 
paradox clothing the most stubborn tendencies in the most medieval mummeries”355 and 
observed that “in America […] the most antediluvian and obsolete calmly continues side by 
side with the newest and the most revolutionary.”356 Alexis de Tocqueville noted that 
American civilization was a result of two contradictory elements “intimately united:” “the 
spirit of religion and the spirit of freedom marching” in lockstep (unlike in his native France, 
where they were “marching in opposite directions”357). The US American character thus 
seems to be made of such polarities – individualism alongside conformity, idealism alongside 
materialism, equality alongside achievement, individualism alongside commitment. As David 
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Potter writes, “[t]he most disconcerting fact about these […] composite images of the 
American is that they are strikingly dissimilar and seemingly about as inconsistent with one 
another as two interpretations of the same phenomenon could possibly be.”358 Michael 
Kammen, for his part, describes the Americans as ‘people of paradox.’ In his Pulitzer-winning 
book of the same title, Kammen talks about US America`s “dualistic state of mind:” 
“Americans have managed to be both puritanical and hedonistic, idealistic and materialistic, 
peace-loving and warmongering, isolationist and interventionist, conformist and individualist, 
consensus-minded and conflict-prone.”359 In Negative Liberties, Cyrus R. K. Patell, drawing 
on the work by Robert Bellah, acknowledges the existence of two languages within US 
American nationalism as defined by the principle of individual sovereignty (‘American 
individualism’): the first language represents “the individualistic mode that is the dominant 
American form of discourse about moral, social, and political matters,” while the second 
language represents “other forms, primarily biblical and republican, that provide at least part 
of the moral discourse of most Americans.”360 This second language is, according Patell, of 
rhizomic nature, that is, consists of multiple ‘second’ languages which are “vestigial, 
fragmentary, and relatively unarticulated.”361   
For the purposes of my study of the US national identity, I would like to adopt the framework 
advanced by Anatol Lieven in America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American 
Nationalism. Approaching the United States as “the most modern and the most traditionalist 
society in the developed world,”362 Lieven identifies the most liberal progressive forces and 
the most radically conservative anti-modernist counterforces operating within the US 
American national self. He thus distinguishes between “[t]he two souls of American 
nationalism:”363 the American Thesis (the American Creed or the American Ideology) and the 
American Antithesis. To adopt Greenfeld`s understanding of national identity as “a set of 
ideas”364 or as Bourdieu`s “principles of vision,”365 the American Thesis as “the set of great 
democratic, legal and individualist beliefs and principles on which the American state […] is 
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founded”366 thus represents the very identity of the US nation. Therefore, as I argue in this 
thesis, the US American nation`s narrative of identity exists in the form of the American 
Thesis as a set of propositions (Bourdieu`s “orthodox discourse”367) which makes the 
“discursive constructions of the nation plausible and self-evident, […] creat[ing] internal 
solidarity and commitment to the nation state and its policies, and […] represent[ing] the US 
to outsiders.”368 In my assessment, the central of those propositions is the principle of 
individual sovereignty (‘the separate and equal station,’ the equality of ‘all men’ ‘endowed by 
their Creator, with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the 
pursuit of Happiness,’ as well as the government, ‘deriving [its] just powers from the consent 
of the governed.’) The American Thesis is thus a liberal/democratic force which ensures 
respect for one`s rights in US America.  
In addition to Lieven`s understanding of the phenomenon, I also dare argue that the Thesis 
constitutes the US nation`s morality, because, as I will further demonstrate, in US America, it 
is seen as morally right to profess the Thesis, and rather immoral to violate its principles. This 
allows the Thesis as the society`s ‘good’ to contain divergent (undemocratic) interpretations 
of the common reality by returning them to the ‘ordinary’ and ‘the good’ which the Thesis 
defines in the first place. Such divergent interpretations of the national self might be 
subsumed under what Lieven calls ‘the American Antithesis,’369 the strand in the fabric of US 
American nationalism which is radically pre- and even anti-modern. According to Lieven, the 
Antithesis is thus “a central feature of American radical conservatism.”370 Articulating its 
protest/grievances in the rhetoric of the Thesis, the American Antithesis nonetheless creates a 
force of considerable power which is disruptive to the national unity in the American 
Creed.371 Lieven argues that “the combination of these different strands […] determines the 
overall nature of the American national identity and largely shapes American attitudes and 
policies toward the outside world.”372 I will return to these phenomena and illustrate the 
peculiarities of their interaction in the following chapters “The American Thesis: US 
America`s National Self” and “The American Antithesis: The Disruptive Force within US 
America`s National Self.” 
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To illustrate the “extreme tension”373 between the liberal forces of the Thesis and the radically 
conservative counterforces of the Antithesis, Lieven uses the analogy of a hurricane which is 
similarly formed in the clash between “[a] mass of warm, humid air” and “a mass of cooler 
layers of air.”374 To illustrate this point to myself and the reader, I would like to borrow the 
analogy of the ‘order-entropy’ distinction from basically any high school physics textbook, 
for such, indeed, seems to be the ‘physics’ of US nationalism: the order of the American 
Thesis and the entropy of the American Antithesis. As it seems to me and as I will attempt to 
demonstrate below, while the Thesis creates order (the unity of the Americans in one 
ideological consensus, and, by that, the observance of civil liberties, namely, the right to 
individual sovereignty), the Antithesis (due to its entropicity) somewhat challenges these 
propositions, thereby creating cracks and schisms in the established order.  However, in such 
entropic moments, the principles of the dominant Thesis are applied to new situations 
produced by the Antithesis (the Antithesis as if illuminates various ‘weak’ aspects of the 
social reality). The resolution to such national crises comes to be formulated in the 
liberal/democratic language of the American Thesis, which only reinforces the nation`s 
allegiance to its principles and thus secures the constancy of the practice of democracy in US 
society. Therefore, Lieven remarks that “as in a hurricane or thunderstorm, rather than simply 
being opposing forces, the two elements which combine to produce this system work 
together.”375 The entropy and order of US American nationalism are thus complementary 
forces. Order consolidates that which has been achieved (for example, democratic reform), 
building it into the existing structure (in this case, into that of the national community). 
Following the logic of the ‘order-entropy’ analogy, if order prevails over entropy, the 
situation is always one of stagnation (the absence of qualitative change). Entropy exposes that 
which has been achieved to erosion and destruction, thereby opening space for further 
development and change. The prevalence of entropic forces over those of order leads to the 
complete destruction of the achieved progress and the existing structure itself, for entropy is 
never concerned with the assimilation of the ‘gains’ made. As I will argue in the chapter “The 
American Thesis: The Assimilation of Dissent,” national entropy in the form of the American 
Antithesis thus stimulates democratic reform in US America: when the existing order is 
challenged, it is put to revision by the American Thesis which assimilates (antithetical) protest 
into the practice of democracy, the observance of individual rights. As a result, the US 
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American nation arises from the ashes of its occasional lapses into “beleaguered hysteria”376 
as a ‘renewed’ (more democratic) national community. In my understanding, by 
accommodating the exceptional to the canonical (and the moral), the Thesis thereby manages 
diversity (the very objective the architects of US nationalism were pursuing). As Lieven 
observes, the Thesis (with its complex interaction with the Antithesis) has “a special role in 
holding a disparate nation together:”377 the principles of the Thesis and their value for the 
well-being of the nation are in fact “the only things on which [for example] Pentecostalists in 
Texas and gays in San Francisco can agree.”378 I will return to this point in the following 
chapter “The American Thesis: The Assimilation of Dissent.” 
To add to Leiven`s argument, drawing from the work by Richard Hughes on US America`s 
national mythology, I come to the conclusion that, as a dominant narrative, the American 
Thesis is told with the aid of specific cultural languages (Lieven also seems to acknowledge 
the existence of these languages as he refers to them as the Creed`s “attendant national 
myths,”379 but, unfortunately, does not go into much detail in discussing them). I choose to 
approach these ‘myths’ (as both Hughes and Lieven refer to them) as in fact mythic 
narratives, because, as I will further argue, the American Thesis as the nation`s identity is, in 
my understanding, foremost a peculiar cultural narrative (a discursive construction) of the US 
nation. These narratives are formally not part of the American Thesis, but are nonetheless 
closely related to it, for they aid in the narration (justification, legitimization, rationalization, 
and representation) of the US national self. As Lieven notes, “[t]hese myths are not, strictly 
speaking, part of the formal Thesis or Creed, but help give it much of its emotional force.”380 
However, I do agree that these cultural narratives are indeed of deeply mythic nature (I hold 
with Roland Barthes`s understanding of myth as a language, “a type of speech”381); they are 
thus discourses which are primarily narrative in their structure. In my understanding, the 
narratives of chosenness, naturalness, and messianism/millennialism help to rationalize, 
legitimize, and justify the conception and representation of US America in its national 
identity, the American Thesis. The mythic languages of the American Thesis will be the main 
focus of analysis in the chapter “The Myths of US American Nationalism.” 
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4.1 The American Thesis: US America`s National Self 
 
In this thesis, I argue that the American Thesis/Creed is the very identity of the US nation. It 
is the meaning of US America, its common sense and morality. Let us first list those 
fundamental propositions which constitute the nation`s identity in the Thesis. Lieven sums up 
“the elements of the American Creed and American civic nationalism” as follows: the Thesis 
professes “faith in liberty, constitutionalism, the law, democracy, individualism and cultural 
and political egalitarianism.”382 Like Greenfeld, Lieven traces the origin of these ideas to 
“English traditions.”383 To somewhat amplify Lieven`s list, I would like to specify a bit the 
meaning of the general words like ‘faith in liberty,’ ‘individualism,’ and thus ‘cultural and 
political egalitarianism.’   In line with my argument, the American Thesis is, first of all, belief 
in a people`s sovereignty as one nation (a government, ‘deriving their just powers from the 
consent of the governed,’ ‘the Right of the People to alter or to abolish’ an unjust rulership) as 
well as faith in individual sovereignty (the ‘unalienable right’ to ‘Life, Liberty, and the pursuit 
of Happiness’) which implies the equality of such sovereigns (‘the separate and equal station 
to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them’). In my assessment, all of 
these propositions are rationalized, legitimized and often discussed in the languages and 
imagery of the mythic narratives of chosenness (‘Nature's God entitle them,’ ‘endowed by 
their Creator’), naturalness (‘the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God,’ ‘the Course of human 
events’), and messianism (‘with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence’).  
The choice of words is important here, for, as Lieven argues, it is indeed about faith in these 
principles, nothing less than “a form of religious conversion.”384 The American Thesis is 
therefore often referred to as the American Creed. The very word ‘Creed,’ as we can see, has 
connotations of religiosity and religious fervor. The faith in the American Creed indeed 
reaches religious proportions in the United States: Sacvan Bercovitch, whose analysis of the 
‘symbolic construction of America’ will come into focus in the following chapters, similarly 
describes the ubiquitous ideological consensus that he encounters in US America as having 
“all the moral and emotional appeal of a religious symbol.”385 I would dare argue that the 
American Thesis (as the community’s morality) is indeed perhaps the only state religion of 
the US. As Lieven contends, the principles of the American Thesis are “not exceptional to 
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America; most of the beliefs are also held by the other developed democracies.”386 What is 
indeed exceptional about the propositions of the American Thesis is, in Lieven`s assessment, 
“the sheer unanimity of belief in these guiding national principles,”387 or, the fact that, as once 
in England, these ideas were “able to become the content of the people`s very identity, […] 
rooted so firmly in the consciousness, both individual and collective, [as well as] the 
culture.”388 Lieven therefore identifies two most exceptional features of the American Thesis 
as US America`s Creed: the “absolutist passion” with which the principles of the Thesis are 
championed, and “the degree to which they are integral to American nationalism.”389 The 
American Thesis thus constitutes the language and logic of American civic nationalism (“the 
foundation for American civic nationalism,”390 its ‘common sense’) and allows for the self-
representation of the United States as “an example of civic nationalism par excellence.”391 
According to Greenfeld, US nationalism is indeed quite exceptional, for US America 
managed to absolutize the very idea of the nation (along with its inherent values) and became 
perhaps its most ardent practitioner: as the scholar notes, Americans “remained faithful to the 
original idea of the nation, and [came] closest to the realization of the principles of 
individualistic, civic nationalism.”392 “So pervasive is the American Creed or Ideology in 
American culture”393 that Lieven comes to the conclusion that this ‘absolutist passion’ of faith 
in the Thesis is perhaps what accounts for the phenomenon of “compulsive nationalism”394 in 
US national culture.   
Lieven goes even further and concludes that the Thesis is so pervasive that it may in fact be 
compared to some kind of “black magic,” or even a “knee reflex”395 in that it similarly 
suspends independent/divergent/uncanonical thought (outside the semantic circumference 
delineated by the Thesis) in its adherents. Lieven thus believes that it is this effect produced 
by the Thesis that accounts for the country`s “intense national solipsism.”396 Given my 
understanding of the Thesis as US America`s common sense and morality (‘the national 
good’) as well as the above observation that the threat of secession is persistent in the US 
nation, it is therefore logical to conclude that any dissent in US America that does not 
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conform to the principles of the Thesis would be marked as immoral and ‘nonsensical’ or 
even indeed delusional. This point will be elaborated upon in the following chapter “The 
American Thesis: The Assimilation of Dissent.” At this point, it suffices to conclude that, as 
has been demonstrated, the Thesis as the US national identity not only rationalizes and 
legitimizes the discursive construction of the US nation, but also binds US America`s national 
community in a powerful ideological consensus.  
 
4.2 The American Antithesis: The Disruptive Force within US America`s National Self 
 
The American Antithesis is not so uniform in its ideological orientations and aspirations, 
though. As Lieven contends, the Antithesis is a complex national tradition which contains 
most diverse images of the social reality of US America as well as of the world in general.397 
In my understanding, the American Antithesis represents a variety (and a clash) of 
opposing/dissenting narratives rooted in specific ethnoreligious traditions: these include the 
anxieties and grievances of “the original, ‘core’ White Anglo-Saxon and Scots Irish 
populations of the British colonies in North America; the specific historical culture and 
experience of the White South; the cultural world of fundamentalist Protestantism; and the 
particular memories, fears and hatreds of some American ethnic groups and lobbies.”398 
The American Antithesis thus represents a radical form of US nationalism and constitutes the 
nucleus of US America`s radical conservatism.399As Lieven notes, “[r]adical nationalism has 
many fathers, but its mother is defeat, and her milk is humiliation.”400 These particular 
nationalisms within the ‘umbrella’ nationalism of US America are thus nourished by the sense 
of defeat and the resulting attitudes of embitterment and militancy. Why do these antithetical 
segments of the US population feel increasingly defeated and thus embittered and alienated 
within their own nation? To answer this question, we need to return to the very definition of 
the phenomenon of the nation. All the scholars of nationalism on whose research I draw in 
this thesis (Anderson, Breuilly, Greenfeld, Smith) approach nationalism and the nation as the 
products of modernity.  Greenfeld`s Weberian understanding of any social order as an 
objectivization / materialization of its image from the minds of those who participate in this 
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order401 allows the scholar to conclude that, “[r]ather than define nationalism by its 
modernity,” we would be well advised to see “modernity as defined by nationalism.”402 The 
American Thesis which founded the US nation ideologically thus also belongs to modernity 
and to a great extent shapes/defines it. The very term ‘Antithesis,’ as Lieven uses it, implies a 
certain degree of resistance to and even revolt against the Thesis and the social reality it 
creates, that is, against the world of modernity itself. As Lieven rightfully notes, “many 
Americans are in revolt against the world which America itself has made;”403 against the 
many trends of modernity that drive these people into feeling “embattled, embittered and 
defensive.”404 These antithetical groups thus feel increasingly defeated by modern change 
(initiated and sustained not least by the Thesis) which is interpreted by them as “a form of 
daily assault on their passionately held values.”405 According to Lieven, the sense of defeat 
and humiliation that inheres in the Antithesis is therefore generated by what seems like an act 
of coercion to adapt to “a model of modernity and progress which [the Antithesis] did not 
create and over the shape of which [the antithetical groups] have had little say.”406 I believe it 
might be argued that modernity (heralded by the Thesis) violates what these antithetical 
groups consider to be ‘the canonical,’ and thus ‘the good’ (their particular understandings of 
what makes common sense and the morally right). Judging by the list of the antithetical 
groups within the US nation that Lieven provides, we might conclude that these antithetical 
images of the world are quite old (older than the national idea, in fact); some of them can be 
traced back as far as the biblical times (for example, the religious fundamentalism of the 
American South). According to Lieven, the character of these radical antithetical narratives 
can be expressed in “the ‘three Rs’ of extreme nationalism:” “Reaction against the tendencies 
of the present; Resistance to Change; and Radicalism, which has radical change in mind.”407 
The practice of the Antithesis (of extreme nationalism) by these groups thus fuels “the mood 
of beleaguered hysteria”408 as well as the national paranoia of the perceived threat to the 
nation`s sovereignty, cultivates a culture of hatred and violence, and occasionally tampers 
with domestic policies, thus wielding a great deal of influence on the nature of US America`s 
nationalism. According to Lieven, the American Revolution itself, although rationalized in the 
language of the Thesis, did contain such elements of resistance to modernity. The King was 
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seen as having betrayed the ancient English liberties by having started to rule in a novel way 
(indeed, dared to violate the canonical). As Lieven notes, “[a]t least some aspects of the 
American Revolution itself were founded in a ‘dread of modernity.’”409 Nonetheless, US 
America was by and large heralding modernity: everything about it was new and indeed 
revolutionary; its national organization was decisively Modern.  
In reference to the American Antithesis, Lieven identifies another central feature of US 
radical nationalism: the “rhetoric of ‘taking back’ America and restoring an older, purer 
American society.”410 Lieven notes that if the Thesis might be somewhat radical in its 
decisive orientation towards the nation`s glorious future (the language of messianism will be 
discussed in the concluding chapter), then the Antithesis is radical precisely because “it 
continuously looks backward, to a vanished and idealized national past” and seeks to restore 
the image of that past in the social order of the day (to “return to an idealized past, of a 
culturally and ethnically purer nation”411). In my understanding, Richard Hughes`s analysis of 
US national mythology supports Lieven`s argument as regards the US antithetical groups` 
resistance to modernity and their ideological orientation towards the past. Hughes approaches 
this feature of US radical conservatism within the context of ‘the myth of the eternal return.’ 
Drawing on Mircea Eliade, Hughes pays attention to how these groups (conservative 
Americans that practice antithetical nationalism, Hughes refers to them as ‘traditional 
people’) seek to make modernity, that is, “the secular world of rapid change,” “bearable and 
meaningful by living symbolically and mythically in a sacred time, of the founding of their 
world.” As these ‘traditional people’ seek to objectivize their specific images of the world 
into US America`s contemporary social reality, the United States has been reenacting “the 
restoration vision […] with such regularity that it has become an American version of ‘the 
myth of the eternal return.’”412 The pursuit of an idealized past thus generates much tension 
(expressed in irrational fears, animosity, hatred, etc.) within the nation living in modernity as 
defined by the Thesis, and is often projected on the outside world.  
Although in revolt against modernity and its key aspects, the US antithetical groups are, as 
Lieven believes, not in (at least public) revolt against the Thesis as such.413 These antithetical 
strands within US nationalism “are usually subordinate to American civic nationalism 
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stemming from the Creed, which dominates official and public political culture.”414 
Moreover, if asked, these individuals would most likely voice their strong faith “in the 
American democratic and liberal Creed.”415 However, the specificity of these ‘traditional 
people`s’ allegiance to the national Creed seems to reside in their peculiar understating of it. 
Not only do they strongly believe that the American Thesis is “the product of a specific White 
Christian American civilization, and that both are threatened by immigration, racial minorities 
and foreign influence,”416 they would also tend to have a specific understanding of the central 
ideal at the heart of the Thesis, the ideal of individual sovereignty / liberty. As Lieven notes, 
“although this [antithetical] culture is devoted to freedom, it is not devoted to ‘negative 
freedom,’ […] but to a kind of positive freedom.”417 Introducing the subject matter of 
Negative Liberties, Cyrus R. K. Patell identifies the complex co-existence of two conflicting 
understandings of individual freedom within US American national culture: the negative and 
positive conceptions of the nature of individual freedom. In Patell`s opinion, “negative liberty 
is the alpha of U.S. culture, its founding premise and point of departure.”418 In my 
interpretation, the phrase ‘its founding premise and point of departure’ refers here to what this 
thesis understands as the American Thesis, the ‘baseline’ narrative of the US national identity. 
In Patell`s understanding,  negative freedom is about ‘an individual`s right to…’419 as well as 
‘freedom from…:’420 “the free individual has an innate dignity that is protected through the 
possession of certain rights that have the effect of creating a sphere of privacy over which the 
individual is master, free from constraints, protected from the incursions of others.”421 The 
individual is thus in possession of individual sovereignty which protects them from being 
“subject to the will of others.”422 The positive conception of freedom, on the other hand, 
views the free individual`s exercise of sovereignty and self-government “as intimately related 
to one’s communal commitments and attachments.”423 This understanding thus advocates 
‘freedom to…’ – freedom to be actively involved (to actively exercise one`s sovereignty) in 
the national community`s life, its social and political spheres,424 to protect it (its sovereignty 
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as a community) against foreign influences.425 As Hughes observes, at some points in the 
national history, this ‘moral obligation’ to exercise sovereignty in one`s service to community 
resulted in full-fledged reform like, for example, the passage of the 1919 Volstead Act and the 
1920 Eighteenth Amendment/Prohibition through the efforts of the antithetical groups active 
in US American revivalism.426 Before the 1960, individuals affiliated with such antithetical 
groups were, according to Hughes, in full control of the federal government, while Time 
magazine named 1976 “the Year of the Evangelical.”427  In my understanding, this “quest for 
cultural dominance”428 within one`s community on the part of antithetical Americans is thus 
an apt example of their positive conception of human liberty. This valorized active 
involvement in the community`s affairs seen as the practice of one`s sovereignty is also what 
accounts for the power of the effect of US radical conservatism on US nationalism in general.  
As Patell notes, if negative liberty is sometimes called “the liberty of the moderns,” then 
positive liberty is often referred to as “the liberty of the ancients.”429 While negative liberty 
protects an individual`s rights, the positive (antithetical) conception of liberty tends to 
“emphasize [an individual`s] responsibilities and duties.”430 As Patell argues, the interplay of 
the negative and positive notions of individual liberty/sovereignty “is the central feature of the 
official narrative generated by U.S. culture around the idea of individualism [and] the nature 
of freedom.”431 In my interpretation, although the Thesis does not specifically refer to 
‘negative liberty’ rather to universal human liberty, its conception of the nature of freedom is 
nonetheless decidedly negative: it was the Declaration of Independence, the first articulation 
of the America Thesis, that wove “negative liberty into the very fabric of U.S. cultural 
life.”432 The antithetical conception of individual liberty is, on the contrary, positive: the 
Antithesis views individual self-realization as inconceivable in isolation from community. 
The Antithesis thus professes a more dramatic association of one`s self with one`s respective 
community (in this case, with the national whole).433 The example of the South’s secession 
from the Union might well illustrate this point. As Greenfeld outlines the process of the 
consolidation of the US nation, the scholar remarks that Southerners actively demanded that 
their unalienable right to self-government (sovereignty) be thoroughly recognized within the 
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Union.434 It was because they felt that this right was repeatedly abridged that the South 
seceded. The problem with the Southerners’ interpretation of individual liberty was, 
according to Greenfeld, that individual sovereignty as manifested in self-government can “not 
be made into a communal right,” it is “the inalienable right of individuals, and only in this 
sense [is] it meaningful.”435 The sovereignty of a community thus derives from “the 
composite liberty of its members.”436 As Greenfeld concludes, “[a] collectivistic interpretation 
of this value [is but] a distortion of its original – its American – meaning.”437 The issue of 
slavery was thus instrumental in highlighting this semantic contradiction. 
Therefore, as Patell contends, those who practice positive freedom (the antithetical groups) 
“want authority to be ‘placed in their own hands,’” while “those who advocate negative 
liberty [seek] to curb authority as such.”438 According to Patell, both interpretations of 
individual freedom of which the Thesis and the Antithesis speak “originate[…] in the desire 
to be one`s own master,”439 to exercise one`s sovereignty. Seemingly two interpretations of a 
single concept (something the US nation tries to convince itself of440), both are not however 
“in teleological relation”441 and represent two diametrically opposite and irreconcilable views 
of the world. As Lieven observes, liberty as conceived by the Antithesis is “tightly 
circumscribed by communal culture.”442  The liberty of those who are not formally part of 
these culture and community (cultural aliens or deviants) “therefore can legitimately be 
circumscribed by authoritarian and even savage means, as long as the aim is to defend the 
community and reflects the will of the sound members of the community.”443 Following the 
logic of the conception of freedom as advocated by the Antithesis, the exercise of individual 
sovereignty is thus limited to / appropriated as a prerogative by specific groups along the 
moral, cultural, and even ethnic lines of their respective communities, hence the antithetical 
resistance to “the rise of Blacks, gays, feminists and other hated [minority] groups.”444 
To sum up this section, such seems to be the portrait of the American Antithesis. Following 
Lieven`s analysis, I therefore argue that, as a set of divergent / dissenting narrative images of 
the US and the world, the American Antithesis represents a disruptive force which divides the 
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nation along the lines of conflicting agendas and local identities, cultivates animosity of one 
group of individuals against another such group with an opposing set of conceptions and 
affiliations (all guaranteed by the ideal of individual sovereignty). As Lieven notes, the 
conservatism of US America`s antithetical segments of the population per se does not seem to 
be the problem, for there are indeed some unpleasant tendencies in today`s world of 
modernity, while many traditional values may indeed contribute to the health of any society. 
In Lieven`s opinion, the main problem resides in the fact that the Antithesis “react[s] not only 
against the negative features of modernity but against modernity in general.”445 The 
Antithesis thus occasionally fosters conflict and schism as regards the meaning of US 
America`s national self (indeed, the meaning of US America itself) and tampers with the 
practice of democracy as well as the progression of modern change.  
 
4.3 The American Thesis: The Assimilation of Dissent 
 
In her study of US nationalism, Greenfeld notes that “[t]he national commitment of America 
– to liberty and equality [indeed, to the Thesis] – remains the main source of social cohesion 
and the main stimulant of unrest in it.”446 As she further adds, “[t]he rigidity of loyalty to 
these national ideals, as well as its laxity, endangers the nation; yet this loyalty preserves 
it.”447 In my opinion, this quotation aptly sums up the argument of this chapter: while the 
American Thesis fosters cohesion within the diverse US nation and ensures that it stays loyal 
to the promises of democracy and individual liberty, it nonetheless (by its nature) stimulates 
and legitimizes dissent. However, as I argue, the ‘black/white’ magic of the American Thesis 
as the US national identity and hegemon cultural narrative resides in the fact it nonetheless 
succeeds in bringing this dissent, that is, the exceptional / non-canonical, back to the routine 
canonicality (the ordinary) as defined by the Creed.  
The last point might be well illustrated by the fact that even the Antithesis, which produces 
the greatest effect (in the form of antithetical dissent) on US nationalism, is, according to 
Lieven, “subordinate to American civic nationalism stemming from the Creed.”448 As the 
scholar adds, the forces of the American Antithesis are “not in public revolt against the 
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American Creed and American civic nationalism as such.”449 The paradox here is that even 
those Americans who profess the ideas and values which are quite often in striking opposition 
to the principles of the Thesis “generally believe strongly in the American democratic and 
liberal Creed,”450 and fashion their antithetical revolt as in fact motivated by the sense that the 
Creed is threatened by foreign forces. The American Thesis is thus able to successfully 
contain the disruptive potential of antithetical dissent as represented by the Antithesis.  At 
such moments of secessionist crisis, the American Thesis steps in to resolve the crisis and 
thus manifests itself, in Lieven`s opinion, as US America`s “self-correcting mechanism.”451 
Indeed, as Bourdieu notes, “there has to be heresy for the orthodox discourse to intervene.”452 
Therefore, the Thesis as US America`s ‘self-correcting mechanism’ assimilates dissent 
(‘heresy’) and once and again returns the nation to the common denominator (one common 
identity under the banner of the Creed). In my understanding, this is what Bourdieu describes 
as some kind of “the instantaneous adaptation operated by the feel for the game, and the game 
itself.”453 This ‘self-correction,’ in Lieven`s opinion, seems to contain US America`s 
antithetical “impulse to dictatorship,” and, as I argue at the end of this chapter, guarantees the 
constancy of democracy and democratic reform within the nation. Drawing on the analysis by 
Greenfeld, Lieven, Bercovitch, and Patell, I therefore conclude that, in US America, the 
‘mainstream’ as well as the dissenting groups lobbying their specific interests all seem to 
appeal to the Creed/Thesis as their baseline axiology. As has been demonstrated, the 
dissenters themselves quite rarely revolt against the Thesis itself (against its principles, the 
central of which is the sacred status of individual sovereignty). “A vital function” of the 
American Thesis as a national identity is therefore “to reconcile such conflicting pressures, or 
rather to create an appearance of doing so which is sufficiently convincing to the society 
concerned.”454 In Negative Liberties, speaking of the dominant narrative of individualism in 
US culture (which I understand as the narrative of the Thesis, since US America`s devotion to 
individualism is legitimized by the value of individual sovereignty advocated by the Creed), 
Patell, too, notes how the ideology of US nationalism (the Thesis and its attendant myths) 
“includes contradictions, but it also seeks to rein them in, to prevent them from causing 
disruptions.”455 Indeed, as Lieven remarks, while the ideologies of other states are often 
revolted against by “large parts of the populations concerned,” in the case of US America, 
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“[e]ven most American dissidents throughout history have sincerely phrased their protests not 
as a rejection of the American Creed as such, but rather as a demand that Americans, or 
American governments, return to a purer form of the Creed or to a more faithful adherence to 
it.”456 As I have already argued in the above analysis of Bourdieu’s concept of habitus, any 
‘dissent’ from the canonical version of social reality would be interpreted as nonsense 
(indeed, a dangerous delusion / delirium). Lieven similarly believes that “[g]roups which 
really step outside the Creed soon find themselves marginalized or even suppressed.”457 
Following the logic of Bourdieu`s notion of habitus as some kind of ‘common sense,’ we 
might conclude that if one seeks to introduce any qualitative change into a social order, one 
must at least minimally abide by a community`s implicit consensual code.458 A social agent`s 
utopian, reformist, or even revolutionary claims must therefore be articulated (again, at least 
minimally) in the language and logic of a community`s habitus, for it is these ‘language and 
logic’ that determine a community`s ‘common-sense’ vision of social reality in the first place. 
As Bourdieu writes, “[t]hese social laws cannot be transgressed, they can only be 
transformed, and at the cost of much hard work.”459 For any dissent to be recognized as 
legitimate, it must be formulated in the language of the canonical, must appeal to the 
ordinary. As I argue in this thesis, in the case of US America, the canonical is the 
Thesis/Creed. 
To illustrate this point, I would like to remember perhaps of one of the greatest historical 
precedents of antithetical dissent in US America, the American Civil War. Indeed, so strong 
was the effect of the South`s antithetical dissent that it drove the US American nation (not yet 
truly ‘united’) to the verge of possible dissolution. Greenfeld notes in this regard that the 
South`s opposition to the Union was conceived of, articulated and presented in the language 
of the Union`s foundational ethos, its very identity.460 Moreover, it was “presented as a stand 
in defense of American – national – ideals.”461 As Greenfeld argues, Southern nationalism 
and secession both responded “to the unbearable inconsistency between American ideals and 
slavery:”462 to practice slavery and remain within the nation which extols an individual`s 
rights to liberty and self-government meant to live in the state of cognitive dissonance, of 
unbearable psychological stress. However, “with the exception of slavery, nothing was so 
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dear to [the Southern] heart”463 as liberty. It is indeed a major paradox that the South, fighting 
for the preservation of the institution of human bondage, in fact “fought for liberty:”464 the 
chief concern of the South “in secession was to preserve [its] sacred right of self-
government.”465 It was just that slavery was understood as an essential requisite for the 
South`s exercise of liberty / sovereignty; “slavery was requisite for the preservation of 
liberty.”466 As Greenfeld contends, “’self-government’ was the watch-word of the South.”467 
Within the Union, the South thus voiced its demand for the recognition of the right to self-
government, and when the Southerners felt that this right was not properly respected, they 
seceded.  
To somewhat add to the above discussion, I would like to address the work by Sacvan 
Bercovitch and briefly outline his observations of how resistance and dissent in US America 
tend to be formulated in the semantics of the Creed. Just like the scholars cited above, 
Bercovitch, too, identifies some kind of a preferred model of resistance and protest in the US 
nation. Although he does not refer to it as the Thesis or the Creed,  I dare conclude that this 
‘preferred model of resistance’ is in fact the model provided by the Thesis as the nation`s 
foundational ethos and identity. Sacvan Bercovitch understands US America as “a process of 
symbol making through which the norms and values of a modern culture were rationalized, 
spiritualized, and institutionalized – rendered the vehicle, as the American Way, both of 
conscience and consensus.”468 In his work on the ‘symbolic construction’ of the US, 
Bercovitch studies the music of US America. He as if inquires, What symbolic constructions 
make the choir of the Americans, as unlike each other as they could possibly be, sing the 
same national hymn in such unison?  
First of all, Bercovitch, like Greenfeld and Lieven, identifies the secessionist impulse within 
US culture that is guaranteed by the sacred right of individual sovereignty (“a transcendental 
license to have your dissent and make it,”469 as he calls it) and that, as has been argued, is 
potentially destructive to the national unity of US America. Therefore, a drive for secession is 
simply inherent in the nature of US nationalism.  The following questions thus arise: How is 
dissent practiced in US America? How is it rationalized? How come that diversity and dissent 
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seem to end up assimilated into conformity and loyalty, thus affirming the virtue of the 
community? The question is thus why in the US American national community otherness 
constantly returns to sameness? Bercovitch describes this phenomenon as ‘a rite of assent’ or 
‘the ritual of consensus.’ If I understand Bercovitch`s point correctly, I dare interpret this 
‘rite/ritual of assent’ as US America`s ideological consensus in its national identity and thus 
as foremost the assent to and the ritualistic re-affirmation of the fundamental principles of the 
American Thesis. As Bercovitch notes, “what I discovered [in US America] was a corporate 
identity built on fragmentation and dissent: a hundred sects, factions, schools, and 
denominations, each apparently different from the others, yet all celebrating the same 
mission;”470 indeed, “a vast Pequod's-crew of self-declared isolatoes, joined together in a 
deafening concordia discors.”471 As Bercovitch elaborates, “[t]o a Canadian sceptic, a gentile 
in God`s Country, it made for a breathtaking scene: a pluralistic, pragmatic people openly 
living in a dream, bound together by an ideological consensus unmatched by that of any other 
modern society.”472 This, according to the scholar, gave him “something of an 
anthropologist`s sense of wonder at the symbols of the tribe.”473 Following Bercovitch`s 
observations, I therefore argue that the ‘ideological consensus’ to which the scholar refers (“a 
system of values, symbols, and beliefs, and a mode of socialization designed to keep the 
system going”474) is exactly the consensus in the dominant Thesis which is able to 
accommodate / habitualize dissent by circumscribing the semantic field within which such 
dissent is formulated and even conceived of. The American Thesis is thus “a ritual of 
consensus that diffuse[s] all issues in debate by restricting the debate itself, symbolically and 
substantively, to the meaning of America.”475 Quoting Fredric Jameson, Patel also argues that 
the language of US individualism (the American Thesis) “powerfully deflects and deforms 
everything that passes through it; like a system of cartographic projection, it translates the 
content offered it into the style and specificity of its own volumes and contours, with the 
Wittgensteinian consequence that whatever it cannot express falls outside of social 
reality.’’476 This leads Patell to conclude that this is “the language into which we [Americans] 
are locked.”477 It follows, then, that the ‘dark/white magic’ of the Thesis resides in its ability 
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to accommodate/channel all kinds of dissent (radical, conservative, revolutionary, religious, 
gay, feminist, ethnic, individualist, collectivist, etc.) into the celebration of the American 
nation, of the American Way, which creates the situation of what Lieven calls “an intense 
national solipsism.”478  
“[F]or the victims of sexism, racism, and other forms of group-oriented discrimination,” this 
feature of the Thesis and its promises is however “simultaneously the source and the 
frustration of hope.”479 In my understanding, the Thesis is ‘the source of hope,’ for it indeed 
recognizes the primacy and sacredness of individual liberty and human dignity. I also allow 
that it may become ‘the frustration of hope’ simply because the fundamental value expressed 
by the Thesis is the value of individual sovereignty, “the unalienable right of individuals” 
which cannot be “made into a communal right,”480 as Greenfeld`s puts it. Only in its 
‘individualistic’ interpretation is this right meaningful. Therefore, the minority groups` right 
to sovereignty can only be meaningful as “the composite liberty of [a group`s] members.”481 
Looking at the matter from this perspective, I therefore agree that group dissent and 
democratic protest might be indeed somewhat tanked by this fact, especially if this dissent 
steps outside the rhetoric of the Thesis and contradicts the ‘common sense’ that the latter 
presents. However, as has been argued, dissent in US America is rarely formulated in 
principles other than those of the dominant Thesis. Bercovitch therefore speaks of “a 
complicity of opposites”482 within US culture which constantly absorbs dissent and 
factionalism into the system as defined by the Thesis. American protest is thus never 
genuinely (qualitatively) radical, for the voices of protest and oppression speak the same 
language (appeal to the same dominant narrative). They all follow the “exemplary American 
tradition of protest.”483 This therefore means that resistance in US America is predominately 
(if not always) canonical (conforming to the “canonical cultural pattern”484) and never un-
American. 
To repeat the point that I argue in this chapter, dissent in US America always appeals to the 
rhetoric of the dominant Thesis which nourishes the imagination of the US American nation 
and constitutes its identity. According to Bercovitch, US American dissent seems to be 
practiced in accordance with the following pattern: at first, dissent poses “a fundamental 
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challenge to the system,”485 later, however, this challenge comes to reaffirm the system. The 
system is thus opposed in ways that reaffirm its fundamental principles of organization. US 
America`s dissenters seek to make the national identity defined by the foundational Thesis “a 
trope of liberation:” they take “old symbols as vehicles of moral / political renovation,” but 
the symbols “refigured thus demand for renovation” and “render freedom, opportunity, 
democracy, radicalism part of the American Way.”486 The symbols appropriated for dissent 
thereby repeat the narrative of the American self and thus ‘celebrate’ the nation, the American 
Way. Therefore, in my understanding, all dissenters (liberals and conservatives alike) practice 
Americanness (formulate their dissent in the language of the dominant narrative which they 
regard as the ‘common sense’ and ‘the good’). As Bruner, himself an American, notes in 
reference to various ‘factious phenomena,’ what is of particular interest is how such moments 
of faction not only do not “separate us, but how much more often they are neutralized.”487 He 
ascribes this to the “astonishing narrative gift” of humans as “one of the principal forms of 
peacekeeping.”488 This point is in line of my conception of the US national identity as 
expressed in the Thesis and its attendant mythology as foremost a narrative / discursive 
identity. This matter will be discussed in the next section of the thesis.  
Coming to America in the sixties, Bercovitch had the chance to observe this phenomenon of 
the assimilation of dissent by the Thesis against the backdrop of the ‘turbulent’ decade which 
he describes as being, in fact, ‘not so turbulent.’ According to Bercovitch, “[w]hat was lost in 
that endless debate about America, I realized, was the fact that the debate itself was part of a 
long ripened ritual of consensus.”489 According to the scholar, the protests did not address 
“the cultural limitations”490 at the heart of the conflict. The conflict, which took the form of 
one group`s demand for the recognition of its status/sovereignty, was couched in the language 
that was the source of oppression, but also the promise of liberation (the Thesis as the ‘source 
of hope’ and ‘the frustration’ thereof). The conflict never called for the departure from 
Americanism, but for the return to its traditional / purer forms, “to a more faithful adherence 
to it,"491 to remember Lieven`s words.  The abridgment of an individual`s rights (the man 
grievance of the movement) was thus interpreted as departure from the canonical (‘the 
ordinary / habitual’), that is, from the American Thesis.  
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According to Bercovitch, America as a symbolic field occasionally falls under the influence 
of “extrinsic sources” which are potentially disruptive and by that potentially 
(trans)formative. US America however manages to ‘absorb and adapt’ these influences “to its 
own distinctive patterns.”492 Therefore, in US America, antithetical radicalism has a cultural 
function: US liberalism (the Thesis) widely valorizes dissent/secession which is however to be 
eventually absorbed into the dominant liberal discourse. Therefore, it is, according to 
Bercovitch, a ‘triumph of the Culture,’ and, perhaps, a “tyranny of the culture”493 (the triumph 
and tyranny of the American Thesis). The Culture/Thesis “found ways of harnessing 
revolution for its own purposes” (to re-establish the principles of the Thesis): what “tended 
toward subversion” came to re-affirm “persistent deeply conservative patterns of culture.”494  
Finally, I would also like to briefly mention yet another interesting aspect of the workings of 
the American Thesis within the social reality of the US nation. In Challenging Authority: 
How Ordinary People Change America, Frances Fox Piven studies how the subversion of 
political authority by popular protest initiates democratic reform in the US American nation. 
As Piven argues, there are moments in the national history when ordinary people rise together 
against what they perceive as injustice (in the case of US America, in my understanding, 
‘injustice’ means the failure on the part of the governing authorities to observe the 
individual`s right to sovereignty / liberty). Popular drama thus draws attention to the issues 
which have hitherto been ignored by political leaders and the managers of the parties. Popular 
unrest works against electoral coalitions, and political authorities are forced to bridge these 
gaps in order to unite voters into majorities. Such dissent therefore works against the interests 
of the political (and business) elite who “in its drive to win a majority works to paper over or 
ignore fractious divisions that would make a voting majority unlikely.”495 Piven`s argument 
thus ‘got me thinking’ that the American Thesis might not only somewhat provoke 
antithetical dissent, but also foster dissent of its own making. From the very beginning, 
according to Greenfeld, US America`s “idealistic loyalty to” the values of “the absolute 
sovereignty, self-government, or independence of every individual”496 and the exceptional 
degree to which these ideals were integrated into the nation`s identity had ‘boded ill,’ that is, 
carried a disruptive potential of considerable power (the nation`s innate propensity for 
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“complete atomization and political anarchy”497). The Creed`s disruptive potential thus 
resides in US America`s most cherished ideal of individual sovereignty and status as the 
‘unalienable rights’ of a human being and a national member. I therefore argue that the times 
of crisis and conflict in the history of US America are exactly those historical moments when 
certain segments of the US national people perceive that their right to sovereignty (guaranteed 
by the foundational Thesis) is abridged. At such moments, the US nation, as Bruner would 
have put it, “either does not agree on the meaning of what is canonical and what makes 
divergent, or the narratives it lives by become so ideologically or self-seemingly motivated 
that distrust replaces interpretation.”498 In other words, when the US national members 
perceive that there are inconsistencies between the ideals (the Thesis which guarantees one`s 
exercise of individual sovereignty) and reality (the actual application of the ‘thetic’ 
principles), they protest. As Bruner notes, when “input violates expectancy, […] the [whole] 
system is put on alert.”499 Robert Bellah, for example, refers to such moments of crisis as US 
America`s “times of trial”500 – among those are the Founding, the Civil War, the 1960s with 
the decade`s pending issues of racial equality, the Vietnam War… and, I would say, counting 
(the reader might consider in this regard the crisis around Donald Trump`s election to 
presidency or the more recent Black Lives Matter movement). In my understanding, such 
‘moments of trial’ are the times of some kind of ‘narrative breakdown/wreckage,’ when the 
existing discursive constructions of the common national identity and how much they 
correspond to the context of the day are called into question and negotiated. Such ‘narrative 
wreckage’ thus calls into question the very existence of the US American nation in its 
semantic (ideological) unity, but at the same time initiates the renegotiation of the meaning of 
the US nation. Given that the US nation is very much its liberal Thesis (at least ideologically), 
this renegotiation thus returns the nation to the practice of democracy and even promotes 
further democratic reform. This pattern is easily traceable in US America`s national history: 
as I dare argue, the great historical moments of “egalitarian reform”501 were the nation`s 
response to the discrepancies between its identity (as defined by the Thesis) and the 
undemocratic tendencies of the day. Those were the moments when the US American people 
demanded renegotiation of what US America truly is. This (re)negotiation was made possible 
not least by virtue of the existence of the Thesis, the dominant narrative of the nation`s 
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identity, its common sense, and value system, its “prolonged and intricate process […] of 
construction and negotiation deeply embedded in the culture.”502  
It must be noted that this kind of dissent is not antithetical, for, as it seems to me, it does not 
revolt against modernity as such. This protest is ‘thetic:’ not only does it appeal to the 
principles of the Thesis, but also ensures their realization in practice. In my assessment, the 
success of protest via the Thesis therefore only positively reinforces its postulates as the 
primary (and the only) frame of reference, indeed, as the preferred model. The American 
Thesis thus becomes the only valorized model of protest within the US American nation. If 
one wishes to be heard, one must speak in the language of the Creed (the mother tongue of 
US nationalism and its common sense). This observation only adds to the above argument by 
Bercovitch that any protest in US America comes to re-affirm the national narrative. 
However, unlike the disruptiveness of antithetical forces which tend to sabotage the practice 
of democracy, the disruptive potential of the Thesis makes the democratization of US society 
not only possible, but also quite constant: it sets off the process of (re)negotiation of common 
meanings, but ultimately returns this renegotiation to its most fundamental principles, the 
sovereignty and the value of individual life. This is perhaps what Hughes describes as US 
America`s “propensity for restoration”503 (note how this seems to be always restoration to the 
narrative image of the national community as set by the American Thesis). Since its 
establishment as the dominant narrative, the American Thesis has driven such moments of 
turmoil: the Creed thus “by its very nature [contains] a stimulus for disaffection and revolt, 
for the more intense the commitment to the ideals, the more sensitive, the more intolerant, one 
[becomes] to the imperfections in their realization.”504 However, as ‘a self-correcting 
mechanism,’ the Thesis has also been instrumental in the successful resolution of such times 
of crisis and conflict, bringing the nation closer to its democratic ideal (returning the 
exceptional to the canonical).  
To add one last point to the discussion of the catalytic properties of the Thesis, I would like to 
briefly return to the above argument by Patell who writes that the promises of ‘US American 
individualism’ (the Thesis) become the ‘source of hope’ as well as cause its frustration for the 
victims of ‘group-oriented discrimination.’ The Thesis, indeed, postulates the primacy of 
individual (not group) sovereignty, and “only in this sense [is] it meaningful,”505 as 
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Greenfield puts it. In my opinion, this is, indeed, an interesting paradox within US national 
culture which deserves to be discussed in more detail. What I can add for my part is that, even 
with this paradox, US America remains a democratic state, and we see instances of 
democratic reform which I personally tend to ascribe to the workings of the Thesis. Even 
when professing the individualistic notions of liberty, the American Creed remains liberal at 
its core, that is, in its original version / interpretation, it simply cannot serve as a means of 
oppression. Following the above argument by Bercovitch, I believe that it is true, however, 
that the process of renegotiation initiated by the Thesis is rarely (never?) attempted beyond 
the semantic / ideological space (the rhetoric, ideas, values, narratives, metaphors, etc.) as 
circumscribed by the Thesis. Such renegotiation is thus never un-American. Moreover, it is 
not really about ‘renegotiation’ per se, as I tend to believe, rather about the ‘reiteration’ of the 
American Creed in the times of crisis, that is, when the nation seems to have departed from its 
original identity.  
To conclude this chapter, the American Thesis thus “mediates between the canonical world of 
culture and the more idiosyncratic world of beliefs, desires, and hopes; [i]t renders the 
exceptional comprehensible and keeps the uncanny at bay […] reiterates the norms of the 
society without being didactic [and] provides a basis for rhetoric without [radical] 
confrontation.”506 The Creed is thus, in Lieven`s assessment, “a matter of necessity for the 
United States:” it proves to be “essential to preventing the country’s immensely disparate and 
sometimes morally absolutist social, cultural, religious and ethnic groups from flying 
apart.”507 Greenfeld notes in this regard that US America`s commitment to the ‘thetic’ 
principles of liberty and equality “remains the main source of social cohesion and the main 
stimulant of unrest in it.”508 The order and entropy of the American Thesis both reside in 
“[t]he rigidity of loyalty to [its] national ideals, as well as its laxity, [that] endangers the 
nation; yet this loyalty preserves it.”509 However, as has been noted, the Thesis at the same 
time “exclude[s] alternatives to the dominant culture by limiting the opposition to terms 
which are intrinsic to the patterns of dominance.”510 The hegemon narrative of the US nation 
thus effectively returns the exceptional/divergent/uncanonical to the ordinary and canonical 
(and, by definition, the solely ‘commonsensical’ and ‘morally good’). To quote Bourdieu, 
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“[c]ultural oppression is much more unconscious, and cultural alienation tends to exclude any 
awareness of alienation.”511  
However, what exactly makes the American Thesis so persuasive? What allows it to produce 
such a powerful emotive effect on the US nation? As I will attempt to demonstrate in the 
following chapter, at least part of its power the Thesis derives from a set of attendant myths 
(mythic narratives) which are “so deeply embedded as to operate beneath the level of most 
Americans` consciousness.”512 As Lieven remarks, these myths (mythic narratives), although 
“not, strictly speaking, part of the formal Thesis or Creed,” “help give it much of its 
emotional force”513 and account for much of its persuasiveness (ontologicity). Given that the 
Thesis constitutes US America`s national identity, these myths thus affirm the discursive 
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5. The Myths of US American Nationalism 
 
As I have attempted to demonstrate in the previous chapters, the American Thesis as a 
complex of ideals and propositions constitutes US America`s national identity, the nation`s 
common sense (the ordinary / the canonical) and morality (the good). Another peculiar feature 
of the Thesis, as Lieven and Hughes note, is that it “draw[s] on a set of common myths.”514 In 
my assessment, these national / cultural myths can be described as somewhat ‘satellite’ 
myths: they as if orbit the American Thesis, exerting a considerable degree of gravitational 
influence upon it without ever attempting to collide with its principles. In this gravitational 
interaction, the Thesis and its attendant myths are thus mutually sustaining. As I argue in this 
chapter, US America`s national myths support (rationalize, legitimize, and ritualistically 
reenact) the Thesis. As the US nation`s identity, the Thesis as such is simply a set of ideas, 
while the specific configuration of cultural myths around the dominant Creed and in 
interaction with it, in my opinion, creates the narrative of the US as a nation.  
The Thesis and its myths thus respond to what Anderson refers to as  
“the need for a narrative of ‘identity’”515 brought about by the structural constraints in the 
moment of the birth of nationalism as the phenomenon of modernity. As I attempted to 
demonstrate in the chapter on the extralinguistic context of the United States` national 
beginnings, the Creed (among other objectives) did in fact respond to the nascent nation`s 
need for such a ‘narrative of identity.’ As I will further argue, it is this narrativity (narrative 
form) of the US national identity that accounts for the ontological and affective power of the 
Thesis. As Lieven notes, the “mixture of the principles of the American Creed with a set of 
historical and cultural myths about the nation” is what ultimately makes US America`s ‘civil 
religion’ which “became the essential cultural underpinning of America’s current version of 
civic nationalism.”516 The American Creed and its attendant myths thus support US 
America’s ‘peculiar brand of nationalism’ which Lieven describes as to a large extent a 
“myth-based nationalism.”517 As Bercovitch admits, having “been living in the United States 
for a few years,” the scholar “realized that [he] was living inside the myth of America,”518 and 
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what Bercovitch eventually discovered was not simply the existence of some grand national 
myth as a kind of cultural superstructure, but “the day-by-day uses of myth.”519 
Therefore, before I proceed to discuss the specific myths of US nationalism, I would like to 
answer the following questions: What is the nature of myth? What is its role in the formation 
of nations? What accounts for its persuasiveness and affectivity? In his attempt to answer 
similar questions, Darren Kelsey approaches myth as ‘a type of discourse’ and ‘a vehicle for 
ideology.’ As discourse, myth thus represents a specific knowledge of social reality as well as 
“subjectivity and power relations which inhere in such knowledges and relations between 
them.”520 Myth as discourse is able to “constitute the ‘nature’ of the body, unconscious and 
conscious mind and emotional life of the subjects [it] seek[s] to govern.”521 To study myth as 
a vehicle for ideology is, according to Kelsey, to study how “power relations […] construct 
discourses to serve particular ideological interests.”522  The reader might find it interesting 
how well the definition of ideology fits that of myth: like myth, ideology is “a system of 
cultural assumptions, or the discursive concatenation, the connectedness, of beliefs or values 
which uphold or oppose the social order, or which otherwise provide a coherent structure of 
thought that hides or silences the contradictory elements in social […] formations.523 Myth is 
thus fashioned by discourse and carries ideology: “[d]iscourse constructs the story (myth) that 
carries the ideology, whilst ideology also informs the construction of discourse.”524 However, 
unlike myth, ideology alone, according to Kelsey, is not able to ‘put the drama on stage.’525 It 
is due to the affective qualities of myth that it is capable of fostering drama, inviting everyone 
to participate in it. Kelsey thus contends that it is the affective dynamics of myth that allow it 
to operate “beneath immediate levels of consciousness.”526 Lieven voices a similar 
conviction, noting that the myths attendant on the Thesis are “so deeply embedded as to 
operate beneath the level of most Americans` consciousness.”527 Myth stirs affect, and this 
affect is contagious. Affect is not the same as emotion, though: affective practices are “the 
discursive and psychological processes and interactions that both stir emotions and use 
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emotions to communicate broader conceptual information, personal feelings, and social 
values.”528  However, what is it about myth that makes it so affectively powerful?  
Following the above definition of myth as ‘a type of discourse,’ I therefore argue that myth 
(as any discourse) is “primarily narrative in structure.”529 Drawing on the work by major 
scholars of myth criticism (Barthes, Cassirer, etc.), Herfried Münkler identifies three principal 
dimensions of myth: its narrativity / narrative form (a myth tells a story), its rituality (the 
ritualistic re/iteration of a narrative, as I understand it), as well as its visuality and iconicity 
(the visual / iconic representations of a narrative in images and personas).530 Of all the three 
dimensions of myth, it is precisely the narrative one that is, in my assessment, responsible for 
its affectivity. Therefore, as I understand it, it is the narrative quality / structure of the myths 
which sustain the American Thesis that makes the latter so emotionally and ontologically 
powerful (as has been demonstrated in the preceding chapter), simply because the narrative 
organization of meaning and experience is so organic to human thought.   
In his introductory chapter to Narrative Psychology: The Storied Nature of Human Conduct, 
Theodore R. Sarbin draws the reader`s attention to the degree to which the narrative principle 
underlies human experience as well as guides human thought and action: as he remarks, 
“human beings think, perceive, imagine, and make moral choices according to narrative 
structures [...] meanings are held together by the implicit or explicit use of plot.”531 As 
Crossley notes, “people bleed stories:”532 our plans and memories, our fantasies and 
daydreams are stories; rituals of daily life – stories; our relationships with others – stories; 
others are interpreted as stories. Life seems to be driven by narrative plots. As Sarbin has it 
and as I attempted to demonstrate it in the chapter on the nation as a cultural community, the 
human world is a world of (cultural) meanings, and “survival in a world of meanings is 
problematic without the talent to make up and to interpret stories.”533 Following this 
argument, I therefore believe that it is through the narrative principle that social meaning is 
achieved. In my understanding, the ‘drama’ into which one is born trains one to ‘perform’ in a 
believable manner (to reach some kind of Stanislavsky`s ‘believable truth’): as Sarbin notes, 
“the appropriateness, propriety, and convincingness of the actor’s performance depends upon 
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the degree of overlap of the stories imagined or enacted by other actors.”534 As Bruner notes, 
such stories, “once acted out, ‘make’ events and ‘make’ history [and] contribute to the reality 
of the participants”535 in a respective social order. 
What also links myth to narrative is the fact that the former functions like and on the basis of 
language, as Roland Barthes argues. According to Barthes, myth is a ‘system of 
communication’ and “a type of speech.”536 If I understand the philosopher correctly, myth as 
language is simultaneously a system (of communication), that is, a conceptual order – words, 
metaphors, images, etc. and the many combinations thereof, each producing its own specific 
meaning – as well as speech, that is, everything that can be said within this system; that which 
the system allows to say, or even to conceive of saying. Following this understanding of 
myth, I therefore conclude that the Thesis along with its attendant myths constitute the very 
language of US nationalism / the US national identity (its system of communication and 
speech). As the definition of the word ‘language’ implies, the language of US nationalism 
describes the world / communicates a specific image of social reality for the US nation (as 
well as the image of the nation itself). “The limits of my language,” to quote Wittgenstein, 
thus “mean the limits of my world.”537 Indeed, as has been noted in the previous chapter on 
how the Creed tends to determine the very language in which protest in US America is 
conceived of and articulated, the limits of the Thesis indeed seem to ‘mean the limits’ of the 
Americans` world. 
At this point, I would like to linger a bit over the specificities of narrative form and its 
functioning. In my opinion, the power of myth as being narrative in structure might be 
ascribed to the fact that there is indeed, as Bruner notes, “some human ‘readiness’ for 
narrative […] [some] predisposition to organize experience into a narrative form.”538 What are 
the properties of narrative form that make it so useful in the construction of meaning? To 
begin with, according to Kenneth and Mary Gergen, narrative is distinguished by “its ability 
to structure events in such a way that they demonstrate, first, a connectedness or coherence, 
and second, a sense of movement or direction through time.”539 In Acts of Meaning, Jerome 
Bruner argues that the principal property of narrative is indeed “its inherent sequentially:” “a 
narrative is composed of a unique sequence of events, mental states, happenings involving 
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human beings as characters or actors.540 Following Bruner`s argument, I understand these 
‘events, mental states, and happenings’ as facts of (objective as well as subjective) reality, 
and, as facts, these “constituents [of narrative] do not […] have a life or meaning of their 
own.”541 “Their meaning,” as Bruner continues, is thus “given by their place in the overall 
configuration of the sequence as a whole.”542 Following this argument, I therefore conclude 
that meanings arise from the establishment of relations or connections between the facts of 
extralinguistic reality. Individual facts might not be related to one another in any meaningful 
way outside a narrative and might not have the meaning they acquire once these facts are 
organized temporally into sequences (that is, into a narrative). As Bruner notes, for experience 
to become meaningful, facts thus must be ‘strung’ into a story via emplotment, that is, by 
means of the plot or fabula. Through the plot structure, human predicaments are made sense 
of and their resolutions are attempted. The human mind seems to be as if pre-wired to seek 
and see causality even there where no such connection can be established.543  
A second feature of narrative is, according to Bruner, its “indifference to extralinguistic 
[factual] reality,” that is, narrative “can be ‘real’ or ‘imaginary’ without loss of its power as a 
story.”544 It is again “the sequence of [a story`s] sentences, rather than the truth or falsity of 
any of those sentences” that determines the “overall configuration or plot”545 of a story. As 
Bruner also states, another important criterion for a narrative to appear ‘true’ is its 
lifelikeness,546 and I tend to interpret this ‘lifelikeness’ as in fact the degree to which a 
particular narrative corresponds to a community`s specific habitus (or its dominant discourse, 
for, as has been noted, discourses fashion myths). I would also like to draw the reader`s 
attention to how Bruner`s standard of ‘lifelikeness’ seems quite reminiscent of Barthes`s 
observation that myth “transforms history into nature,”547 supplying ‘self-evident truths’ and 
establishing artificial causality. Moreover, as Bruner remarks, actual facts organized into a 
narrative themselves turn into somewhat a trope: they come to “resist logical procedures for 
establishing what they mean,” or for “arriving logically at their ‘truth conditions.’”548 Within 
a narrative, facts thus poorly lend themselves to logical analysis, only to interpretation. To 
draw a parallel, it is quite interesting how this observation echoes the argument by such 
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scholars as Blumenberg, Wallace, Flood, Jameson, Pease, etc. who note that myth is largely 
unresponsive to rational explication and ideological critique.549 As Hayden White writes: 
“The process of fusing events […] into a totality capable of serving as the object of 
representation is a poetic one. […] These fragments have to be put together to make a whole 
[…] and they are put together in the same way that novelists put together figments of their 
imaginations to display an ordered world […]”. Facts therefore “do not speak for themselves, 
but […] the historian speaks on their behalf, and fashions the fragments of the past into a 
whole whose integrity is in its representation – a purely discursive one.”550 Another 
interesting point to be added to the above argument is that the sequentiality and lifelikeness of 
narrative might also account for its dramatism (dramatic quality). As Kenneth and Mary 
Gergen note, narrative is distinguished by its “capacity to create the feelings of drama and 
emotion,”551 that is, dramatic engagement: “segmented events in themselves appear limited in 
their capacity to sustain engagement. […] It is the relationship among events, not the events 
themselves, that seems chiefly responsible for sustaining dramatic engagement, and a theory 
of narrative form is essentially concerned with such relationships.”552 
Another crucial feature of narrative is, according to Bruner, its ability to reconcile the 
ordinary/the usual with all sorts of departure from this canonicality, that is, ‘the exceptional:’ 
by ‘forging links’ between the exceptional and the ordinary, narrative makes exceptionality 
more ‘digestible’ for comprehension (that is, ‘meaningful’), thereby neutralizing the potential 
for conflict and contradiction. When the ordinary/routine organization of reality is disrupted, 
the need arises to make sense of the breach: to explicate, rationalize, find reasons, to explain 
the deviation by bringing it to conform to “a canonical cultural pattern.”553 As Bruner 
remarks, “lifelike narratives start with a canonical or ‘legitimate’ steady state, which is 
breached, resulting in a crisis, which is terminated by a redress, with recurrence of the cycle 
an open possibility.”554 As Crossley notes, “always in emergencies we invent narratives,”555 
and I tend to interpret the word ‘emergency’ here as in fact the disruption of the canonical 
organization of experience by the exceptional. The preceding discussion of how the American 
Thesis assimilates otherness into sameness as well as the analysis of the structural constraints 
in which the architects of the US nation found themselves around the Revolutionary moment 
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(‘status anomie’ and ‘identity crisis’) and their subsequent attempt to create a ‘story of US 
America,’ might well illustrate this point. The restoration to the canonical version of reality is 
thus attempted in accordance with what constitutes this canonicality, “the predominant 
narratives, inscribed goals and moralities intrinsic to [a community`s] culture”556 (cultural 
constraints or habitus).   
Finally, the last characteristic feature of narrative is its unique way of using language for 
creating/communicating meaning. As Bruner notes, this end comes to be achieved chiefly by 
the employment of tropes. Wodak, for example, observes how, especially in national 
narratives, metonymy “may conceal responsible agents or move them to the background,” 
while personification might attribute “a human form to an abstract entity”557 (for example, 
Columbia, symbolic of the US nation, moving to the dark-skied West, personifying America`s 
Manifest Destiny; or God to whom/which human intentionality was effectively attributed by 
the anthropomorphic turn of the architects of the American Revolution`s thought).  
Having outlined the nature of myth, I therefore proceed to briefly address the most 
fundamental myths of US nationalism which affirm the American Thesis as the nation’s 
identity and give it the emotional force and the ontological status that distinguish the Creed.  
Synergizing with the Thesis, the myths of the United States’ chosenness, naturalness, and 
messianism/millennialism thus articulate the narrative of the US nation’s identity and form the 
ideological/semantic basis of US America`s nationalism.  
 
5.1 The Narrative of Chosenness 
 
The Lord your God has chosen you out of all the peoples […] to be his people, his 
treasured possession. The Lord […] set his affection on you and [chose] you […] 
because the Lord loved you and kept the oath he swore to your forefathers that he […] 
with his mighty hand […] redeemed you from the land of slavery, from the power of 
Pharaoh king of Egypt. (Deut. 7:6-8, NIV) 
These words from the Hebrew Bible (the book of Deuteronomy) express the idea of 
chosenness which travelled through the ages from ancient Israel to England and then to its 
American possessions whose soil was fertile enough for such a self-image to take root and 
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eventually blossom. As has been noted, the unique status of a national community was built 
into the very idea of the nation, but each nation seemed to validate its uniqueness in its own 
way, drawing this uniqueness from different sources. According to Greenfeld, the notion of 
chosenness or uniqueness inheres in the very idea of the nation: “national identity tends to be 
associated and confounded with a community`s sense of uniqueness and the qualities 
contributing to it.”558 The uniqueness of the world`s first nation, the English nation, was not 
only guaranteed by its status as a polity, as Greenfeld believes, but, as Hughes notes, was also 
justified by the Biblical rhetoric and imagery of a chosen people.559 The very idea of the 
chosen nation was an idea from the Scripture. It was therefore the religious sentiment of the 
English nation that ultimately became the basis of US America`s national uniqueness. As 
Greenfeld puts it, “because of the association between the Reformation and English national 
identity, Protestantism not only provided the yet voiceless nationalism with a language, but 
also secured it a sanctuary and protection, which it needed in order to mature.”560 According 
to Hughes, the uniqueness (the status of being the chosen one) so generously granted to the 
ancient Jews was centuries later effectively ‘appropriated’ by the resourceful Americans for 
themselves and for the land that they similarly appropriated as their new home, an 
‘uninhabited’ earthly paradise, as they saw it, where the new history of humankind would be 
made.561 Although, in time, the language of chosenness lost in the intensity of its deeply 
religious character, its central message remained intact: as Hughes argues, US America was 
imagined as a messiah entrusted by the Higher Being with a righteous mission to convert the 
supposedly heathen world into the religion of democracy and initiate it into the revelations of 
the virtues of freedom and self-government (basically into the Thesis, I might add). Hughes 
therefore identifies the Myth of the Chosen Nation as one of “the most powerful and 
persistent of all the myths that Americans invoke about themselves.”562 He defines this myth 
as “the notion that God Almighty chose the United States for a special mission in the 
world.”563 Among the most fundamental elements of this myth, in Hughes`s opinion, are 
religion (the Judeo-Christian heritage) and ‘blood’ (Anglo-Saxon blood), or belief in “the 
Anglo-Saxon [innate] capacity for morality and free institutions.”564 This latter ‘Anglo-
Saxon’ component, in my opinion, only further attests to the degree to which the US national 
identity is indebted to the principles of English nationalism.  
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In the case of the US American nation, Hughes (like Greenfeld) indeed traces the origins of 
this powerful cultural narrative to the ‘birthmother’ of US nationalism, that is, to England and 
the English Reformation, and especially to the historical figure of William Tyndale who was 
most instrumental in “populariz[ing] the notion that England stood in a covenant relationship 
with God.”565 As Hughes outlines the history of the idea, in 1519, William Tyndale, upon 
translating the Pentateuch, or the five books of Moses, into the English language, comes 
across a theme that particularly resonates with him: God’s covenant with Israel in which the 
former promises to pour the many blessings on the Israelites, treat them as ‘his treasured 
possession,’ on condition that they follow His divine law.566 So powerful was the effect of 
this biblical imagery on Tyndale that in the preface to the second edition of his initially 
rejected translation of the New Testament, he brings the concept of the covenant to the 
forefront as the central theme of the Scripture. Despite the anti-Puritan sentiments at the time, 
the publication did not meet significant resistance, largely due to the fact that Henry VIII was 
deeply involved in his matrimonial problems.567 Tyndale`s commentary became unexpectedly 
popular with the English public: it enjoyed numerous print runs, while the combustible 
popular imagination had been ignited with the idea of the national covenant. Tyndale does not 
limit the possibility of contractual relationship with God to ancient Israel, but allows that God 
can conclude a similar agreement with England, if it proves itself willing to abide by His 
commandments. Although Tyndale did not directly refer to the English folk as the God-
chosen nation, the concept of the national covenant allowed this definition by default: if the 
Lord had ‘chosen [the Israelites] out of all the peoples on the face on the earth’ to enter into a 
covenant with, it was exactly because they were exceptional.568  
According to Hughes, this language was eagerly picked up by the most ardent practitioners of 
English nationalism (as Greenfeld described them569) as well as the most ardent adherents to 
the Bible and God`s word – the Puritans. Having suffered many traumas and humiliations 
(which only strengthened their adherence to the principles of the English national idea), the 
Puritans, according to Hughes, managed to launch a full-scale revolution, “one of words and 
propaganda:”570 they occupied leading positions in the country’s major educational 
institutions, planting their ideas in the circles of prospective clerics, and devoted themselves 
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to the publication of books and pamphlets, agitating in every possible way for their cause.571 
It must reminded, though, that their cause was decidedly nationalist: as Greenfeld notes, on 
the surface, the Puritans demanded only spiritual reform, but many in England understood 
that Puritanism carried a powerful reformatory potential of the society as a whole: 
“Puritanism opened wide the gates for the reform of society in general, and implied nothing 
less than the destruction of the established order.”572 
As Hughes continues, despite the efforts, the Puritans were constantly confronted with the 
futility of their tactics, and eventually ended up thoroughly discouraged. Elizabeth I, although 
sticking to the middle way in dealing with the Catholics on the one hand and the Puritans on 
the other, for the most part ignored the demands of both, which drove the latter (and perhaps 
the former, too) into an even greater frustration. Exhausted, some Puritans attributed their lack 
of success to a tactical mistake: it was now obvious that, from the very beginning, the 
attempts to restore the first Christian church in England were doomed to failure.573 The 
establishment of a truly Christian (and I might add, nationalist) community based on God’s 
word (and the original ideals of English nationalism), as they believed, was possible only on 
condition that it be separated from the suffocating environment of England and its 
institutionally sited religious authorities. Religion was often evoked by the Puritans to justify 
their ideological claims which were deeply nationalist.574 It was indeed their “inability to be 
English in England,”575 as Greenfeld notes, that drove the groups of Englishmen and 
Englishwomen across the ocean. According to Greenfeld, the religiosity of Puritanism only 
aided in the promotion of the movement, formulation of its ideology and contributed to its 
self-representation. References to religion most convincingly legitimized the Puritans` 
unprecedented reformist claims which logically followed from the very definition of England 
as a nation. Social change was therefore demanded in the locution of God`s will, and the 
position of England as a God-chosen nation.  
As Hughes further argues, with the faith in the possibility of implementing biblical and 
national ideals in England lost, the Puritans continued to ground their experience of New 
England in the idea of the covenant.576 However, in the colonies, the covenant metaphor was 
increasingly interpreted as alluding to the notion of chosenness, and what was perhaps only 
 
571 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 38-39. 
572 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 72-73.  
573 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 38.  
574 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 73.  
575 Greenfeld, Nationalism, 71. 
576 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 39. 
91 
 
assumed in the logic of the biblical covenant with ancient Israel became even more 
accentuated. In my opinion, what is interesting in light of the previous discussion of the 
essentially negative understanding of individual liberty as outlined in the Thesis is that the 
notion of ‘covenant’ was initially collectivistic before it was ‘individualized’ by the Puritans. 
In my assessment, it was this individualistic understanding of individual liberty that the 
American Thesis inherited. However, as Hughes notes, not yet having reached the shores of 
the New World, the idea was famously articulated by John Winthrop in the sermon delivered 
aboard Arabella, and in at least one key respect bore little resemblance to the definition it 
acquired upon the arrival in America. What the metaphor of the covenant meant for Winthrop 
was solidarity or, in his words, “brotherly affection,” as he encouraged his fellow men: “we 
must be knit together […] as one man, we must entertain each other in brotherly affection, 
[…] we must delight in each other, make others` condition our own.”577 Hughes identifies 
several reasons for this semantic change.578 First, the New England Puritans perceived 
themselves to be in the vanguard of religious liberty (and not only religious), as true 
revolutionaries who did not settle for mere reform, but managed to erect in the New World 
some semblance of the first/primitive Christian church as revealed in the Scripture. Secondly, 
the ‘saints,’ as they referred to one another, found themselves in the objective geographical as 
well as subjective psychological/spiritual isolation.  Not only were there the waters of the 
Atlantic Ocean separating the Puritans from Europe, but also an abyss of incomprehension 
and alienation. They were progressively seeing themselves as misunderstood and abandoned, 
one-on-one in the covenant with God. These objective and subjective circumstances only 
strengthened the temptation to self-fashion as a community of the chosen. Their conviction in 
being the ideal members of the English nation (“better English than the English,”579 as 
Greenfeld notes) who strictly abided by the principles of its nationalism (something that 
England “tired of the revolutionary striving to attain [its own] ideal”580 was no longer able to 
do) only added to the Puritan sense of chosenness.  
As Hughes contends, so symbolically potent was the example of the Puritans that the 
narrative of chosenness was slowly seeping into the collective (sub)conscious of the future 
US American nation. According to the scholar, “the Myth of the Chosen Nation [was] central 
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even to the thinking of the American Founders,”581 for “[i]mages of the children of Israel and 
of America as a chosen people likewise informed the rhetoric of the Revolution.”582 Indeed, 
when commissioned to design a seal for the United States, the committee members appointed 
by Congress offered their own visions of what should be communicated about the United 
States of America among which was the image of the children of Israel guided by ‘a cloud by 
day and a pillar of fire by night.’583 From Hughes`s analysis of the historical evidence of the 
period, it becomes clear that the political and intellectual elites of the day were indeed eager 
to establish genealogy between contemporary US America and ancient Israel (something that 
England once did). In his novel White Jacket, Herman Melville, for example, describes the 
US American nation as “the peculiar, chosen people – the Israel of our time, [whom] God has 
predestined [to be] the pioneers of the world; the advance-guard, sent on through the 
wilderness of untried things, to break a new path in the New World that is ours.”  Long 
enough, says Melville, have the Americans been skeptical of themselves and their mission, 
but not anymore, for “the political Messiah had come, [and he had come] in us.”584  
Therefore, I might conclude that the language of chosenness, which inhered in the original 
national idea and which was only strengthened by the rhetorical appeals to the Bible, is deeply 
woven into the fabric of the US American national narrative: its national identity, cultural 
practices, and iconography. In my understanding, the language of chosenness sustains the 
narrative of the US American national identity as outlined in the principles of the American 
Thesis. Certainly, the idea of chosenness underlies the American Thesis as the legacy of the 
American Way. Indeed, by the late eighteenth century, the sense of occupying a privileged 
position was so firmly embedded in the minds of the Young Republic that it simply became a 
‘self-evident truth.’  
  
5.2 The Narrative of Naturalness and Self-evidence 
 
The United States Declaration of Independence postulates:  
When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve 
the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the 
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powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of 
Nature`s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that 
they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation. 
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are 
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, 
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. 
[...], with a firm Reliance on the Protection of divine Providence [...].585 
In my understanding, these words quite laconically not only articulate the contents of the 
American Thesis, but also present the myths that accompany the Creed. As perhaps the first 
statement of the US national identity, these lines testify to the fact that the ideal of individual 
sovereignty was indeed the ideological nucleus of the former colonists` and, most 
importantly, the colonial political and intellectual elites` worldview (indeed, their very 
habitus). Another important feature of the above excerpt is, in my opinion, that the Thirteen 
Colonies` claim to independence (indeed, to the right of sovereignty) is couched in the natural 
language that, as will be demonstrated, the colonies ironically enough inherited from England 
itself (which they were now divorcing). As the first statement of the US American nation`s 
identity, these lines illustrate how the nascent Americans conceived of themselves as, in 
Hughes`s assessment, Nature`s Nation. These words thus speak of US America`s conviction 
that its ideals and institutions were “not spun out of someone’s imagination or contrived by 
human wit,”586 but are “rooted in the natural order, that is, in God’s own intentions first 
revealed at the dawn of creation.”587 According to Hughes, the Myth of Nature`s Nation that 
emerged in full force in the Revolutionary period “had its deepest roots in the European 
Enlightenment, especially in Britain.”588 The narrative of naturalness however made it appear 
as if “American identity derived not from British history and culture […] but from nature, 
formed directly by the Creator.”589 At the same time, to further illustrate the intricate 
interaction of the Thesis and its attendant myths, the language of self-evidence, which inhered 
in the conception of US America as Nature`s Nation, derived its legitimacy from the 
principles of the nation`s Creed: as Hughes notes, the American Thesis proclaimed that “there 
 
585 “Declaration of Independence: A Transcription,” National Archives, accessed 14 Feb 2020. 
https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript. 
586 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 70. 
587 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 2. 
588 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 61. 
589 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 70. 
94 
 
are certain truths that are simply ‘self-evident’ and require no formal proof,”590 while the self-
evidence of these truths was justified by the fact that “they are rooted in ‘Nature and Nature’s 
God’ and therefore reflect the way things are meant to be.”591 If ‘in the beginning was the 
Word,’ I dare conclude, the word was with US America, and the word was US America (its 
specific identity and institutional organization). The narrative of naturalness and self-evidence 
allowed US Americans to imagine their nation as indeed Nature`s Nation. Thomas Paine, for 
example, asserted in The Rights of Man that “the case and circumstances of America present 
themselves as in the beginning of a world;”592 while John Adams adds, for his part, that “the 
United States of America have exhibited, perhaps, the first example of governments erected 
on the simple principles of nature.”593  
As I argue in this thesis, heir to the English national identity, US America traces its national 
beginnings to the nationalism of England in quite a lot of key respects. According to Hughes, 
the US American nation`s language of naturalness is no exception in this regard. Following 
Hughes`s analysis of the origins of US America`s national myth of Nature`s Nation, we once 
again follow the genealogy of the natural language to eighteenth-century England during the 
Age of Enlightenment.594 In 1624, Edward Lord Herbert of Cherbury, Anglo-Welsh diplomat, 
historian, and religious philosopher, was growing appalled at the bloody religious crisis in the 
seventeenth-century Europe. This crisis, as he thought, was caused by the fact that the Bible, 
whose interpretation used to be the prerogative of the Catholic Church, had now been 
translated by such spiritual figures as Luther and Tyndale into the languages native to 
Europe`s Christians and thus became open to numerous rivalling interpretations.595 To put an 
end to religious wars in Europe, Herbert had to come up with a solution that would appeal to 
the ‘truths’ (agreeable to rational thinking), on which all representatives of the most diverse 
religious affiliations would reach a consensus, and which would therefore bring together the 
conflicting sects. According to Hughes, in his book De Veritate (On Truth), Herbert argues 
the existence of two books authored by God: the Bible and the Book of Nature, that is, of the 
natural world.596 Whereas the former is, according to Herbert, an infinitely complex scripture, 
the latter book is universal and relatively simple, containing self-evident truths that all 
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religions recognize and follow. One such truth was, for example, that nature taught the 
existence of God through the perfect clockwork-like functioning of the natural world.597 
Herbert therefore appealed to the public to adhere to the Book of Nature, placing it higher 
than the Bible and (to an extent) replacing the Bible with it. Such a tactic effectively deprived 
any conflict on religious grounds of its theological rationale. According to Hughes, in his 
attempts to reconcile the Christians of Europe, Herbert was foremost a pragmatist rather than 
a theologian; his objective was to “reduce religion to a set of self-evident essentials upon 
which all reasonable human beings could agree.”598 Herbert grounded his conception of 
religious faith in nature and reason, and thus made his contribution to the birth and 
establishment of the English Enlightenment and English Deism.  
Continuing his analysis, Hughes notes that the eighteenth-century Enlightenment thought 
relied on the possibility of empirical study of the world through the judgments of reason and 
the evidence of the senses.599 Deism and the English Deistic tradition were a particular mode 
of thinking about God/deity that adopted the methodology, so to say, of the Enlightenment 
view of the world. Deism departs from the ideas about a ‘Triune God’ and truths revealed in 
mysterious visions from above (and beyond human reason) in favor of an even greater 
‘monotheism’ – the conception of an indivisible deity, a supreme clock-maker, as well as the 
truths found in nature and understood / studied by the rational mind. As regards the 
Enlightenment backgrounds to US nationalism, Greenfeld remarks that the discourse of 
naturalness might have existed even prior to Herbert`s project of peacemaking of which 
Hughes speaks. “Since Bacon,” science, which postulated the primacy of nature as the teacher 
of the world`s ‘truths’ / laws, was, as Greenfeld states, “viewed as a sign of [the English] 
nation`s greatness, the foundation and guarantee of its strength and virtue.”600 According to 
Greenfeld, “[b]ecause of its association with English nationalism – science became a cult 
object long before it could demonstrate its potential.”601   
In Hughes`s observation, Herbert’s strategy is easily traceable in the Declaration. Indeed, as 
Hughes notes, it is known today that, while drafting the document, Jefferson addressed the 
works by Herbert and other Deistic thinkers.602 For example, the Declaration acknowledges 
the existence of a particular type of deity – Nature`s God – who created all men equal and 
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endowed them with unalienable rights. The document also posits the existence of a body of 
unwritten moral givens (‘we hold these Truths’ – the rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness – ‘to be self-evident’). However, as Hughes remarks, the image of a universal 
individual (‘man in general’) of which the Declaration speaks was a mere projection of the 
architects` own image of themselves. In my understanding, the founders fell prey to the 
attributional bias: in extolling the image of ‘homo naturalis’ (Nature`s man), they in fact 
extolled the image of ‘homo europaeus’ (European man), that is, the image of themselves, the 
Enlightenment man of reason, standardized in US America within the coordinate system of 
white (upper-class) manhood.603 In my opinion, this might be illustrated by the historical fact 
that the Declaration`s liberatory message turned out to be a contradiction in terms (at best) 
when applied to lived reality, for the discrepancies between the ideals outlined in the text and 
their actual realization in reality were striking. This peculiarity in US national history is what 
Edmund Morgan notices when he remarks that “the simultaneous development of slavery and 
freedom is the central paradox of American history.”604  
In my understanding, the architects` attributional bias might serve as an example of the 
amount of power that habitus or ‘cultural constraints’ (in Greenfeld`s terminology) of which I 
spoke in the introductory chapters has over those who grew up in that particular cultural 
environment. To paraphrase the Peripatetic axiom which states that ‘nothing is in the intellect 
that was not first in the senses,’ we might say that there is nothing in the intellect that was not 
first in one`s respective cultural environment which inevitably shapes one`s worldview. And 
such was the eighteenth-century climate of opinion, which postulated that “whatever question 
you seek to answer, nature is the test, the standard: the ideas, the customs, the institutions of 
men, if ever they are to attain perfection, must obviously be in accord with those laws which 
‘nature reveals at all times, to all men.’”605 As Hughes believes, the architects “absolutized 
their very particular cultural traditions and then heralded those traditions as both natural and 
universal.”606 The point of arrival was therefore identical to the point of departure.  
Therefore, I might conclude, the language of naturalness inherited by US America from 
England just as naturally legitimized the narrative construction of the US nation as Nature`s 
Nation: first, the language of natural rights and self-evidence allowed the Thirteen Colonies to 
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formulate their claim for independence in a ‘believable’ manner (as has been noted, 
‘believability’ in a cultural community is achieved via reference to its respective habitus 
which constitutes the community`s common sense and ‘the good’); in the following decades, 
the language of naturalness was effectively made use of to construct, consolidate, and valorize 
the narrative of US America`s national identity. God`s chosen nation, US America emanated 
the natural order of things and thus felt entitled to spread its word of democracy and self-
government to the rest of the world.  
 
5.3 The Narrative of Messianism/Millennialism 
 
In his “Introduction: What, then, is the American?”, Christopher Bigsby remarks:  
America has so successfully colonized the future that it has mastered the art of 
prospective nostalgia. Its natural tense is the future perfect. It looks forward to a time 
when something will have happened. It is a place, too, where fact and fiction, myth 
and reality dance a curious gavotte. It is a society born out of its own imaginings.607  
In my understanding, it would not be a mistake to interpret Bigsby`s observation that 
‘prospectively nostalgic’ US America, having ‘successfully colonized the future,’ now lives 
in the future perfect tense as, in fact, alluding to what Hughes calls the US nation`s Myth of 
the Millennial Nation or “the notion that the United States, [as Nature`s Nation,] building on 
[the] natural order [it embodies], will usher in a final golden age for all humankind.”608 As 
Hughes notes, unlike the myth of Nature`s Nation which emerged as the dominant narrative in 
the Revolutionary period, the origins of the narrative of US America`s millennialism can be 
traced to the early national period, when it suddenly dawned on the United States that, as the 
chosen nation whose national spirit and social organization as if emulated the virtues of a 
golden age at the beginning of time, it was entrusted with the mission to “illumine the globe 
with truth, justice, goodness, and democratic self-government and […] thereby usher in a final 
golden age for all humankind.”609 According to Hughes, with one foot in the pastoral age at 
the dawn of creation, US America (due to its millennial vision) could effectively bracket the 
other end of the historical continuum.610 If I may draw an analogy, this way of thinking 
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depicted US America as a somewhat Janus-faced nation, simultaneously looking backward 
toward the ‘dawn of creation’ and forward toward to its ‘dusk.’   
To follow Hughes`s outline of the historical background to the millennial vison, the US 
nation`s millennial fantasy, according to the scholar, has its deepest roots in the ancient world 
and draws on the apocalyptic visions of Judaism and Christianity as well as the figure of the 
anticipated savor or messiah within whose power it is to save the world from its many 
afflictions.611 When the first coming of Jesus Christ did not entail any (earthly) salvation of 
humanity (ancient Christians continued to be persecuted), this contradiction was interpreted as 
the postponement of the golden age of justice and peace which was now to be realized at the 
Second Coming of the Messiah: Jesus would rule over the world, Satan would be locked for 
the period of one thousand years (‘millennium’ from the Latin mille, thousand, and annus, 
year), and would not be able to sow discord among peoples. In the meantime, Christians had 
no choice but to wait for this golden age, ‘bearing their crosses’ obediently and enduring the 
worst of life’s hardships. However, as Hughes notes, in the eighteenth century, something 
changed. The Enlightenment thought had greatly contributed to the fact that man (in 
possession of reason) and the science that studied him/her removed God from the center of 
the universe.612 The numerous discoveries in the medical field (which made it possible to treat 
hitherto lethal diseases) as well as the advancement of the ideas of natural rights, individual 
freedom and humans` equality under the law made it easy to imagine man taking control of 
his/her fate, and even accelerating the approach of the golden age. The intervention of a deity 
was no longer necessary. In this eighteenth-century postmillennial vision, the Second Coming 
was no longer that big of an issue.  
In the context of the United States` national development, it was, according to Hughes, 
especially easy to imagine US America as the land of the millennium, for the Revolutionary 
moment and the birth of the nation virtually cemented the millennial vision for years ahead: 
everything was revolutionary about US America – the ‘audacity’ of the act and the radically 
democratic rights and freedoms on which the new nation was to be built.613 The former 
colonies at that time had every reason to see this historic event as the beginning of the age of 
justice and liberty. As Hughes continues, during the Revolutionary period, an important shift 
in the millennial thinking occurred. If at the beginning it was God that first chose ancient 
Israel by His inscrutable will and then extended His blessing to New England, a century later, 
 
611 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 131-132. 
612 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 133. 
613 Hughes, Myths America Lives By, 138. 
99 
 
it was the US American people (self-endowed with certain unalienable rights) who chose God 
(‘appropriated’ Him to justify their cause), and in whose hands was now the advancement of 
the golden age of the future. Hughes describes this shift in thinking as “[t]he transition from 
the sovereignty of God to the sovereignty of the people.”614 In my understanding, given the 
centrality of the ideal of individual sovereignty to the US American national self, it was 
perhaps only a matter of time before the nation shook off any authority from above and 
imagined itself as its own God. In Hughes`s opinion, as the US nation matured, the US 
millennial vision found its most vocal expression in US America`s westward expansion (the 
mythologization of the West as the space of unlimited opportunity and genuine Americanness 
and the doctrine of Manifest Destiny), its more recent economic expansion (the growth of the 
US market, the new economic Frontier, discussed in the language of messianism), as well as 
the cultural myth of the American Dream (the messianic vision was internalized by the 
cultural hero of the self-made man who, in their struggle for material prosperity, became their 
own frontier615).  
As regards US America`s sense of mission, Lieven notes that it is the US nation`s “intense 
identification” with the American Creed and its attendant myths that “feeds American 
national messianism, a belief in the nation's duty to save the world.”616 US messianism thus 
inheres in the combination of the American Thesis and the US American national myths. In 
my opinion, Hughes shares a similar conviction to that of Lieven as he states that the US 
millennial vision is the product of the synergistic interaction of the nation`s most fundamental 
myths. Hughes therefore believes that “the myths of America as Chosen Nation, Nature’s 
Nation, and Christian Nation gave to the millennial vision whatever content it had.”617 If we 
remember the specific contents of the narratives of chosenness and naturalness (self-
evidence), we might clearly see how much the messianic language of US nationalism relies 
on these mythic discourses as well as how much the three narratives are interrelated and 
mutually supportive. According to Hughes, these narratives are all “equally ahistorical.”618 
The position of the US American nation is quite unique as it stands untainted, or as Lieven 
puts it, “spared”619 by human history, or, in Paine`s words, “unmutilated by […] the errors of 
tradition.”620 As Hughes believes, historical time cannot adequately measure US America, for 
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its identity is clearly rooted in a golden age of the past (in the natural order of things) and a 
golden age that is yet to come (the millennium).621 In my understanding, an element of 
ahistoricism was inherent already in the first statements of US nationhood. The necessity (not 
mere preference or desire) of which the first lines of the Declaration speak (‘when in the 
Course of human events, it becomes necessary’) is similarly ahistorical, for the ‘Course of 
human events’ does not seem to imply any historical necessity, rather that “there is a general 
course of nature in human action as well as in the operation of the sun and the climate.”622 
Since its birth as a nation, US America as Nature`s Nation has stood outside human history 
and followed its own (natural) course of development. As Hughes continues, the second 
characteristic that the narratives of naturalness and millennialism have in common is the 
degree to which they complement each other by standing on either side of human history and 
at the same time above it623: as has been noted, if the natural language grounds US America`s 
beginnings in the great age at the dawn of creation, then the millennial language fashions US 
America as the ultimate endpoint of human history. Both mythic narratives therefore flank the 
United States` experience by rooting American ideals and values (the Thesis) in primordial 
nature (‘Laws of Nature and Nature`s God’), while at the same time entitling the nation (by 
virtue of its chosenness) to secure the final victory in the apocalyptic battle of good (the 
American way, I would add) versus evil.  
In light of the above discussion of the nature of US nationalism, I would also like to draw the 
reader`s attention to how much US American millennialism seems to be the logical extension 
of the nation`s tradition of self-government as well as other principles inherited from English 
nationalism. In my assessment, US America`s desire for expansion whether in time, 
geography, or market might be interpreted as motivated by the nation`s loyalty to the sacred 
right to exercise its sovereignty (as postulated in the Thesis). It is simply a natural right of the 
chosen nation. This, in my opinion, aptly demonstrates the interplay of the Thesis and its 
‘satellite’ myths, to which Lieven attributes the United States` sense of mission.  
In his analysis of the Myth of the Millennial Nation, Hughes adduces ample historical 
evidence of the fact that the millennial vision has indeed possessed the US national 
consciousness. As Hughes notes, even before the Revolutionary moment, such patriarchs as, 
for example, John Adams already defined the mission of US America (Adams speaks of the 
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settlement of America) in the language of millennialism as “the illumination of the ignorant, 
and the emancipation of the slavish part of mankind all over the earth.”624 After the 
Revolution, this light/darkness trope had been actively exploited in the talks about the 
position of US America vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Ezra Stiles, president of Yale, for 
instance, preached in 1783 that US America was to “illuminate the world with TRUTH and 
LIBERTY […], [for] [l]ight spreads from the day spring in the west; and may it shine more 
and more until the perfect day.”625 Almost fifty years later, in the 1830s, Lyman Beecher, 
prominent Presbyterian minister, voiced his belief in US America`s providential mission to 
“throw its beams beyond the waves, [and] shine into darkness” so that “earth`s debased 
millions […] leap from the dust, and shake off their chains.” Beecher`s millennialism 
therefore imagines the rest of the world as mired in corruption: as he has it, “the history of the 
world is the history of human nature in ruin.”626 In all these ‘imaginings,’ US America seems 
to stand above this ‘history of human nature in ruin,’ completely unaffected by its 
‘malevolent’ workings.  
In my assessment, these examples illustrate how the narratives of naturalness and 
millennialism join forces to boost each other`s mythic potential. To sum up the above 
argument, the world will adopt the American way because it is only natural, for its identity is 
so firmly embedded in and reflect the natural order of things. The world will simply have no 
choice, for US America, as the myth of the Chosen Nation prescribes, was also chosen by the 
incomprehensible will of the Almighty to become His agent on earth and the ultimate 
‘Redeemer Nation’627 for the rest of humanity. A redeemer nation, US America no longer had 
to emulate the natural order of things, for it itself came to represent the new order worthy of 
emulation. US America, it was therefore believed, would awaken the world to the virtues of 
freedom and democracy (to the virtues of its Thesis) and encourage the oppressed by its own 
example to throw off the shackles of tyranny. Indeed, as Lieven notes, “it would be quite 
wrong to think that American messianism necessarily implies a desire to save the world by 
 
624 Cited in Ernest Lee Tuverson, Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America`s Millennial Role (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1968) 25, qtd. in Hughes, 139. 
625 Ezra Stiles, “The United States Elevated to Glory and Honor,” 1783, in Conrad Cherry, ed., God`s New 
Israel: Religious Interpretations of American Destiny (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998) 
90, qtd. in Hughes, 139. 
626 Lyman Beecher, “The Memory of Our Fathers,” a sermon delivered at Plymouth, Massachusetts, December 
22, 1827, in Winthrop Hudson, ed., Nationalism and Religion in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1970) 
99, qtd. in Hughes, 140. 
627 Ernest Lee Tuveson`s term, his book Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America’s Millennial Role. 
102 
 
action; [for] [e]qually strong, and indeed historically more common, has been the belief that 
America's mission to humanity consists above all of the force of its example.”628 
*** 
To sum up the above argument, I have thus attempted to demonstrate the intricate interaction 
of the American Thesis and the set of national myths which, as I have argued, give the Creed 
its ontological status and emotional force. In my understanding, what accounts for the 
affectivity of mythic constructions is their narrativity (the narrative structure of myth). 
Drawing on the work by Jerome Bruner, I thus argued that narrative (due to its inherent 
sequentiality, factual indifference, and its peculiar way of managing departures from the 
canonical) is the natural mode of organizing experience by humans.  Following the work by 
Richard Hughes, I have thus identified three most fundamental myths (narratives) of US 
nationalism: the narratives of chosenness, naturalness (self-evidence) and 
messianism/millennialism. These myths allow to imagine US America as an exceptional 
nation chosen for a special mission in the world; as the nation whose ideals and institutions 
emulate the natural order of things (‘the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God’).  
In my assessment, the interaction between the American Thesis and the myths that 
accompany it (as well as the complex interplay among the myths themselves) is truly 
synergistic: not only do these myths (“so thoroughly ahistorical and […] so completely self-
evident”629) mutually sustain one another, but they also lead to the genesis of additional 
(somewhat contingent, I would say) mythic narratives. One such ‘by-product’ myth is, 
according to Hughes, the US nation`s myth of the Innocent Nation or “a profound sense of 
innocence” that characterizes the US experience: as Hughes notes, “while other nations may 
have blood on their hands, the nobility of the American cause [the impression of which is 
provided by the Thesis and its myths] always redeems the nation and renders it innocent.”630 
In Lieven`s opinion, the belief in US America`s ‘original sinlessness’ is “both very old and 
very powerful:”631 it strengthens US narrative-based nationalism and tempers the nation’s 
willingness to co-operate with other countries, casting them as ‘originally sinful.’ In Hughes`s 
opinion, the myths of Nature`s Nation and the Millennial Nation were most instrumental in 
the construction of US America as the Innocent Nation:632 these myths effectively root the US 
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national experience in the Edenic age of the past (on one side) and in the golden age of the 
future (on the other), thereby lifting the nation above and over “the bog of human history”633 
rendering it innocent. “Defined by the beginning of the world,” US America “would define its 
end.”634  
By way of conclusion, I would like to briefly outline the nature of the myth of US innocence 
for a more comprehensive picture of US national mythology. In his analysis of the myth of 
the Innocent Nation which has dominated US national consciousness for the most of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Hughes attributes the United States` sense of innocence 
to the Americans` specific stance towards history and its contents: as the scholar observes, 
encouraged by their national myths “to ignore the power of history and tradition as forces that 
shaped the nation,”635 “many Americans live their lives in the eternal present, a present 
informed and shaped not by history but by those two golden epochs that bracket human 
time.”636 The US American sense of ahistoricism (which, as we have discovered, inheres in 
most of the nation`s myths) encourages the nation to reject the historical process and its 
traumas, and to imagine itself as living in the eternal present flanked by two glorious epochs – 
the golden age of the past (the dawn of time / the time of creation) on the one hand and the 
golden age of the future (the millennium of liberty and justice) on the other.  As President 
Ronald Reagan puts it in his State of the Union Address, “[t]he calendar can`t measure 
America because we are meant to be an endless experiment in freedom, with no limits to our 
reaches, no boundaries to what we can do, no end point to our hopes.”637  
The specificity of US American nationalism resides in the fact that the US nation was, 
according to Lieven, mostly “spared by history.”638 This fact manifests itself in the semi-
religious faith in the national mythology (“communal self-deception”639) by most Americans: 
the US rarely confronted that kind of history which would challenge the validity of the 
national myths and set off a process of collective revisionism. By rejecting history, as Hughes 
notes, Americans “also reject[ed] the most fundamental contents of history, especially 
finitude, suffering, and death.”640 On the contrary, existing above and beyond history, the US 
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American nation lives in ‘the eternal present:’ as if there is no ‘before,’ but only ‘the eternal 
now;’ as if history, indeed, had never happened. As Lieven remarks, the decline in historical 
studies and the school students` low scores on history exams might testify to this 
observation.641 However, as Lieven also believes, the lack of historical knowledge / 
awareness does not necessarily entail ignorance, but “the presence of myth.”642 
The question that arises in this respect is why US America is so ‘forgetful,’ whether its 
ahistoricism might be some kind of the nation`s coping mechanism. In some sense, yes. As 
we may observe, the world-shattering historical events such as, for example, the French 
Revolution or the two World Wars of the twentieth century were unfolding far from the 
American shores. However, US America was living its own history, subjectively not less 
traumatic. For this reason, I might conclude that the way in which US America deals with 
historical trauma is via the (self-inflicted) historical amnesia, or the national ‘habit of 
forgetting’ / of willing forgetfulness. As Ernest Renan notes, “[f]orgetting, I would almost say 
historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation, which is why progress in 
historical studies often constitutes a danger for [the principle of] nationality... The essence of 
a nation is that all individuals have many things in common, and also that they have forgotten 
many things.”643  We can all agree that US America is an exceptionally diverse national 
community (and has always been so). To preserve its national coherence (that is, not to be 
torn apart by the bitter memories of the past, in which, in my opinion, the US American 
project abounds), the US nation needs to be a bit more (or a lot more) forgetful than other 
nations. In my understanding, in US America, one thus needs to learn to forget in order to feel 
‘at home’ within their own nation. As Henry Kissinger puts it:  
the rejection of history extols the image of a universal man living by universal 
maxims, regardless of the past, of geography, or of other immutable circumstance... 
The American refusal to be bound by history and the insistence on the perpetual 
possibility of renewal confer a great dignity, even beauty, on the American way of life. 
The national fear that those who are obsessed with history produce self-fulfilling 
prophecies does embody a great folk wisdom.644 
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In my understanding, in the US American ‘cult of the nation’ (“the heightened culture of 
nationalism”645), the language of innocence supported by the nation`s sense of ahistoricism 
thus serves to affirm the unity of Americans in one common national identity, for, as I have 
attempted to demonstrate, the disruptive forces (the American Antithesis as well as other 
kinds of dissent, all legitimized by the nation`s loyalty to the ideal of individual sovereignty) 
continue to operate within the national fabric, constantly threatening the internal cohesion, 
while the effects of their workings (under certain circumstances) might be quite powerful, not 
to say, lethal.  
It is perhaps this fact that, in my opinion, may account for US America`s sense of insecurity 
as one nation and nurture two national obsessions: one with “cultural and moral decline,” 
another one – with “domestic treachery.”646 According to Lieven, this in turn gives rise to the 
“nationalist rhetoric of anxiety.”647 As the scholar observes, most politicians and public 
intellectuals willingly avail themselves of this language, while the US press and media 
astonish by their employees` “capacity for both radicalism and sheer hatred.”648 The 
unwillingness or even inability among the Americans, mainly the dominant sections of the 
political and media worlds, to question the nation’s innocence fuels, according to Lieven, “a 
culture of public conformism.”649 As Lieven remarks, drawing on Louis Hartz, “[w]hen one’s 
ultimate values are accepted wherever one turns, the absolute language of self-evidence 
comes easily enough,” in which he recognizes “the mood of America’s absolutism: the sober 
faith that its norms are self-evident.” This faith feeds “the conformitarian ethos” which “has 
always been infuriating because it refuses to pay its critics the compliment of an 
argument.”650 As Senator Fulbright observes, “[i]n the abstract we celebrate freedom of 
opinion as part of our patriotic legacy; it is only when some Americans exercise it that other 
Americans are shocked, [for] [i]ntolerance of dissent is a well-noted feature of the American 
national character.”651 More than a century before, de Tocqueville similarly noted that he 
knows “no country in which there is so little true independence of mind and freedom of 
discussion as in America, [for] [t]he majority raises very formidable barriers to the liberty of 
opinion: within these barriers an author may write whatever he pleases, but he will repent it if 
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he ever step beyond them.”652 These observations, in my opinion, quite aptly illustrate the 
socially binding and assimilatory power of the Thesis and its myths which in Bercovitch`s 
assessment translates into nothing less than “tyranny of the culture”653 
I therefore might conclude that it is for these reasons that the national language of innocence, 
the conformism it generates, and the US refusal/reluctance to face the pain of history (past 
and in the making) may produce counterproductive strategies in dealing with the reality of 
structural problems. As I see it, these national ‘habits’ also make it virtually impossible to 
discuss public issues openly and with the involvement of different (conflicting/dissenting) 
perspectives, thus abridging the most fundamental liberty US America prides itself on, that is, 
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In conclusion, the main argument of the thesis is that the identity of the United States of 
America as a nation is represented by the American Thesis (the American Creed / the 
American Ideology), a set of propositions, central of which is the semi-religious adherence to 
the ideal of individual sovereignty / liberty.  The American Thesis as the US nation`s identity, 
its common-sense vision of social reality and morality, therefore renders the “discursive 
construction[…] of the nation plausible and self-evident, […] creat[ing] internal solidarity and 
commitment to the nation state and its policies, [as well as] represent[ing] the US to 
outsiders.”654 
I have attempted to support my argument by, first, defining the phenomenon of the nation as a 
mental construct, the product of the human mind and its activities, for, as I tend to argue, it is 
the human factor (the human agency) that constitutes the nucleus of social action, combining 
in itself both culture (idealism) and structure (social structuralism). I thus approach the nation 
as ‘an imagined community’ (Benedict Anderson`s concept). According to Anderson, national 
communities are distinguished by the specific styles in which they are imagined, that is to say, 
in my understanding, the specific image of a national community is necessarily maintained by 
the symbolic (narrative) means of a culture. An imagined community, the nation is also a 
‘political community’ and a ‘form of politics’ at that (John Breuilly`s conception of 
nationalism), which links the phenomenon to the issue of power and the exercise thereof. I, 
for my part, choose to relate the issue of power to the struggle for the monopoly on the 
positions of dominance among those segments of society that find themselves in possession of 
economic, political, and not least cultural or symbolic capital (Pierre Bourdieu’s term), that 
is, among the elites. Following Liah Greenfeld`s understanding of the nature of social reality, 
I therefore argue that social action tends to be determined principally by the motivations of 
the relevant actors in power (in possession of capital), or, in other words, by the “persons 
who, by virtue of their strategic locations in large or otherwise pivotal organizations and 
movements, are able to affect political outcomes regularly and substantially.”655 To study the 
nation is therefore to identify the relevant actors, determine their motivations, and examine 
how these motivations are in turn shaped by the image of reality in the minds of the involved 
agents (their subjective ontological and axiological orientations). It is also similarly important 
to study the situational constraints in which the actors find themselves and which virtually 
force these power groups to adopt a particular course of action. By analyzing the structural 
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and cultural constraints (Greenfeld`s distinction) operant in the construction of nations (to 
attempt some kind of the ‘archeology of knowledge’), we might therefore identify the 
structural and ideological origins of a respective national identity (in this case, the identity of 
the United States).  
I therefore study the specific contexts of the US national identity. Following Howard Zinn`s 
research on the elites in colonial and post-revolutionary America as well as Greenfeld`s 
description of the structural phase in the process of nation building, I argue that the colonies` 
secession from the English center entailed structural changes in the social reality and resulted 
in the structural inconsistencies between the traditional organization of this reality and the 
non-canonical context of the day. The canonical image of social reality provided by the 
colonies` membership in the English nation thus guaranteed the status-quo configuration of 
power relations, thus legitimizing the elites` place in the social hierarchy (their identity) as 
indeed the colonial upper class. The structural change in the social reality resulted in the crisis 
of identity (status inconsistency) for these power groups (structurally manifested as ‘anomie’) 
and directly imperiled the status-quo power relations (the possession of all sorts of capital), 
guaranteed by this traditional identity. In my understanding, the elite groups thus sought to 
create a new ‘narrative of identity’ (Anderson`s term) for the nascent US American nation. 
This identity was to persuasively articulate the colonists` grievances inflicted by the British 
metropole and legitimize the colonies` dissent as canonical, and later unite the young nation 
into one (affectively binding) ideological consensus / one common image of social reality. 
Following Greenfeld`s discussion of the cultural phase in the project of nation-building, I 
therefore argue that the nascent US nation was already in possession of national identity 
which was the identity of the English nation. Curiously enough, in US America, national 
identity predated the formation of a unique American identity. Therefore, the narrative of the 
US national self could have been formulated in the only language that was native to the 
former colonists, that is, the language of English nationalism with its peculiar complex of 
beliefs and values. This language thus represented the cultural constraints from which the US 
national identity emerged.  
The American Thesis (Anatol Lieven`s term) therefore became the model and blueprint of 
thought and action as well as the common-sense image of social order for the US American 
nation, indeed, the dominant ‘principle of vision’ and its very identity. The central postulate 
of the Thesis is the idea of individual sovereignty, “the absolute sovereignty, self-government, 
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or independence of every individual,”656 and the ensuing “faith in liberty, constitutionalism, 
the law, democracy, individualism and cultural and political egalitarianism.”657 The Thesis 
thus binds the diverse nation of US America ideologically by effectively managing / 
habituating dissent from the canonical image of social reality (in the form of what Lieven 
calls the American Antithesis, the radically conservative strand within US nationalism) and 
ensuring the constancy of the practice of democracy in such moments of crisis (Robert 
Bellah`s ‘times of trial’) when the nation seems to have departed from its original identity.   
In my opinion, the astonishing ontological and affective power of the Thesis might be 
attributed to the fact that the Creed draws on a set of common national / cultural myths which 
allow to rationalize, legitimize, and ritualistically reenact the US national identity as defined 
by the Thesis. I thus ascribe the affectivity of mythic constructions to the fact that myth is 
inherently narrative in structure. Following Jerome Bruner`s argument, I attempted to 
demonstrate that the organization of experience narratively is innate / organic to the human 
mind.  Meaning (including social meaning) is thus achieved via narrative. Drawing on the 
work by Richard Hughes, I therefore argue that the meaning of the US national self is 
achieved via the most fundamental mythic narratives of US culture: the narratives of 
chosenness, naturalness and messianism/millennialism. These narratives depict US America 
as the nation whose ideological and institutional organization rests on the principles of the 
natural order of things as designed by God and first revealed at the dawn of creation. Nature`s 
nation, the United States is thus entrusted with the mission to “illumine the globe with truth, 
justice, goodness, and democratic self-government and […] thereby usher in a final golden 
age for all humankind.”658 Operating synergistically, these narratives in interaction with the 
principles of the Thesis make the narrative of the US national self. As Lieven believes, “[t]he 
American Creed, and the institutions which it underpins, are indeed the nation`s greatest glory 
and will be its greatest legacy after the United States itself has disappeared. The fruits of 
American [policies] may prove ambiguous or even disastrous in the long run; but the 
principles which have allowed masses of diverse people in an enormous land to live together 
and prosper without coercion will always have positive lessons to teach.”659 
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